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INTRODUCTION:  THE KANTIAN BRIDGE
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FEW scholars hav sriously considrd th ida that Kant’s philosophy may hav tis to Spinoza’s,1 and
fwr still hav considrd th possibility that thos tis may form th finrst anchorag points of a bridg
btwn Spinoza’s philosophy and Nitzsch’s. Howvr, it is wll known that Kant was on of th ky
contributors to Nitzsch’s philosophical dvlopmnt.2 If in turn Spinoza mad important contributions
to Kant’s dvlopmnt, thn Kant bcoms a potntial point of contact btwn Spinoza and Nitzsch.
Hr w will argu that th dirct influunc which Spinoza xrtd upon Kant’s philosophy has, in turn,
xrtd an indirct (but powrful) forc upon Nitzsch’s as wll; and th through lin of this influunc
can can b tracd back to Kant’s own mastrwork, th Critiqu of Pur Rason, and spcifincally to a part
of th Critiqu commonly rfrrd to as th Antinomis. Omri Bohm, whos work forms th backbon
of much of this ssay, dmonstrats convincingly that th Antinomis wr influuncd mor profoundly
by Spinoza than most Kant scholars hav vr dramd.
Howvr, bfor w continu on with our main argumnt, thr is a potntial snar to b addrssd:
Nitzsch likly nvr rad Kant’s finrst Critiqu  [Brobjr 2008, p.77].3 So th qustion ariss: If w hav
no good rason to bliv that Nitzsch had vr rad it, thn why should w bliv that th Critiqu,
or any part of it, had any ral influunc on Nitzsch’s thought – much lss that it conncts his thought
to Spinoza’s? The answr is this: although Nitzsch may not hav rad Kant, h rad voraciously about
him via scondary (gnrally No-Kantian)4 sourcs for xtndd priods of tim (a pattern which holds
tru rgarding Nitzsch’s xposur to Spinoza as wll).5 Theough th dtour through scondary litratur
will plac additional layrs of mdiation btwn Nitzsch and Spinoza, it prsrvs th viability of an
argumnt for a Kantian bridg btwn thm; so long as w can prov that th following points ar tru
rgarding ths scondary sourcs: a) important aspcts of Nitzsch’s thought wr dirctly impactd
by thm; b) thy wr thmslvs dirctly impactd by Kant’s original works; and c) th parts of Kant’s
original works that impactd thm ar th ons that wr wholly or partly formd undr th influunc of
Spinozism. It is fortunat, thn, that w know of at last on author whos works fulfinll all thr of ths
rquirmnts: Afrikan Spir.
Theat Spir impactd Nitzsch’s thought is common knowldg;6 in fact it’s Spir’s claim to fam. Spir
was a No-Kantian, influuncd most profoundly by th Critiqu of Pur Rason – though it is somtims
claimd in th litratur that h was influuncd by Spinoza as wll [Brobjr 2008, p.71]. (As of th tim of
this ssay’s compltion, I do not know of any litratur in any languag which attempts to substantiat th
rlationship btwn Spir and Spinoza; howvr thr ar crtain parallls in thir thinking which mak
Spinoza particularly usful as a guid to undrstanding Spir, as w shall s latr.) And most importantly
of all – for our purposs at last – w know that a cntral componnt of Spir’s philosophy was a dirct
rspons to a part of th Critiqu which w bliv (with good rason) was formd undr th influunc
of Spinozism: i.. th Antinomis. Spcifincally, Spir’s rading of Kant’s Antinomis lad him to conclud
that thr is a ‘fundamntal antinomy’ at th hart of all thought, and that as a rsult w can nvr hav
knowldg of th objcts w ncountr in th world. From Michal Grn, whos work forms th scond
half of our argumnt’s spin, w larn that Nitzsch had accptd th logic bhind Spir’s ‘fundamntal
antinomy,’ which h thn incorporatd into his own thinking. Theis allows us to mak sns of aspcts of
Nitzsch’s pistmology which hav frustratd intrprtrs sinc th dawn of Nitzsch scholarship –
such as his thory that all thought falsifins.
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And thus w discovr our through lin. Grn tracs th thrad from Nitzsch to Kant, and Bohm
tracs it from Kant to Spinoza. What w ar contributing hr is th missing link in btwn, th proof
that thr is no brak in th thrad. Theis antinomial through lin provs that Nitzsch was influuncd by
Spinoza via an indirct Kantian connction. It was Spir’s antinomial influunc that ld Nitzsch to adopt
his mtaphysical stanc, his mtaphysics of ‘radical Bcoming,’ which broadly aligns with th Antithsis
positions of th Antinomis. Theis is intriguing bcaus Spinozism also broadly aligns with th Antithsis
positions. If Nitzsch and his “prcursor” shar an antithtic alignmnt, thn Yovl’s famous claim that
Nitzsch saw Spinoza as a “gnalogical scandal” is dpnd and clarifind [cf. Yovl 2018]. Not only do
w finnd proof of ancstry, w finnd a gntic similarity that dos mor than mak it asir to compar and
contrast thm – it illustrats how Nitzsch’s thought dvlopd as a rsult of Spinoza’s lgacy, and why
h cam to b so similar to Spinoza in so many ways. (It also hlps to shd light on Nitzsch’s various and
contradictory rsponss to his “prcursor.”)7 For ths rasons (and othrs), it will b argud that Grn’s
and Bohm’s thoris ar not mrly compatibl, but in fact strngthn and support on anothr to such
a dgr that if w accpt th on, w ar complld to accpt th othr. In doing so w s that without
Spinoza, nithr Kant nor Spir nor Nitzsch could hav bcom who thy ar.
Theis ssay’s main argumnt is as follows: 1) Spinozism was th backbon of Kant’s Antinomis; and
Spinoza’s position (at last insofar as Kant undrstood it) was th modl upon which numrous antinomial
positions (particularly th Antithss) wr basd. 2) Spir was ld by th Antinomis to his own invntion
– th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ – which stats that all thought about th mpirical objcts in th world is
fals. 3) Nitzsch adoptd th logic bhind th ‘fundamntal antimony,’ but rjctd Spir’s conclusions.
As a rsult, h was lad to a mtaphysics of ‘radical Bcoming.’ 4) Nitzsch’s ‘radical Bcoming’ broadly
aligns with th Antithsis positions in gnral. 5) Spinoza’s mtaphysics broadly aligns with th Antithsis
positions in gnral [s 1]. 6) Thus, dspit drawing vry differnt mtaphysical conclusions, Nitzsch’s
and Spinoza’s mtaphysics also shar a grat many similaritis – all of which can b broadly dfinnd as
an “antithtic alignmnt” [s 4 & 5]. 7) Morovr, Nitzsch’s mtaphysics, to a signifincant dgr, is a
dscndant of Spinoza’s, in that it only xists as th rsult of Spinoza’s influunc through history – that
is, Spinoza’s influunc on th Antinomis, and on thos influuncd by th Antinomis [s 1, 2, & 3]. W
call this historical connction th “antinomial through lin.” 8) W conclud that Nitzsch’s thought is
signifincantly dfinnd by its rlation to Spinoza – philosophically and historically [s 6 & 7]. 
Theis ssay is dividd into two main sctions. The finrst dals xclusivly with Spinoza and Spinozism
in th Antinomis – for unlss this rlationship is finrmly stablishd, th antinomial through lin has no
foundation. The scond dals primarily with Nitzsch’s rlation to Spir, and Spir’s rlation to Kant. Theis
sction stablishs Nitzsch’s connction to th through lin, th antithtic alignmnt btwn him and
Spinoza, and th ramifincations which follow from it.
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WHILE it is widly known that Kant dsignd th Antinomis to atteack transcndntal ralism,9 Bohm
argus that th majority of Kant scholars hav missd a crucial dtail: Kant blivd th most consistnt
form of transcndntal ralism in xistnc was, in fact, Spinozism.10 From this fact, Bohm infrs that if
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Kant’s ambition in crafting th Antinomis was to atteack transcndntal ralism, thn surly his primary
targt would hav bn what h took to b th strongst rprsntativ of transcndntal ralism – which
was Spinoza [Bohm 2014, p.68-69]. Howvr, Bohm’s infrnc runs countr to th traditional rading
of th Antinomis, which has it that, in ach cas of Antinomy, a Nwtonian position is pitted against a
Libnizian position (and Spinozism has nothing to do with it). As Bohm dmonstrats, this viw suffers
from a numbr of inconsistncis which his dos not; not last of which is that non of th positions in
th Antinomis, whn carfully analyzd, appar to b particularly Libnizian or Nwtonian. Yt many
bar a striking rsmblanc to Spinoza’s position. Furthrmor, Kant’s xplicit rfrncs to Spinoza and
Spinozism appar to indicat not only that Kant blivd Spinoza to b mor consistnt than most othr
transcndntal ralists, but that many of thm (.g. Libniz) actually collaps into Spinozism whn thy
ar xamind honstly. In addition, on svral occasions Kant xplicitly associats Spinozism with his
own concptions, svral of which play a ky rol in Kant’s mtaphysical thought – within and byond
th Antinomis. Therfor, th Spinozistic rading of th Antinomis advancd by Bohm is most likly
th corrct on.
But bfor w continu on, thr is anothr potntial snar that w must addrss: th Spinozism of
Spinoza, whn proprly construd, actually scaps th Antinomis [Bohm 2014, p.78, 92-94]. Spinoza
scaps bcaus Kant’s rfutation “rlis on th claim that an infinnit totum synthticum is impossibl”
[Bohm 2014, p.93]. The phras “infinnit totum synthticum ” mans th synthsis of an infinnit numbr
of discrt ‘parts’ into a complt ‘whol.’ But, as Bohm points out, “th ntitis xprssing Spinoza’s
substanc ar not numrically distinct from it”; thrfor, “[Spinoza’s] substanc is simpl” [ibid., p.92].
In othr words, thr ar no ‘parts’ in th Spinozistic concption substanc, only infinnitly many mods
(or “modifincations” of th whol). Theus, Spinoza’s position “is immun to Kant’s Antinomy” [ibid., p.93].
Howvr, ths aspcts of Spinoza’s argumnt wr not rcognizd by commntators in Kant’s day. Both
Wolffe and Mndlssohn, in thir own attempts to rfut Spinozism, mployd th sam argumnt Kant
dos in th Antinomis (i.. th impossibility of an infinnit succssiv synthsis) [ibid., ch.2, n.39]. Theus,
it can b argud that Kant’s atteacks against Spinozism wr informd by th way it was undrstood in
his day – and undrstandably containd many of th sam fluaws. (Latr in his carr, Kant himslf may
hav com to undrstand th insufficcincy of this rading (V-MP-K2/Hinz AA 28:713) [ibid.].)  Som
may b inclind to doubt our cas on account of ths fluaws – taking thm as a sign that Kant could not
hav bn knowldgabl nough about Spinoza to b maningfully rlatd to his philosophy. W, on th
othr hand, argu that sinc th Antinomis do succd in undrmining th way Spinoza’s position was
rad in his day [ibid.], w cannot rul out that Kant was any lss knowldgabl of Spinozism than Wolffe
and Mndlssohn wr. Morovr, Kant blivd that Libniz, Wolffe and Mndlssohn all collapsd into
Spinozism (as w shall s latr). Theis implis that Kant would not hav bn inclind to copy and past
thir rfutations of Spinozism (sinc thy invitably collapsd into it). A btter supposition would b that
Kant was activly trying to build upon and surpass thir rfutations of Spinoza’s position.
Ther ar svral mor complications to addrss – most with rgard to Kant’s xplicit rfrncs to
“Spinozism.” Much of Bohm’s argumnt hings upon ths rfrncs,11 but it is a matter of contntion
whthr thy ar applicabl to th Antinomis at all. For thy wr all written post-Panthismusstrit –
th famous controvrsy which ruptd whn Jacobi accusd svral prominnt thinkrs of Spinozism (and
cam clos to naming Kant as on of thm) – wll aftr Kant’s finrst Critiqu was publishd. Morovr, it
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is traditionally hld that Kant was ignorant of Spinozism prior to th outbrak of th Strit. And vn if
Kant was familiar with Spinoza bfor thn, som may ask why, if Spinoza had such a grat impact on th
Critiqu, dos Kant not mntion him anywhr in it? Aftr all, h xplicitly mntions almost vry nam
in th philosophical canon in th Critiqu [cf. Bohm 2018, p.483-485]. Why would h choos to lav out
Spinoza, if Spinoza was indd so rlvant? Additionally, in th passags whr Kant dos spak xplicitly
of Spinozism, his argumnts ar oftn nithr laborat nor dtaild [Bohm 2014, p.85]. As such, som
may b skptical about Kant’s sriousnss in ths passags; ar thy indd his considrd viw [ibid.]?
Eithr way, w must b mindful of Bohm’s warning that Kant’s xplicit rfrncs to Spinozism “must b
xamind with car,” lst thir tru rlvanc b misconstrud [Bohm 2018, p.485].
Toward ths numrous nds, w will advanc th following thr points: A) dspit nvr xplicitly
invoking “Spinozism” in th Antinomis, th vidnc suggsts that Kant hld Spinoza is his mind as h
wrot ky parts of th Antinomis; and that h had consciously ruld out any transcndntal ralist altr-
nativ to Spinoza. B) th finrst thr Antithss rsmbl Spinoza’s position to such a dgr that it sms
implausibl to ascrib thm to any othr thinkr; and th fourth Antinomy’s Thesis sms to rul out all
othr transcndntal ralist altrnativs to Spinozism as cosmologically invalid. C) it is highly plausibl
that Kant was familiar with Spinoza and Spinozism bfor h wrot th Critiqu’s Antinomis, and his
dcision to lav all mntion of “Spinozism” out of th finrst Critiqu was likly motivatd by politics. If
w can dfnd ths points, thn w can justify our main argumnt’s finrst claim – that “Spinozism was th
backbon of Kant’s Antinomis, and Spinoza’s position itslf […] was th modl upon which numrous
antinomial positions […] wr basd” – th claim upon which th antinomial through lin rsts.
I-A.  Groundwork for th Mtaphysics of th Antinomis: Spinoza as “Antithtic Rprsntativ”
THE finrst plac w can finnd vidnc that Kant had Spinoza in mind as h wrot th Antinomis is in his
undrstanding of Epicurus. Epicurus is rlvant to Kant’s viw of Spinoza bcaus, immdiatly aftr h
xplicitly associats Epicurus’ position with Spinoza’s, h argus that Spinoza is th mor consistnt of th
two (KU AA 5:393) [Bohm 2014, ch.2, n.18]. Elswhr, Kant would associat th Thesis positions with
Plato, and th Antithsis positions with Epicurus (A471/B499) [ibid.]. It thrfor follows that if th Anti-
thsis positions ar associatd with Epicurus, and Epicurus is associatd with Spinoza, thn Spinoza must
b associatd with th Antithsis positions as wll – at last to a crtain dgr. And, if w ar corrct in
assuming that Kant would b inclind to atteack th strongst possibl rprsntativs of transcndntal
ralism, thn it would stand to rason that Kant must hav had Spinoza in mind as h wrot th Antithsis
positions, rathr than Epicurus – whom Kant thought to b a lss consistnt Spinozist. (As for th rason
why Kant would choos to publicly say “Epicurus” whn h privatly thought “Spinoza,” in I-C. w will
dmonstrat that Kant had good rason to b indirct whr Spinoza was concrnd.) Furthrmor, Kant
stats that at th hart of th Antithss is a principl of “pur mpiricism”12 (A465f/B493f). In Bohm’s
words, “Theis [‘pur mpiricist’] principl […] is that of granting only philosophical knowldg acquird
by naturalistic principls; that is, by th standard of ‘possibl xprinc’ (A468/B496). Mor spcifincally,
‘pur mpiricism’ consists in an ovrriding accptanc of a mchanism of natur: in th Antithss, only
mchanistic-natural xplanations ar sn as lgitimat” [Bohm 2014, p.86]. Theis notion is thn tid to
Epicurus whn Kant idntifins him with th mpiricism of th Antithsis positions (A471/B499) [Bohm
2014, p.86-87; ch.2, n.28]. If our argumnt is on th right track, thn on should xpct – on account of
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Kant’s association of Epicurus with Spinoza, and th logical dduction that Spinoza is thrby associatd
with th Antithss – that Kant would hav associatd “pur mpiricism” with Spinoza as wll; which is
ntirly plausibl. For although Spinoza is not what w would call an mpiricist, whn w compar him
to Kant's notion of “pur mpiricism,” Spinoza is a good match. The ncssitarianism of Spinoza’s pictur
of th univrs [E1app; E2p48-49], and his insistnc that th “natural light” of mpirical xprinc and
rason is th only sourc and critria of truth [TTP, ch.2, §70-94], both fint nicly with this notion. Equally
notabl is that Libniz, who is traditionally associatd with th Antithss, dos not match Kant’s notion
at all [ibid.].13 Theus, Spinoza is alrady a strong candidat to rprsnt th Antithss.
Scond, thr is good rason to bliv Kant is in agrmnt with commntators who argu that
many transcndntal ralists (.g., Wolffe, Libniz, Mndlssohn, tc.) ultimatly collaps into Spinozism
whn analyzd carfully.14 In fact, Kant dismisss vital aspcts of thir mtaphysical stratgy to prvnt
such a collaps – spcifincally, th attempt to rlativiz spac and tim by viwing thm as proprtis of
things – as arbitrary and inconsistnt.15 “Towards th scond Critiqu’s conclusion [cf. KpV AA 5:102],”
Bohm says, “[Kant] addrsss th Libnizian-Wolffican dnial of th world’s infinnity and trnity16 – in
fact, h rfrs to th Libnizian dnial of Spinozism – and rjcts it as inadquat. Whovr rlativizs
spac and tim by viwing thm as proprtis of things (monads), Kant argus, cannot gnuinly avoid
afficrming th world’s infinnity and trnity” [ibid., p.82 (my italics)]. In th sam passag, Kant gos vn
furthr by insisting that “if th idality of spac and tim [i.. Kant’s own transcndntal idalist viw]
is not adoptd, nothing rmains but Spinozism, in which spac and tim ar ssntial dtrminations of
th original [i.. unconditiond] bing itslf, whil th things dpndnt upon it [i.. conditiond bings]
[…] ar mrly accidnts inhring in it. Theus Spinozism […] argus mor consistntly than th cration
thory17 can, whn bings assumd to b substancs and in thmslvs xisting in tim ar rgardd as
ffects of a suprm caus and yt not blonging to him and his action as substancs thmslvs” (KpV
AA 5:102 [my italics]) [ibid., p.83]. Kant’s sriousnss about ths claims bcoms clar in Lcturs on
Mtaphysics, whr h argus that “[i]f w tak spac as ral, w accpt Spinoza’s systm” [V-MP/Dohna
(AA 28:103)]; and lswhr, in an vn mor tlling passag: “Theos who tak spac as a thing in itslf
or as a proprty of things ar forcd to b Spinozists” (V-MP-K3E/Arnoldt AA 29:132 {my italics}; cf. AA
29:65f.) [ibid., 84-85]. Although ths claims do not rul out th possibility that Mndlssohn, Wolffe, or
Libniz [tc.] wr signifincant influuncs on th Antinomis, thy ffectivly rul thm out as potntial
rprsntativs for th various positions within th Antinomis. If, in Kant’s mind, most transcndntal
ralists collapsd into Spinozism, thn Spinozism in gnral must hav bn what Kant had in mind as
h dsignd th Antinomis. Morovr, sinc Kant smd to think Spinoza mor consistnt than othr
Spinozists, it stands to rason that whn Kant thought of Spinozism in gnral, h would hav focusd on
Spinoza in particular – spcially rgarding th Antithss. Not only dos this furthr strngthn th via-
bility of Spinoza as Antithtic rprsntativ, it signifincantly narrows th pool of comptitors.
Theird, whn Kant is stteing up th Antinomis, his dscriptions of th “unconditiond” do show, at
tims, som rmarkabl similaritis to Spinozistic mtaphysics. In Kant’s words: “The unconditiond may
b concivd in ithr of two ways. It may b viwd as [A1 ] consisting of th ntir sris in which all
th mmbrs without xcption ar conditiond and only th totality of thm is absolutly unconditiond.
Theis rgrss is to b ntitld infinnit. Or altrnativly, [A2 ] th absolutly unconditiond is only a part of
th sris – of which th othr mmbrs ar subordinatd, and which dos not itslf stand undr any othr
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condition” (A417/B445).18 As Bohm xplains, “The formr [which is markd A1] is an infinnitistic concp-
tion and th latter [which is markd A2] is a finnitistic on. The clash btwn thm gnrats th Antin-
omis. A1 thus maps onto th Antithsis […]. Kant xplains that it liminats th possibility of a transcn-
dnt unconditiond (hnc th Judo-Christian dity), cration, and frdom. A2 maps onto th Thesis: it
rlis on an unconditiond ntity to which th sris is subordinatd, and it allows room for cration […]
and frdom […] (A418/B445-6)” [Bohm 2014, p.77]. Bohm continus, arguing that th A1 concption
strongly suggsts Spinozism, for “[t]h infinnit sris itslf, considrd as a totality may b concivd as
Spinoza’s unconditiond substanc, whras th sris’s conditiond mmbrs may b concivd as its
mods. […] It is infinnit and yt th On” [ibid]. (Theis imprssion is furthr strngthnd if w compar A1
to th Idal of Pur Rason [ibid., p.78] – which is both vry similar to [A575/B603] and xplicitly asso-
ciatd with [FM AA 20:302] Spinozism – and s that th two concpts paralll ach othr {s subsction
I-C }.) Onc again, not only is Spinoza a strong candidat, it is difficcult to think of many othrs who would
vn qualify: “Giordano Bruno may hav hld an analogous panthistic concption, but Libniz and Wolffe
crtainly did not.19 It can safly b assumd that Kant ithr has Spinoza in mind, or h invnts Spinozistic
substanc monism indpndntly – construing it as th Antithsis’s cosmological concption” [ibid., p.77-
78]. Givn what w hav said so far – that Spinoza is rlatd (via Epicurus) to th Antithsis positions and
th notion of “pur mpiricism” (which Kant claims is at th hart of th Antithss) – it sms safr to
assum that Kant did not mrly invnt a kind of Spinozistic substanc monism, but rathr h had Spino-
zism in mind as h concivd of A1. And, givn that Kant blivd a) that many compting transcndntal
ralist positions (.g. Libniz, Wolffe, Mndlssohn) invitably collapsd into Spinozism, and b) that Epicur-
us (his givn rprsntativ of th Antithsis positions) was a lss consistnt rlativ of Spinoza, th pool
of altrnativs to Spinoza himslf (vn among thos whom Kant considrd to b Spinozists) was at bst
rathr small.
Mor and mor it sms as if Spinoza is not just a big finsh in a small pond – h’s also th only finsh in
that pond. Of cours Spinoza was far from th only influunc on th Antinomis – or thir only targt.
Yt th mor Spinoza provs to b a prfct (or nar prfct) fint as rprsntativ for numrous (usually
Antithsis) positions within th Antinomis, th mor his potntial comptitors for thos rols prov to
b ill fintteing. Som might b inclind to ask: Why should w suppos that th positions in th Antinomis
hav actual, historical rprsntativs at all? “The answr” Bohm xplains, “is that Kant has a somwhat
historical – albit pr-Hglian – concption of rason’s dvlopmnt” [Bohm 2014, ch.2, n.9]. In othr
words, Kant did not bliv that atteacking abstract idas of his own dsign was sufficcint to prov that his
own position, transcndntal idalism, was th suprior altrnativ. “In ordr to argu that rason ncs-
sarily lads to contradictions, Kant [blivs that h] nds to b abl to show that th Antinomis, which
h constructs abstractly, can b mappd onto actual (historical) positions—i.., hav actually confusd mta-
physical thought” [ibid.]. Therfor, as Kant wrot ach Antithsis position, h would hav bn thinking
of an actual prson. Rcall that Spinoza is a good fint for th “pur mpiricism” and A1 concptions which
undrli th Antithsis positions, and that Kant smd to b consciously ruling out all othr candidats.
It should b plain that w ar bing pulld from both dirctions toward accpting that Kant was thinking
of Spinoza as h wrot th Antithss.
With th fact of Kant’s  dlibrat  considration of Spinoza and Spinozism as h was writing th
Antinomis sufficcintly stablishd, w can mov on to th Antinomis thmslvs. Sinc w now hav
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vidnc that Kant was indd thinking of thm at th sam tim, w can assrt with confindnc that any
prcptibl similaritis btwn Spinoza/Spinozism and th actual antinomial argumnts ar not mrly
coincidntal. Rathr, thy ar thr by dsign. As w shall s momntarily, th similaritis btwn th
A1-antithtic positions and Spinoza’s position ar impossibl to ignor.
I-B1.  The Spinozism of th Antinomis: First Antinomy
“THE finrst Antinomy dbats th world’s bginning in spac and tim. The Thesis stats that th world has
a bginning in tim and spac: ‘The world has a bginning in tim, and is also limitd as rgards spac’
(A427/B455)” [Bohm 2014, p.71]. As Bohm continus: “The Antithsis stats that th world has no bgin-
ning and is infinnit: ‘The world has no bginning, and no limits in spac; it is infinnit as rgards both tim
and spac’ (A427/B455)” [ibid., p.72]. Bginning with th Thesis, it atteacks th Antithsis on th grounds
that th notion of a complt infinnity is inconsistnt [ibid.]. By a “complt infinnity,” w man that in th
sns of a sris compltd through succssiv synthsis. The asist analogy that I know of is to Hilbrt’s
Infinnit Hotl. If w imagin a hotl with infinnitly many rooms, thn it can always hold mor popl –
vn if all th rooms ar alrady “full.” By simply asking vryon who is alrady in a room to mov on
door down, an infinnit numbr of rooms ar mad vacant. Theis can b don an infinnit numbr of tims,
in an infinnit numbr of ways (by asking vryon to mov two doors down, thr doors down, and so on,
tc.) [Stwart 2017, p.11-12, 16-18]. Similarly, with a concption of rality that is infinnitistic [.g. A1], no
cosmological sris could vr b “compltd” through succssiv synthsis; for th numbr of “rooms” w
nd to finll will always b infinnit, vn if th sris is alrady “full.”20 In th finld of mathmatics, prhaps,
a concption of this sort is prmissibl – but in th finld of mtaphysics, it is simply absurd.21
The Antithsis rsponds with a countratteack, which is basd on Libniz’s countr-argumnt from th
PSR22 against Nwton’s concption of mpty containrs23 [ibid., p.72-73]. (W rpat, our position is not
that Libniz, Nwton, or a grat many othrs hav not in any way influuncd th Antinomis – only that
a. Spinoza xrtd a gratr influunc than thy did; and b. non of thm ar good rprsntativs of any
position within th Antinomis, whras Spinoza is for svral. W will dmonstrat ths points again
shortly.) The Antithsis’s argumnt may b thought of as a variant of th “nothing coms from nothing”
argumnt. If th world did hav a bginning in tim, thn thr must hav bn a point in tim in which
nothing xistd – a point in which th ntir univrs rsmbld Nwton’s ‘mpty containrs.’ Yt, undr
such conditions, th univrs could hav nvr com to b. Evn if you postulat an all powrful God who
can crat somthing from nothing, you still could not xplain how or why cration occurrd in th finrst
plac; bcaus, according to th PSR (and as a transcndntal ralist position, th Thesis must accpt th
PSR), vrything that happns must happn as th rsult of som rason, caus or ground. In a univrs
that is compltly mpty, thr ar no rasons, causs, or grounds. Evn an all powrful God would not
hav any sufficcint rason to crat th univrs at on particular momnt as opposd to any othr. Theus,
th Thesis can provid no xplanation for th why or th how bhind th world’s cration [ibid.]. And with
that, both Thesis and Antithsis collaps into slf-contradiction.
Sadiq Al Azm, in his widly influuntial rading of th Antinomis,24 assigns Libniz to th Antithsis
position and Nwton to th Thesis. Aftr all, Nwton did mbrac th notion of ‘mpty containrs’ and
rjct th world’s infinnity. As w said abov, th Antithtical argumnt against th cration of th world
is vry similar to Libniz’s rfutation of Nwton’s mpty containrs, and was likly drawn from Libniz.
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Howvr, it must b notd that “th Antithsis is committed to two propositions, not only on. It dnis
a bginning to th world in (mpty) tim and spac, and it stats that th world is infinnit” [Bohm 2014,
p.73-74]. Theis maks it impossibl to wholly ascrib th Antithsis position to Libniz, bcaus Libniz –
lik most dogmatic rationalists – rjctd th world’s infinnity. Lik Dscarts, Libniz rsrvd infinnity for
God alon, who is prfct and absolut. The world itslf is mrly indfinnit25 (although Libniz was not
quit as carful about maintaining this distinction as Dscarts was) [ibid., p.74]. “According to Libniz,”
Bohm xplains, “th xistnc of infinnit whols contradicts th whol-part axiom,26 which stats that a
whol must b largr than its part. If it xistd, an infinnit whol would admit to having an infinnit part
that is just as larg as th whol itslf (both bing infinnit)” [Bohm 2014, p.74]. (For Libniz, only God
may b an infinnit whol without contradicting th whol-part axiom – bcaus God, Libniz rasond,
must b simpl, whras th world is complx and mad of parts.)27 Kant, a radr of Libniz and Wolffe,
was awar of th infinnit/indfinnit distinction. Hnc in his finrst Critiqu, Kant argus that vn though
th infinnit/indfinnit distinction is an mpty ‘Subtilität’ in mathmatics and gomtry, it still has crucial
mtaphysical implications (A511-5/B369-43) – and th Antinomis ar without a doubt concrnd with
mtaphysics [ibid., p.75]. Therfor, as Bohm argus, “th fact that th finrst Antinomy stats th world’s
infinnity rathr than its indfinnitnss is crucial” [ibid.]. W ar forcd to rcogniz that “dspit proving
a Libnizian argumnt from th PSR,” th finrst Antinomy’s Antithsis still “dos not arriv at a Libnizian
conclusion” [ibid., p.76]. Instad, it arrivs at th Spinozistic conclusion that th world is both infinnit and
trnal [ibid., p.82]. (In fact, though Libniz dnis that th univrs could hav bn cratd in an mpty
containr, h still afficrms cration [ibid., p.70, 74].). Al Azm cannot b corrct in ascribing Libnizianism
to th Antithsis position.
Attempts to associat Libniz with th Thesis position28 far btter, for h dos assnt to thoris of
cration and frdom – which would align him with th third Antinomy’s Thesis as wll – and h dnis
that th world is infinnit [Bohm 2014, p.70]. Howvr, that is not nough to plac th Thesis position in
Libniz’s camp. For th viw that th world is not infinnit and has a bginning was common to dogmatic
rationalists. Dscarts, Nwton, and Libniz (among othrs) all shard this viw [ibid., p.80]. Morovr,
Al Azm is corrct in dtcting mor spcifincally Libnizian chos in th Antithsis position than in th
Thesis; dspit th fact that it afficrms conclusions which ar th opposit of his own [ibid., p.81]. Al Azm’s
intrprtation of th Thesis position as Nwtonian is not dfinnitiv ithr. For vn though Nwton dos
argu against th world’s infinnity (as most transcndntal ralists did), his actual argumnt has nothing
to do with an infinnit totum synthticum or succssiv synthsis. Rathr, it “appals to th dfinnition of
matter in Nwtonian physics, and, as such, has nothing to do with th argumnt invokd by th Thesis”
[ibid., p.80]. Theat Libnizian and Nwtonian strands can b found in th Antinomial positions nd not
(and at tims, cannot) b disputd. Still, this has crtainly ld to discrpancis and gnral confusion in
th scondary litratur about th Antinomis [ibid., p.81] – with contradictory mtaphysical positions
(“thr is a bginning of th world,” “thr is non”) oftn bing ascribd to th sam philosophr, and
an abundanc of opposit intrprtations which appar qually prsuasiv [ibid., p.70]. The solution to
this confusion could vry wll b th ky to undrstanding th Antinomis [ibid., p.81].
To that nd, it is worth noting as Bohm dos that thr “is only on rlvant rationalist thinkr
who has a good rason to insist, as th Antithsis dos, that th world is positivly infinnit,” i.. Spinoza
[Bohm 2014, p.80]. Spinoza also insists that th world is trnal and has no bginning in tim. Both of
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ths position, as w hav said abov, wr uncommon amongst transcndntal ralists. Onc again, w
ar lft in a position whr Spinoza sms to b a strong comptitor with no rivals. Add to this what w
hav argud abov rgarding th A1 concption which maps onto th Antithss – its grat similarity to
and association with Spinoza/Spinozism – and our cas appars vn mor conclusiv, without th many
contradictions which bst othr radings. 
I-B2.  The Spinozism of th Antinomis: Theird Antinomy 29
BEFORE w continu on to th third Antinomy itslf, it is worth noting, as Bohm dos, that th third
Antinomy is “systmatically rlatd to th finrst […]. Kant xplains that ‘if you do not, as rgards tim,
admit anything as bing mathmatically finrst in th world’” – that is, as th ‘finrst caus’ of th world, as
is rquird by cration thoris – “‘thn thr is no ncssity as rgards causality to sk for somthing
that is dynamically [causally] finrst’ (A449/B477). Theus whovr sids with th finrst Thesis,” which dals
with cration, “will also sid with th Thesis of th third,” which dals with causality; “whil thos who
sid with th finrst Antithsis […] will also sid with th Antithsis of th third” [Bohm 2018, p.487]. In
brif, Kant blivs that a cosmology’s viw of cration has important implications for that cosmology’s
viw of causality – and, as a rsult, that cosmology’s viw of frdom – such that th cosmologis of th
Thesis positions from various cass of Antinomy should agr with ach othr. Theis principl is also tru
with rgard to th Antithss. As such, if Libniz was alignd with th Antithsis of th finrst Antinomy,
as Al Azm postulats, thn h should also align with Antithsis of th third. If, howvr, h has mor in
common with th Thesis of th finrst, as w postulat, thn h should also hav mor in common with th
Thesis of th third. The sam holds tru for Spinoza.
 As Bohm xplains, “The third Antinomy dals with th problm of causality and frdom. The
Thesis maintains that thr ar two typs of causality – that of ‘natur,’ whrby worldly vnts follow
ncssarily from antcdnt stats; and that of ‘frdom,’ whrby vnts occur through a powr ‘of
gnrating a stat spontanously.’ The Antithsis argus in opposition to this that thr is only on typ
of causality ‘in accordanc with th laws of natur’ (A444/B472). On th Antithsis viw, vry worldly
vnt ncssarily follows from th cosmos’s prcding stat. The ida of frdom is thrfor an illusion,
an ‘mpty thought ntity’ (A445/B473)” [Bohm 2018, p.486-487]. Rcall now what w said abov: if it
is tru that Libniz is alignd with th finrst Antithsis, thn it should also b tru that h aligns with th
third and dnis fr will. And yt, Libniz afficrms fr will [ibid., p.491]. Spinoza is th on who dnis
frdom of th will (or th ‘causality of frdom’ as th Thesis puts it) – whil also afficrming th world’s
infinnity and trnality. Therfor, it is Spinoza who is likly to b Kant’s rprsntativ for th Antithsis
position – not Libniz.
The cor of th third Thesis argumnt is that “th law of natur consists just in this, that nothing
happns without a caus sufficcintly (hinrichnd ) dtrmind a priori” [Bohm 2018, p.489]. Not that
Kant’s usag of ‘dtrmind a priori’ dos not carry its usual maning of ‘indpndnc of xprinc.’
Rathr, h is using it in th traditional sns of ‘in advanc of,’ or ‘prior to’ [ibid.]. Therfor, what th
Thesis mans by ‘natural causality’ is ‘mchanistic causality,’ whrby all things ar undrstood by thir
caus/antcdnt vnt [ibid.]. The Thesis atteacks th Antithsis on th grounds that, “[h]ad thr bn
only natural causality, no xplanation would b ultimat or complt” du to infinnit rgrss [ibid.]. The
rason why natural causality lads invitably to infinnit rgrss is this: if vrything is undrstood by an
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antcdnt vnt (i.. a caus), thn vry caus rquirs its own caus, which, in turn, rquirs a caus,
and so on, ad infinnitum. Theis crats an ‘infinnit sris,’ which fails by th sam rasoning mployd by
th Thesis in th finrst Antinomy. The notion of a “complt infinnity” or an “infinnit totum synthticum”
is by Kant’s lights as mtaphysically inconsistnt as th notion of an “Infinnit Hotl” bing “full” (A431-
33/B459-61). The Thesis thrfor provs that th Antithsis violats its own dmand that “nothing can
happn without bing sufficcintly antcdntly dtrmind” [ibid.]. (In othr words, th Thesis is accusing
th Antithsis position of violating th PSR.) The Thesis thrfor concluds that rality cannot b wholly
xplaind through ‘natural’ causality. 
The hart of th Antithsis’s argumnt is what Kant rfrs to as th “unity of xprinc,” which
prsupposs “that vry chang must b connctd to th antcdnt stat of th changing agnt” [ibid.,
p.493]. For if thr was a chang in th agnt – such as an action – and this chang was not connctd to
th agnt’s antcdnt stats, thn th agnt could nvr xprinc th caus of this chang. By Kant’s
lights, any concpt which can nvr b mt with in xprinc is nothing mor than an “mpty thought
ntity” [ibid.] – a form with no contnt. From this starting point, th Antithsis argus that in ordr for
an action to b “spontanous” (i.. not xplaind through mchanical causality), thn it would hav to b
th ‘finrst caus’ of its own chain of vnts [ibid., p.492]. Of cours, this ‘spontanous finrst caus’ must in
turn hav its own ‘finrst caus,’ its own “absolut bginning” [ibid.]. Theis “absolut bginning” is usually
calld th agnt’s ‘fr will.’  Howvr, this ‘fr will’ cannot rsid in th agnt’s antcdnt stats; for
if it did, it would b a part of th pr-xisting sris, and that would plac it undr natural causality. Yt if
it is not connctd to th agnt’s antcdnt stats, thn th ‘fr will’ ncssarily violats th “unity of
xprinc” [ibid., p.493]. In othr words, th agnt could nvr xprinc th ‘fr will’ from which thir
“spontanous” actions supposdly spring. Therfor, th Antithsis provs that th ‘fr will’ (or ‘causality
of frdom’) which th Thesis viw postulats is a mr “mpty thought ntity.” Onc again, both Thesis
and Antithsis crumbl into slf-contradiction.
It is tru that Kant’s notion of th “unity of xprinc” has no paralll in Spinoza’s thought; and, as
Bohm nots, “Kant’s trminology of ‘xprinc’ voks transcndntal idalism and, to that xtnt, is
unfortunat” – at last as far as our argumnt is concrnd [Bohm 2018, p.493]. “Howvr,” as Bohm
continus, “th [Antithsis] argumnt itslf is carrid out from a position of transcndntal ralism and
is not circular” [ibid.]. In othr words, th cor concit of th Antinomis is that both positions (th Thesis
and Antithsis) ar rprsntations of transcndntal ralist positions – not th Kantian idalist position.
Kant’s ntir purpos in th Antinomis is to prov that th rationalist projct is fundamntally fluawd by
dmonstrating that it will invitably rsult in irrconcilabl oppositions. As such, vn though Kant uss
trminology which is vocativ of his own position (i.., th “unity of xprinc”), w must assum that
th cor of th third Antithsis is not drivd from “Kant’s Scond Analogy of Exprinc (which would
b th PSR’s transcndntal idalist vrsion) but th PSR” [ibid., p.494]. Put anothr way, th cor of th
Antithsis’s argumnt “follows from th claim that thr ar no brut facts: th abrupt mrgnc of an
vnt [.g. a ‘spontanous’ action], a suddn bginning which is not connctd to th prvious stat of th
‘not yt acting caus,’ is just a brut fact. […] (Put simply, th Antithsis’s dnial of frdom dos not d-
pnd on th claim that frdom violats th ‘unity of xprinc.’ It dpnds on frdom violating th PSR)”
[ibid., p.494]. Theis rading maks th most sns, both for th rasons givn abov, and bcaus – by its
lights – Kant is arguing against mor than two transcndntal ralist concptions of causality; h is arg-
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uing against accpting th PSR as a transcndntally ral principl. If Kant can dmonstrat that th PSR
itslf – if it is takn to b transcndntally ral – would forc us to both accpt and rjct fr will, h can
undrmin th cor of transcndntal ralism rathr than two vstigial vrsions of it.
The cntrality of th PSR to th Antithss maks it vn mor important to not that “Libniz dos
not offer an argumnt from th PSR against frdom: in contrast to th third Antithsis h argus that
frdom and th PSR ar compatibl, vn complimntary” [ibid. p.488]. (In fact, th argumnt that th
Thesis uss to atteack th Antithsis – i.., th rcurring charg that an infinnit sris could nvr offer a
complt xplanation – is rminiscnt of th Wolffican-Libnizian rfutation of Spinozism.) It is Spinoza
and not Libniz who “xcluds frdom by an argumnt from th PSR” [ibid., p.494] – a fact Kant sms
to b awar of. “In th Critiqu of Practical Rason,” Bohm argus, “[Kant] writs that th Libnizians
prtnd to prsrv room for frdom by taking spac and tim as proprtis of finnit bings but not of
God” [ibid., p.494] – a position that h blivd must invitably collaps into Spinozistic fatalism [ibid.]
(s subsction I-A). In short, Kant was wll awar of th Spinozistic and Libnizian positions rgarding
frdom. Theus it implausibl to claim that Kant could hav had Libniz rathr than Spinoza in mind as h
dsignd th third Antithsis. In brif, not only is Spinoza’s viw of frdom similar to th third Antithsis,
Kant was fully awar of Spinoza’s viw as h wrot it – so w hav twic as many rasons to bliv that
th third Antithsis was written to b a Spinozist position.
I-B3.  The Spinozism of th Antinomis: Fourth Antinomy
JUST as th third Antinomy is systmatically connctd to th finrst, th fourth Antinomy – “which dals
with th (non-) xistnc of a ncssary bing” – is systmatically connctd to th third. “Theis is du to
th fact that thy draw on similar cosmological (finrst caus) argumnts” [Bohm 2018, p.487]. Norman
Kmp Smith corroborats Bohm’s claim, writing that “Kant’s proof of frdom in th thsis of th third
antinomy is mrly a corollary from his proof [in th fourth Thesis] of th xistnc of a cosmological or
thological unconditiond” [Kmp Smith 1918, p.497]. Howvr, th fourth Antinomy cannot b rlatd
to th third in xactly th sam way that th third Antinomy is rlatd to th finrst – maning w cannot
xpct to finnd that Spinozism aligns with th Antithsis whil Libnizianism shars commonalitis with
th Thesis – bcaus th fourth braks th gnral pattern of aligning th Thesis and Antithsis with th
A2 and A1 concptions [rspctivly]. Yt, as w will dmonstrat shortly, th A1 and A2 concptions
do onc again appar opposit ach othr in th fourth Antinomy – this tim togthr undr th Thesis
position. Theus Spinozism dos still, in an important sns, align with th sam position as bfor (i.., A1).
The validity of Bohm’s thory (and, by xtnsion, th foundation of our Kantian bridg) dpnds upon
our ability to prov that this is indd th cas. (Th rason for this dviation from th gnral pattern will
b xamind in subsction I-D.)
“The fourth Antinomy rvolvs around th qustion of th xistnc of an unconditiond bing,”
Bohm continus. “The Thesis stats, ‘thr blongs to th world, ithr as its parts or its caus, a bing
that is absolutly ncssary’ (A452/B480). The Antithsis stats, ‘An absolutly ncssary bing nowhr
xists in th world as its caus’ (A453/B481). […] The argumnt for th Thesis sms to hav hav two
main stags. The finrst stablishs th xistnc of an unconditiond bing by a cosmological argumnt”
[Bohm 2012, p.32]. To put th argumnt brifluy: transcndntal ralists, committed as thy ar to th PSR,
ar forcd to mak th two following assumptions. First, vrything in xistnc must b xplaind by its
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caus (i.., its antcdnt stat) as pr th third Antinomy. If vry caus must itslf hav a caus, thn all
causs (and ffects) must b thought of as part of on causal sris. Therfor, all xisting things must b
xplaind through thir placmnt in that sris. Scond, for this sris to b comprhnsibl it must b
“complt,” or ls fall into an infinnit rgrss, as pr th finrst Antinomy; and in ordr for th sris to b
complt, it must trminat. Theus, thr must b an uncausd caus – i.. an unconditiond bing – which
grounds th sris. With this cosmological argumnt finrmly in plac, Kant thn “movs, in th argumnt’s
scond stag, to rfluct on th connction btwn th unconditiond bing and th worldly (conditiond)
cosmological sris. Is this unconditiond bing […] xtrnal to th sris that it grounds or immannt to
it?” [ibid.]. Kant’s answr to this qustion carris far raching implications for th Antinomis as a whol,
and is thrfor crucial to our cas.
 As Kant argus in th ‘Obsrvation on th Thesis,’ thos who adopt th fourth Thesis position must
choos on of two possibl concptions of an unconditiond bing. Eithr it is concivd as “[A] just th
world itslf or [B] a thing distinct from it” (A456/B484) [Bohm 2012, p.32]. Aftr Kant maks this claim,
h “immdiatly procds to argu that th unconditiond is not distinct from th world [cf. A458/B486]”
[ibid.]. Kant ruls out option [B] by arguing that positing th xistnc of an unconditiond can only b
justifind if it provids xplanatory powr – .g. by trminating th casual sris, and thrby prvnting an
infinnit rgrss. The unconditiond can only hav this xplanatory powr, by Kant’s lights, if it stands in
th sam grounding rlation to th sris as th mmbrs within th sris stand to on anothr. In othr
words, th unconditiond must b a part of or immannt to th causal sris itslf [ibid., 33-34]. As a rsult,
Kant’s conclusion “appars to b that th ncssary bing just is ‘th world itslf’” [ibid., p.32]. Ruling out
[B] thrby “xcluds th Wolffican-Libnizian position” [ibid., p.34], sinc it posits a transcndnt (and
not an immannt) unconditiond. Howvr, as Bohm points out, a “carful rading may at finrst suggst
that Kant’s formulation is somwhat carlss or inaccurat” [ibid., p.32]. Rgarding th unconditiond’s
grounding rlation, his ithr [A] or [B] formulation in th fourth Thesis “may sm too quick, bcaus
Kant’s position is that vn if th unconditiond is immannt to th world two altrnativs still rmain,”
according to his claims at th outst of Antinomis [ibid.]. An immannt unconditiond can b viwd as
A1, i.., “th complt sris of conditiond lmnts, takn as a whol – hnc ‘th world itslf’”; or it
“can blong to th world only as ‘th highst mmbr of th cosmological sris’” (i.., as A2 ) [ibid.]. A1
and A2 ar thus housd togthr in th fourth’s Thesis undr [A]. Theis fact carris two implications. First,
th rasoning w hav bn using to xplain th finrst thr Antinomis is compatibl with th fourth as
wll (dspit th brak in th gnral pattern). Scond, whatvr is tru of [A] must also b tru for A1
and A2 – in othr words, for vry position in th finrst thr Antinomis. Not this principl, for it is of
crucial importanc to our rading.
Bohm gos on to xplain that th fourth’s Thesis “applis this principl [from th ‘Obsrvation’] to
transcndntal ralism. Transcndntal ralists viw xplanatory grounding rlations among things in
th world as causal-tmporal. Theis gnrats a rgrssing causal-xplanatory sris, which is ‘supposd
to carry us by continuous advanc to th suprm [unconditiond] condition’ (A452f./B480f.)” [Bohm
2012, p.34]. As discussd abov, transcndntal ralists ar forcd to mak two assumptions. First, that all
things ar xplicabl through thir placmnt in this causal-tmporal chain; and scond, that th causal-
tmporal sris itslf must “compltd” or groundd by th unconditiond – which must b concivd as
[A], or immannt to th sris. Not that th causal-tmporal sris, givn that it is “tmporal,” ncssarily
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xists in tim. As such, in ordr to b ‘immannt’ to th ‘causal-tmporal’ sris, th unconditiond itslf
must also xist in tim. “If tim is viwd as a proprty of things,” Bohm writs, “tim is a proprty of th
unconditiond” [ibid.].30 (Compar this position to th Wolffican-Libnizian attempt to rfut Spinozism –
rjctd by Kant as arbitrary and inconsistnt – by claiming that tim is a proprty of things but not th
unconditiond [s I-A].) Not also that [A] can b concivd in on of two ways (A1 or A2) [ibid., p.36],
and what is tru for [A] must b tru for both. Theis mans that both A1’s and A2’s unconditiond must b
concivd as xisting in tim as wll – which, in turn, mans that vry Thesis and Antithsis position in
th finrst thr Antinomis must b concivd as groundd by an immannt unconditiond which xists in
tim. If this is th cas, thn Kant has ffectivly xcludd th Wolffican-Libnizian cosmology – not just
from th fourth Antinomy, but from th Antinomis altogthr. Spinoza, on th othr hand, mbracs th
xistnc of an immannt, spatio-tmporal unconditiond. As such, his cosmology rmains valid.
Yt th admission that vry position in th finrst thr Antinomis is groundd by an immannt,
spatial-tmporal unconditiond carris a gratr implication than th xclusion of a Wolffican-Libnizian
cosmology from th Antinomis. Indd, it implis that, by Kant’s lights, vry cosmologically consistnt
form of transcndntal ralism must b concivd as som sort of “Spinozism.” Bohm, th originator of
this argumnt, admits that it is not always clar what Kant mans by “Spinozism” [Bohm 2018, p.485].
Howvr, Bohm argus that a carful study of Kant’s commnts in Lcturs on Mtaphysics rvals that
Kant undrstands “Spinozism” to man ‘substanc monism’ [Bohm 2012, p.29]. (Theis prsnts “Spinozism”
as a broad catgory which contains, but dos not ncssarily rfr to, Spinoza’s viw. Bohm argus that
“Epicurus or Lucrtius can b rgardd as Spinozists, just as Spinoza can b rgardd as an Epicuran,” and
“Kant, who was fond of Lucrtius, crtainly saw this continuity” [Bohm 2014, Prf. §2].) In I-A, w saw
how A1 can b construd as substanc monism – “It is infinnit and yt th On” [Bohm 2014, p.77] – and
th argumnts from th fourth’s Thesis rgarding [A] only rinforc this imprssion. Theough som may
b tmptd to sarch A2 for a way to scap th Spinozist concption of th unconditiond, “thr is no
gnuin way out – not insofar as Kant is concrnd” [Bohm 2012, p.35]; for “if a tmporal unconditiond
caus has always xistd thn ‘its consquncs would hav also always xistd’ (A444/B472)” [ibid.]. In
othr words, vn though A2’s unconditiond is not simply “th world itslf” (as is th cas with A1’s), it
must still b concivd as trnally on with ‘th world.’ Both A2’s unconditiond and ‘th world’ that it
grounds would hav ncssarily always xistd togthr as a unifind whol – i.., as a kind of ‘substanc
monism,’ i.. as a form of “Spinozism.” Theus, vry kind of transcndntal ralism must b concivd, by
Kant’s lights, as som sort of “Spinozism.” A1 is mrly a form of Spinozism which is closr to Spinozism
as Spinoza would hav it. (Not: this rading is ntirly consistnt with Kant’s latr claim that, should his
transcndntal idalism b rjctd, “nothing rmains but Spinozism” [s I-A].)
To summariz our discussion in this sgmnt: bcaus th finrst thr Antithss corrspond with
A1, whr “th cosmological sris is th unconditiond itslf,” w must conclud that “all thr Antithss
ar to b rad as Spinozist positions” – in th sns that thy ar vry similar to (though not idntical with)
Spinoza’s actual position, and no othr thinkr coms clos [Bohm 2012, p.36]. In fact, th thinkr who
has bn traditionally associatd with th Antithss (i.. Libniz) is not mrly a poor fint for th position,
his cosmology is xcludd from th Antinomis by Kant’s own argumnts concrning valid concptions of
th unconditiond. Furthrmor, a carful rading of th Thesis position from th fourth Antinomy would
indicat that Kant blivd that any consistnt form of transcndntal ralism must concivd as a form
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of Spinozism. As such, Spinozism is mor than a rprsntativ for (most of) th Antithsis positions – it
is a principl which undrgirds th Antinomis throughout. Howvr, it may b rasonabl to ask: If th im-
portanc of Spinozism to th Antinomis is so undniabl, why has it bn nglctd for so long?
I-C.  Who Fars a “Dad Dog”? Kant Familiarity With th Jwish Athist 31
BOEHM is fond of saying that Kantian scholarship gnrally holds th opinion that, in Kant’s day, right
up until th outbrak of th Panthismusstrit, Spinoza was considrd to b, in th words of Lssing, a
“dad dog” [Bohm 2018, p.483]. As a rsult, Spinoza is not considrd to b a signifincant influunc upon
th Kantian tradition. Theis opinion has bn motivatd by a numbr of misconcptions, ovrlookd facts,
and naiv radings of Kant’s commnts on Spinoza during th Strit. Though w lack ironclad vidnc
that Kant was familiar with Spinoza or Spinozism bfor th Strit, it is highly plausibl that h was, and
argumnts to th contrary hav so far bn fluimsy. Claring away ths obstacls should clar away th
last vstigs of doubt rgarding our cas.
On obstacl is a scond-hand rport from Hamann to Jacobi, according to which Kant claimd that
h had “nvr bn abl to undrstand Spinoza’s philosophy” [Brifwchsl, Octobr 1785]. Laving th
fallibility of scond-hand rporting asid, vn if w assum that Kant did indd say this, thr is ampl
rason to suspct that Kant was bing coy with Hamann [Bohm 2018, p. 484]. Considring th scandal
surrounding Spinoza’s nam, and that Jacobi had stoppd just short of calling Kant a Spinozist,32 h had
good rason to b indirct. On nd only rcall th tratmnt of Christian Wolffe, champion of Libniz
and on of th most minnt philosophrs of th Grman-spaking world in his day, to raliz just how
damaging an association with Spinozism could b. In 1723, Wolffe’s nmis dnouncd his philosophy
as a backdoor for Spinozism to ntr through. Theis link to Spinoza (rmot as it may sm) bcam th
primary wapon in thir campaign against him – and it was ffectiv. Wolffe was oustd from his chair
at Hall, th taching of his philosophy and th sal of his books wr bannd in Prussia for yars, and
both h and supportrs wr draggd into an intrnational war of words to dfnd thir good nams
[Isral 2001, p. 544-52]. Theough in th nd Wolffe won his war [ibid.], Kant would surly hav wantd to
avoid finghting on himslf – and th obvious tactic would hav bn to distanc himslf from Spinoza as
artfully as possibl.33 Additionally, if on bars in mind that Spinoza was condmnd as an athist,34 and
that som stmd intllctuals (.g. Pirr Bayl) argud that athism was fundamntally incohrnt,35
thn it is asy to s why in this cas a brilliant man might choos to play dumb. Kant would likly hav
undrstood that claiming to b “unabl to undrstand” an “athist” philosophr – who on account of his
“athism” many blivd, or wantd to bliv, must b incohrnt – was a politically saf manuvr.
Therfor, Kant’s claim that h could nvr undrstand Spinoza should do littel to dtr us.
Anothr obstacl is that Kant nvr mntions ithr Spinoza or Spinozism within th Critiqu of Pur
Rason. Ther ar numrous mntions of both in Kant’s latr carr. Yt in th Critiqu, dspit th fact
that h mntions almost vry othr nam in th philosophical canon thr, h nvr mntions Spinoza
[Bohm 2018, p.483-485]. Therfor it could b rasonably surmisd that, bfor th Strit, Kant ithr
ignord Spinozism, or h was simply ignorant of it. Bohm countrs by pointing out that although Kant
nvr mntions Spinoza by nam in th Critiqu, h dos tak tim to atteack th gomtrical mthod, a
vry Spinozistic thm.36 The us of th gomtrical mthod, which bgins with dfinnitions, followd by
axioms, and thn by dmonstrations, is a rarity in philosophy (vn Spinoza wrot only two – prhaps
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thr – of his works in a gomtrical mod);37 and Spinoza’s application of this mthod to philosophical
matters was controvrsial vn among thos who ulogizd him.38 “Ther is thn at last on momnt in
th Critiqu of Pur Rason,” Bohm says, “whr Kant dos ngag with Spinoza – on momnt whr
it is untnabl to conclud that Kant did not think of Spinoza from th fact that h did not mntion his
nam” [ibid., p.485]. The Antinomis, as w dmonstratd abov, ar anothr. Furthrmor, Kant would
hav had a vstd intrst in not apparing to b ovrly sympathtic to Spinoza (at last, not until aftr
th Strit had blown th issu wid opn). So if Kant wantd to portray a Spinozistic concption without
immdiatly atteacking it, it might hav smd wis to giv that position a differnt nam, or associat
it with a differnt thinkr (hnc why Kant says “Epicurus” whil thinking “Spinoza” as h is dscribing
th Antithss). Yt such stratgis, if this is indd what Kant was doing, wr not wholly ffectiv – as
Jacobi wnt ahad and accusd Kant of writing crtain aspcts of th Critiqu “fully in Spinoza’s spirit”
in spit of thm [cf. Bohm 2018, p.484].
The third obstacl is th viw that, bfor th Strit, Spinoza had bcom pass, that h was sn as
a dfatd philosophr [Bohm 2018, p.483], and that activ discours about him had drid up. Theis is far
from tru. Spinoza and Spinozism wr discussd both publicly and at lngth in Kant’s day. Spinoza was
th subjct of th singl longst ntry in Bayl’s Dictionnair (1702). A dtaild, finv-pag tratmnt was
ddicatd to him in J. Zdlr’s Grosss Univrsal Lxikon (1734-52), whras most philosophrs rcivd
only a pag or lss. And in D. Didrot and J. d’Almbrt’s Encyclopédi (1751-72), Spinoza was givn an
qually lngthy tratmnt. According to Bohm thy ddicatd “finv tims mor spac [to Spinoza] than
to most rlvant thinkrs in th history of philosophy” [ibid.]. In all thr publications – which wr, in
Bohm’s words, “th main transmitters of Enlightnmnt thought” [ibid.] – Spinoza and Spinozism wr
bing publicly discussd in gratr dtail than most any othr philosophr or philosophy. And, basd on
th publication dats of ach of ths works, Spinoza had bn rciving this lvl of rigorous attention
for svnty yars (that is, btwn th yars of 1702 and 1772). Additionally, as Bohm obsrvs, “most
Enlightnmnt philosophrs of ambition [Libniz, Wolffe, Mndlssohn, Hum, tc.] xplicitly strivd to
answr Spinozism” [Bohm 2014, Prf. §7]. The ida that Spinoza had fadd into obscurity during Kant’s
tim or in th yars prior to th Strit sms to b, in light of ths facts, quit dubious.39
Of cours, thr is mor than th public discours to considr. W cannot forgt th clandstin
manuscripts of forbiddn philosophical works sold and discussd in scrt throughout Europ btwn
1680 and th 1740s. (The manufactur and distribution of ths manuscript had found major cntrs in
Grmany, particularly in Brlin and Potsdam.) J. Isral nots that th “cntral thrust” or “main bloc” of
radical idas from ths so-calld clandstina “stms prdominantly from […] Spinoza and Spinozism,”
most ubiquitously and influuntially in th form of th Traité ds Trois Imposturs, altrnativly namd
L’Esprit d Spinosa [Isral 2001, p.684-85, 694-95]. Although th form of Spinozism containd in ths
manuscripts was oftn quit far from Spinozism as Spinoza would hav it, nvrthlss thy broadnd
th ara in which Kant may hav ncountrd som form of Spinoza’s philosophical lgacy (ithr via
manuscripts or convrsations with th popl who rad thm). Theis is spcially likly aftr 1740 – th
yar that Frdrick th Grat (who had himslf acquird a tast for clandstin litratur) ascndd to
th Prussian crown. Soon aftrward, thr would b a pronouncd asing of cnsorship laws rgarding
philosophical and thological topics in Prussia (and coincidntally, all throughout Europ), incrasing
th availability of clandstina – so much so that th businss of producing, slling, and sharing ths
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matrials in scrt bcam narly obsolt [Isral 2001, p.684-86]. Therfor, during Kant’s activ lif,
th chancs of ncountring Spinozism (publicly or privatly) wr th highst thy had vr bn.
The fourth and finnal obstacl is th doubt that som scholars hav rgarding Kant’s sriousnss in
his claims about Spinozism. Whn Kant says, for xampl, that “[t]hos who tak spac as a thing in
itslf or as a proprty of things ar forcd to b Spinozists” (V-MP-K3E/Arnoldt AA 29:132), is this his
considrd viw? For th argumnts in ths passags ar oftn nithr laborat nor dtaild. Bohm
admits that this is th cas, but h contnds that this is so bcaus Kant “is rlying hr on an laborat
argumnt h had providd in th fourth Antinomy” [Bohm 2014, p.85]. In short, h is rlying hr on
th argumnt that only an immannt unconditiond is possibl, and that th unconditiond must xist
in tim and spac as part of a causal-tmporal sris; thus, all sufficcintly cohrnt transcndntal ralist
cosmologis (A1 and A2) ar to b concivd as som form of Spinozism. H argus for this in dtail in
th finrst Critiqu – whr h nvr rfrs to Spinoza by nam – and implicitly assums it in th scond
[Bohm 2012, p.31]. Morovr, as Bohm points out, th txts from th scond Critiqu and th Lcturs
on Mtaphysics, whr Kant opnly rfrs to Spinoza by nam, “appar only aftr th finrst dition of th
Critiqu. Indd, thy appar only aftr th brak of th Panthismusstrit (1785)” [ibid]. Theis is likly du
to political prudnc on Kant’s part [ibid.]. In othr words, th Panthismusstrit was not th tim that
Kant discovrd, or vn r-discovrd Spinozism, “bcaus,” as Bohm puts it, “Spinoza’s idas […] had
not bn forgotten” [ibid., p.485]. It was simply th sa chang that Kant and othrs ndd in ordr to b
abl to spak of it in public without cnsur.
Indd, thr is a strong cas to b mad that Kant himslf was a spcial kind of Spinozist. Asid
from th fact that Kant sms to bliv that all consistnt forms of transcndntal ralism ar som sort
of Spinozism, thr ar a numbr of important Kantian concpts which ar rmarkably Spinozistic – and
ar oftn xplicitly associatd with Spinozism. On xampl is Kant’s concpt of th Idal of Pur Rason,
i.., “a (rgulativ) ida of an unconditiond bing, concivd in th form of A1: it is th ‘All of Rality,’
ncompassing all othr conditiond bings as ‘nothing but limitations’” (A575/B603) [Bohm 2014, p.78].
“[I]t should b obsrvd,” as Bohm points out, “that in th sam priod in which Kant xplicitly nams
Spinozism ‘th most consistnt form of dogmatic mtaphysics,’ h also claims that th rgulativ idal of
rason yilds a Spinozist concption” (Lcturs AA 20:302; cf. 28:706) [Bohm 2018, p.501]. The sam is
tru for what Kant calls th ns ralissimum – i.., th ground of “all possibilitis,” such that “vrything
that is possibl – insofar as it is ral – is but a limitation of th ralissimum, th All of Rality” [ibid., p.41].
Bohm taks this to b “a Spinozist construal of th ralissimum” [ibid.]. “In fact, Kant writs xplicitly,
at last latr in his carr, that th ns ralissimum, th ground of all possibility, must b concivd along
Spinozist lins” (AA 28:785-786) [ibid., p.43]. Theough som might tak this as vidnc that any Spinozis-
tic tndncis in Kant’s thinking wr confinnd to his latr carr, it is worth noting that som of Kant’s
pr-critical ssays wr rmarkably Spinozistic – .g. “On Possibl Basis” [Bohm 2012, p.38-40]. Mor-
ovr, th lin of argumnt in “On Possibl Basis” concrning th unconditiond sms to b contiguous
with Kant’s rasoning in th fourth Antinomy’s Thesis. Theis fact lads Bohm to conclud that Kant was
likly a Spinozist in his pr-critical phas [Bohm 2014, Prf. §7], and that th rasoning which w s in
th Idal and th fourth Antinomy’s Thesis volvd out of his pr-critical Spinozism.
Bohm’s intrprtation is (again) at varianc with th common viw. For xampl, with rgard to
intrprting th Idal of Pur Rason, th common viw holds (contra Bohm) that complx, finnit things
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ar xtrnal to th Idal – vn if thy ar groundd by it. Still, Bohm’s viw has th advantag in that
th common viw sms to dviat from th fourth Antinomy’s main rquirmnts for valid grounding
rlations btwn conditiond bings and th unconditiond – namly, that all bings, conditiond and
unconditiond alik, must b undrstood through th sam grounding rlation. Furthrmor, how could
th Idal b thought of as th ‘All of Rality,’ vn in a rgulativ sns, if thr ar ral things which ar
‘xtrnal’ to it? Although thr is som vidnc which can b rad as ruling out a Spinozist rading of
th Idal (A579/B607), such argumnts hav so far bn hingd on th ida that Spinozism quats God
(i.. th All, th On, Substanc, Natur, tc.) with th sum total of rality.40 Theis ida is not accurat, for
whil Spinoza’s God is th All of Rality, “th totality of all xisting things,” H is ontologically prior to
His “parts” – and thus H cannot b rducd to a mr sum of all things41 [ibid., p.42]. (Theis ida should
b rtaind as w conciv of A1. Whn w compar th various statmnts Kant maks with rgard to
th unconditiond, Spinozism, Panthism, and adquat grounding rlations, it bcoms clar that A1’s
unconditiond – i.., th ntir cosmological sris takn as a whol – is to b concivd as th ground
in which all things inhr, and not as an aggrgat of vrything in th world. According to Kant, “th
suprm rality [i.. th unconditiond] must condition th possibility of all things as thir ground, not
as thir sum” {A578f./ B606f.}.)42 Morovr, Kant sms to hav known that Spinoza did not conciv of
substanc as a sum (AA 28:794–795). Although Kant crtainly thought Spinozism was dply mistakn
in that it dducs th xistnc of th ralissimum from its concpt,43 h still agrd with th way that
Spinozism rprsnts th ralissimum as th ground of all things [Bohm 2018, p.501]. Therfor, it is
rasonabl to infr as Bohm dos that Kant’s matur, critical position is a kind of “rgulativ Spinozism”
[Bohm 2012, p.41, 43].
The botteom lin is this: not only ar th common argumnts against Spinoza’s influunc on Kant’s
philosophy rathr fluimsy, w hav a signifincant amount of vidnc which would indicat th prsnc of
an intns and carr-spanning dialogu btwn th two; th Antinomis bing but on product of that
dialogu. As such, w hav good rason to b confindnt that Bohm’s Spinozist rading of th Antinomis
is sound. W contnd that Spinoza was th singl gratst contributor to th dsign of th Antinomis as
a whol, particularly with rgard to th finrst thr Antithss. H was also thir primary targt, although
Kant nvr so much as usd his nam in writing thm – hnc Isral’s claim that Kant was conducting a
“silnt war against Spinoza” [Isral 2011, p.707].
I-D.  A Spinozan Lgacy: Final Theoughts on th Antinomis
OUR purpos in this sction – which I bliv w hav bn succssful in fulfinlling – was to stablish th
profound influunc of Spinoza on th Antinomis. Theus, w hav scurd th finrst link in th antinomial
through lin (what w arlir calld th finrst anchorag points of th Kantian bridg). The nxt stp is to
dmonstrat that Nitzsch’s philosophical dvlopmnt is, to a signifincant xtnt, th historical rsult of
th Antinomis, which thmslvs xist as an historical rsult of Spinoza’s philosophical lgacy.
Yt bfor bring this sction to a clos, thr is on complication in our pictur of th Antinomis to
addrss. Although w hav rpatdly argud that th clash btwn A1 and A2 gnrats th Antinomis
– and that A1 maps onto th Antithsis positions whil A2 maps onto th Thesis positions – this pattern
sms to faltr in th fourth Antinomy. Spcifincally, in th fourth both A1 and A2 togthr rsid in th
Thesis position; and nithr can b found in th fourth Antinomy’s Antithsis, which fluatly dnis that any
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ncssary (i.. unconditiond) bings xist. Therfor, th fourth Antithsis ruls out not only A2, but A1
and Spinozism as wll – th concpts w hav bn rpatdly associating with th Antithss. How can
this apparnt dviation from th pattern b xplaind? To my knowldg, Bohm nvr dirctly addrsss
this concrn. Howvr, w can dfnd Bohm’s argumnt if w rcall that th Antinomis ar systmatic-
ally connctd. Thes systmatic connctions btwn th antinomial positions imply that an adquat
xplanation of th Antinomis must, in similar fashion, b abl to locat consistnt lins of rasoning that
undrli th systmatically connctd positions. By dmonstrating that A1 [along with A2] appars in th
fourth Antinomy’s Thesis, Bohm’s rading achivs two important goals. First, it succds in maintain-
ing th connction btwn th Antinomis and Kant’s claim that it is th clash btwn A1 and A2 that
gnrats thm (a claim which crats th xpctation that both A1 and A2 will b prsnt in vry cas).
Scond, h maks it fasibl to claim as h dos that Spinozism is on such consistnt lin of rasoning –
conncting th systmatically linkd finrst, third, and fourth Antinomis. Any thory which would supplant
Bohm’s would hav to b similarly succssful.
Furthrmor, I bliv that if w rfluct on th rlationship btwn Kant’s Antinomis and th PSR,
thn w can xplain th dviation from th gnral pattern. As w hav sn, vry antinomial position
implicitly ndorss th PSR – which dmands that absolutly vrything must hav a rason, caus, or
ground. Hnc th importanc of A1’s and A2’s unconditiond, ach of which provids a logically viabl
yt opposit viw of th ultimat rason, caus, or ground. Each cas of th Antinomis is gnratd by
th impossibility of rconciling ths viws, or justifying th prfrnc of on ovr th othr. Theus Kant
is assrting that th PSR invitably lads to paradox whn it is takn as a transcndntally ral principl.
(Kant finnds no problm in taking it as a transcndntally idal principl, as pr th “Scond Analogy of
Exprinc”). Howvr, a carful xamination of th fourth Antinomy suggsts that Kant is making an
vn boldr claim. In th fourth, both A1’s and A2’s unconditiond ar locatd on th sam sid, th Thesis
sid. Manwhil, in th Antithsis position – which must b concivd as a transcndntal ralist position,
and thrfor must b an argumnt from th PSR – it is argud that thr ar no ncssary, unconditiond
bings; maning that thr is no ultimat rason, caus or ground. Theis implis that, unlik th finrst thr
Antinomis – which giv us two options to pick from (A1 and A2) – th fourth Antinomy givs us thr.
In th fourth Antinomy, Kant is arguing that, if w accpt th PSR to b a transcndntally ral principl,
thn it is qually cohrnt (and ultimatly paradoxical) to choos A1, A2, or a third option – a nihilistic
option – according to which all rasons, causs, and grounds ar purly contingnt. In fact, bcaus thr
is no rason, caus, or ground for xistnc itslf, on could argu that any concpt of xistnc as a kind
of prmannt Bing is fals. (As w shall s in Sction II, this is xactly th position which is takn up by
Nitzsch – almost a hundrd yars latr.) Theus, in braking th gnral pattern and introducing a third
option, Kant is hoping to prov that transcndntal ralism is vn mor futil – mor nihilistic 44 – than
was ralizd at th outst of th Antinomis.
On finnal not: it is important to raliz that, dspit thir fundamntally incompatibl viws of th
unconditiond, th A1 concption and th nihilistic ‘third option’ do shar crtain commonalitis. Both
conciv of rality as a causal-tmporal chain dvoid of any unconditiond mmbrs. Ther is nothing to
condition th sris xcpt th sris itslf. (Such a concption lads to a rlativistic pictur of mpirical
rality, as w will discuss in dtail in Sction II.) The differnc is, for A1, th ‘sris itslf’ (or what Kant
rfrs to as ‘th world itslf,’ or th ‘All of Rality’) is itslf an trnal Bing. A1 concivs of rality in a
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mannr akin to Spinoza’s “fac of th whol univrs” [Ltter 64 (OP); cf. Curly 2016, p.438-39], accord-
ing to which th particulars of th univrs may chang, but th whol, th aggrgat, th proportions of
rality itslf, ar always th sam. For A1, th fac of rality itslf nvr changs. Howvr, if thr ar no
ncssary or unconditiond bings anywhr (as is th cas for th ‘third option’ of th fourth Antithsis),
thn th ‘sris itslf’ cannot b an trnal Bing. Ther is nothing to stop th fac of rality itslf from
changing – assuming it was vr slf-idntical to bgin with. (Thes similaritis and differncs will b
important thms throughout Sction II – most spcially in our discussion of th ‘antinomial alignmnt’
shard by Nitzsch and Spinoza.)
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WITH th foundation of our Kantian bridg laid – that is, by finrmly stablishing Spinoza’s influunc on
th Antinomis – w can mov on to th bridg itslf. To put it brifluy, Spir’s rading of th Antinomis
quats th Thesis positions with th concpt of Bing, and th Antithsis positions with th concpt of
Bcoming. Undr such a rading, on could infr that vry cas of Antinomy can b summarizd by a
singl rlation: th fundamntal (and paradoxical) confluict btwn th concpts of Bing and Bcoming.
Spir xtnds this ‘fundamntal antinomy’ to his thory of judgmnt, and thus concluds that all thought
about mpirical objcts is fals. Theis is so, according to Spir, bcaus both Bing and Bcoming xist in
vry objct, and yt only Bing can b thought. Bing – including th ida of a slf-idntical objct – is
ncssary for cognition, but it is incompatibl with th Bcoming which is vidnt and xprincd via
th snss; thus all cognition is slf-contradictory [Grn 2002, p.60]. Therfor, whras Kant viws th
Antinomis as a trap from which philosophy nds to scap, Spir boils thm down to a singl principl
and compls us to bit th bullt. Rathr than scap th paradox, w must accpt that th natural world
is inhrntly paradoxical, and thn rfocus our minds on th inxprincabl world of Bing – th world
of trnal, logical truths – th absolut, Parmnidan On.
Grn dmonstrats that Nitzsch accpts th rasoning bhind Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy’ –
hnc his thory that all thought falsifins – but h rjcts Spir’s conclusion as a Christian-lik rjction of
th world. If Bing dos not xist in th world of xprinc and Bcoming, and can provid us with no
xplanatory powr, btter to do as Kant dos with th ida of a transcndntal unconditiond in th fourth
Antinomy and simply dny that it xists at all. As a rsult, Nitzsch taks a position of ‘radical Bcoming’
– on that is vry similar to th mtaphysics in Kant’s fourth Antithsis. In fact, Nitzsch’s mtaphysical
pictur of th univrs broadly aligns with th Antithss in gnral – just lik Spinoza’s. Therfor, whil
th two thinkrs draw vry differnt mtaphysical conclusions, thy shar a broad antithtic alignmnt –
on which natly charactrizs thir rspctiv philosophis, thir similaritis and differncs, thir rla-
tion to ach othr, and (in Nitzsch’s cas) how thy cam to b what thy ar. In brif, as th ‘antinomial
through lin’ tracs th influunc of Spinoza’s lgacy though tim, th ‘antithtic alignmnt’ charactrizs
th rmarkabl similarity btwn Nitzsch and Spinoza which rsultd from that influunc.
Tom Baily, in his articl on Nitzsch’s Kantianism, draws conclusions that ar quit differnt from
our own. Rgardlss, h rsponds to many of th sam problms and indd provids us with an xcllnt
outlin of ths problms. During his xploration of Nitzsch’s criticisms of th Kantian notion of an
II. THE ANTINOMIES AND NIETZSCHE     21
‘inaccssibl rality,’ h argus that a carful rading of th rlvant passags rvals a scond concrn,
“on rgarding lss th accssibility of rality than how w mak judgmnts about rality at all” [Baily
2013, p.138-39]. In fact, as Nitzsch ngags with Kantian concptions of judgmnt, h addrsss “thr
signifincant issus rgarding Kant’s own account of judgmnt” [ibid., p.146]. The finrst issu is concrnd
with th problm of how snsibl xprinc can b admitted into judgmnt. “Kant’s solution,” as Baily
obsrvs, “to claim that th imagination provids critria for th application of concpts to snsibl x-
princ, is notoriously unsatisfactory and it might b mor fruitful to rjct th notion of judgmnt on
which th problm rsts” [ibid.]. The scond issu concrns th “I” (or th “dor,” or th “go”). As Baily
xplains, “Kant also claims that a judgmnt must rfr to an ‘I,’ undrstood as a non-mpirical bing” – a
claim which raiss qustions about how th non-mpirical ‘I’ can intract with and atteain knowldg of
mpirical objcts, and Nitzsch’s “attempt to formulat an ontology without substantial subjcts might
b considrd a rspons to such qustions” [ibid.]. Finally, th third issu concrns th notions of Bing
and causality. Nitzsch’s tratmnt of “thinghood and causality” is similar to Kant’s attempts to dfnd
th concpt of causality against mpiricist objctions (.g. Hum). Baily intrprts Nitzsch’s criticism
of causality as an ffeort to prsrv som portion of th concpt from mpiricist atteacks [ibid.].
Baily’s account is largly corrct, and Nitzsch is indd attempting to addrss all of ths issus.
Yt what his account is missing is that, for Nitzsch, ths ar not rally sparat problms. Rathr, thy
ar all rlativs of on problm: i.. th (non-) xistnc of Bing. Nitzsch’s dnial of Bing is profoundly
important concrning his rjction of “dors,” as wll as his critiqus of causality. If thr ar no ‘bings,’
how can thr b absolutly discrt “dors” bhind “dds,” or vn absolutly discrt vnts – ‘caus,’
and ‘ffect’? Morovr, Nitzsch’s dnial of Bing largly stms from a singl sourc: Nitzsch’s “rror
thory” – i.., his argumnt that all thought falsifins. What Baily also fails to raliz is that Nitzsch’s
“rror thory” is, in larg part, adaptd from Spir’s “rror thory,” which in turn stms from his notion of
th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ – an invntion which is a dirct rspons, not just to th Antinomis, but to
th finrst issu: th waknsss in Kant’s solution to th problm of how snsibl xprinc is admitted
into judgmnt. Nitzsch largly accpts and thn adapts th rasoning bhind Spir’s “rror thory” as a
rsult of accpting th ‘fundamntal antinomy.’  Theis lads Nitzsch to qustion th capacity of human
bings to form objctiv, mpirical judgmnts. Theis skpticism charactrizs th majority of Nitzsch’s
carr, and it continud to influunc him (possibly in a waknd form) throughout th last yar of his
productiv (and san) lif.
Theis is not th way Nitzsch’s work is usually intrprtd by Anglophon scholarship, howvr. As a
matter of fact, th sam naturalistic tndncis which mak Nitzsch atteractiv to ths intrprtrs in
th finrst plac sm to sw sds of inscurity in thm rgarding th valu of Nitzsch’s philosophy. For
as much as Nitzsch (particularly in his lat phas) is drivn by a powrful naturalistic tndncy, thr
is much about Nitzsch’s philosophy which is not amnabl to naturalism – particularly with rgard to
pistmology. (Ther ar fwr things mor anathmatic to th naturalist than th claim that all thought
falsifins and that nothing is knowabl.) Brian Litr nicly summarizs ths atteituds toward Nitzsch
whn h says that “on important rason that philosophrs should tak Nitzsch sriously is bcaus h
sms to hav gotten, at last in broad contours, many points about human moral psychology right ”; that
is, from a modrn scintifinc standpoint [Litr 2013, p.595]. And to th dgr that Nitzsch truly dos
bliv in concpts not amnabl to th philosophical naturalist, “thn so much th wors for Nitzsch w
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might say. W may do Nitzsch th philosophr a favor, howvr,” if w rconstruct his projct by using
trms that ar “both rcognizably his in signifincant part, and yt at th sam tim far mor plausibl onc
th crackpot mtaphysics of th will to powr […] is xpungd” [ibid., p.594]. Theus motivatd by th far
that if on allows Nitzsch’s lss-than-naturalistic tndncis into viw, it will doom som part (if not
th whol) of his philosophy to th wastbaskt – or, wors yt, to th clutchs of thos much-malignd,
truth-skptical post-modrnists (a fat wors than dath, to b sur) – sympathtic Anglophon scholars
will oftn try to rscu Nitzsch from himslf. Som will try to rhabilitat Nitzsch by d-radicalizing
his mor xtrm viws. Othrs will lapfrog ovr larg swaths of Nitzsch’s carr, avoiding as much
as possibl thos tims in which h was most undr th influunc of Spir, so thy can highlight his mor
naturalistically inclind lat-phas. Theough wll-intntiond and oftn rich with insight, both stratgis
do Nitzsch (th man and th philosophr) a dissrvic. If w want to undrstand Nitzsch’s naturalist
priod, thn w must undrstand th arlir priods from which it mrgd – including th influunc of
oldr philosophrs (.g. th naturalist Spinoza and th anti-naturalist Spir) who playd a rol in making
Nitzsch who h was at ach particular stag. Furthrmor, whil Nitzsch did indd shift away from
th anti-naturalism of his arlir priods, th vidnc sms to suggst that Nitzsch nvr compltly
scapd th influunc of Spir and th transcndntal tradition [Grn 2002, p.165]. As w rad naturalist
accounts of Nitzsch’s thought, w must b mindful of Grn’s warning to rmain “skptical about wh-
thr Nitzsch’s intrsts ar thirs” [ibid.].
Our purpos in this sction will b twofold: proving Michal Grn’s cas for th Spiran influunc
on Nitzsch’s thought, and tying ths insights to th antinomial through lin and Nitzsch’s antithtic
alignmnt with Spinoza – all whil striking a balanc btwn larning from naturalist intrprtations of
Nitzsch and bing wisr than thy. Lik th last sction, this on is dividd into four sgmnts. In A) w
will focus on Spir’s thought: its rlations to th Antinomis and Kant’s thory of judgmnt, and how th
‘fundamntal antinomy’ and his “rror thory” cam to b as a rsult of thos influuncs. W will thrby
stablish th scond point [2] of our main argumnt. In B) w turn to Nitzsch’s thought and its rlation
to Spir’s: how h accptd th rasoning bhind th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ and adaptd his own “rror
thory” from Spir’s, and how ths dvlopmnts influuncd his viws on logic, judgmnt, and causality.
Hr w stablish our main argumnt’s third claim [3]: i.., that Nitzsch’s accptanc Spir’s antinomial
rasoning, and simultanous rjction of Spir’s conclusions, rsultd in Nitzsch adopting a mtaphysics
of ‘radical Bcoming.’ In C) w bgin tying th various thrads of th ssay togthr with an account of
th antithtic alignmnt – xploring th grat similarity btwn Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s mtaphysical
picturs of th mpirical world, in spit of thir radically differnt ontologis – concluding th sgmnt
with a dmonstration of th compatibility of Bohm’s and Grn’s thoris [4-6]. In D) w complt th
sction with an account of th antinomial through lin from which th antithtic alignmnt follows, and
dmonstrat th strngth of this through lin by showing: a) how it historically grounds th oft-prcivd
similaritis btwn Nitzsch and Spinoza, b) th promising lads it offers us with rgard to futur r-
sarch, and c) th potntial valu of th ‘Kantian bridg’ for Nitzsch studis in gnral [7-8].
II-A1.  The Antinomial Spir: Kant’s Antinomis and Spir’s Dnial of Empirical Knowldg
 
“SPIR rlis a grat dal on Kant’s antinomis of pur rason (Kant 1965, A405-576/B432-595) to argu
that mpirical objcts contain irrconcilabl lmnts of both bing and bcoming” [Grn 2002, p.59].
THE ANTINOMIES AND NIETZSCHE: II-A1     23
 
To sum up our arlir discussion, th Antinomis ar gnratd by transcndntal ralism’s conviction
that th mpirical world is wholly intlligibl through causal-tmporal xplanations (via th PSR). Theis
conviction, Kant argus, invitably lads to mutually contradictory positions – both of which ultimatly
collaps into slf-contradiction, thrby laving us in a stat of paradox. In th fourth cas of Antinomy,
for xampl, argumnts ar mad both for and against th xistnc of an unconditiond bing, and both
cass ar qually convincing and slf-contradictory. Theis occurs bcaus th transcndntal ralist viw
of natur is on in which all things ar xplaind through thir placmnt in a causal-tmporal chain; an
imag that “naturally both invits and forbids th introduction of a finrst caus [i.. unconditiond bing]
that xplains why this chain of causation xists at all” [ibid., p.76]. Spir’s rading of Kant’s Antinomis is
what lads him to conclud that all mpirical knowldg is inhrntly contradictory. (It also conncts him
to Spinoza via th antinomial through lin.)
Bfor continuing on w must not that, in his xplication of Spir’s argumnts, Grn oftn uss th
trms “unconditional/d unity,” “substanc,” and “Bing” in a smingly intrchangabl mannr. Similarly,
Grn uss th trms “conditional/d unity” and “Bcoming” in an intrchangabl fashion. Theis maks
sns if w rcall th fourth Antinomy. The Thesis position argus that in ordr for rality to xist at all, it
must b groundd by an unconditiond bing. It thn argus that th unconditiond must b immannt
to th sris; and, sinc th sris is tmporal, must hav always xistd togthr with th sris in tim.
That is, as an unconditional unity. The Antithsis position, on th othr hand, argus that unconditiond
bings simply do not xist anywhr, and as such nithr do unconditional unitis. Only a conditional
unity is possibl in such a univrs. Furthrmor, Spir is oftn particularly concrnd not mrly with th
xistnc of mpirical objcts, but with th unifincation of qualitis within an objct – and h argus that
an ‘objctiv unifincation of qualitis’ is only possibl if said unity is unconditional (i.., drivd from an
unconditiond Bing) [Grn 2002, p.65]. Theus, it maks sns for “unconditiond unity” to b associatd
with “Bing” (and “substanc,” which is th sam thing), and for “conditiond unity” to b associatd with
Bcoming [cf. Grn 2002, p.58-60, 63-68, 69, 75-80]. Whnvr w us ths trms, w will us thm in
th sam intrchangabl mannr as Grn.
Ther is on mor thing which w must not rgarding Grn’s xplication of Spir – spcifincally, a
mistak h maks in undrstanding th Antinomis. For Spir himslf may hav mad th sam mistak
(which could possibly xplain why Spir quats th Thesis with Bing and th Antithsis with Bcoming).
In his xplication of th antinomial influunc in Spir’s thought, Grn sms to confluat th mtaphysics
of th finrst thr Antithss [which ar basd on A1 and afficrm th xistnc of th unconditiond] with
th fourth’s Antithsis [which is nihilistic and dnis that an unconditiond bing xists anywhr]. For
xampl, in Grn’s summary of th finrst Antinomy [cf. Grn 2002, p.64-66], h rightfully prcivs that
th Thesis ntails absolut tim and spac, and that th Antithsis prcluds both (as w shall s in II-C2).
Howvr, h wrongfully charactrizs th finrst Antithsis’s viw as on in which th world is “infinnitly
conditiond” without “unconditional unifincation.” H claims an “unconditional unifincation” is impossibl
for th Antithsis to support, bcaus “[t]his unconditional unifincation is a substanc,” and unconditional
substancs can only xist in th thsis viw [ibid., p.65]. Theis is fals. The finrst Antinomy’s Antithsis – as
Bohm has dmonstratd – is, indd, arguing for th xistnc of an unconditional substanc [i.., A1].
Only in th fourth Antinomy dos th Antithsis position dny th xistnc of any unconditiond Bing.
Although it is possibl that Spir rad th Antinomis in a mannr similar to Bohm – i.., that th fourth
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Antinomy is “crucial for our undrstanding of th othr thr Antinomis as wll” [Bohm 2012, p.36] –
it is also possibl that Spir rad th Antinomis in sam th mannr as Grn: confluating th mtaphysical
commitmnts of th finrst thr Antithss with thos of th fourth. For th sak of charity and simplicity,
w will assum that Spir did not mak this mistak and that h drivd his rading mainly from th fourth
Antinomy. (Our thory is compatibl with ithr cas. W ar noting it hr for transparncy.)
Ther in th fourth Antinomy, as Thesis and Antithsis positions argud (rspctivly) for ithr an
“unconditiond unity” (Bing) or a “conditiond unity” (Bcoming) as th ground of all xistnc – and
ultimatly collapsd into paradox – Spir discovrd what h took to b th tru lsson of th Antinomis.
Spcifincally, that an trnal and paradoxical struggl btwn Bing and Bcoming undrlis all cass of
Antinomy – and all mpirical thought. Theis is Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy.’  It was Spir’s rading of th
Antinomis that lad him to th blif that thr was an unbridgabl gap btwn Bing and Bcoming.
Sinc only Bing can b thought (but nvr xprincd) and only Bcoming can b xprincd (but nvr
thought), this unbridgabl gap btwn Bing and Bcoming maks objctiv, mpirical knowldg of th
objcts w mt with in xprinc impossibl to atteain.
But why dos Spir bliv that Bing can b thought, but not xprincd? First, bcaus in ordr
for somthing to qualify as “Bing” (that is, an “unconditional unity”), two things must b tru about it: it
must always b qual to itslf (that is, it must b slf-idntical), and it cannot contain any contradictions
(that is, it cannot violat th law of noncontradiction). Howvr, Grn xplains that “[c]ontrary to th
philosophical tradition, th principl that vrything is idntical to itslf is, for Spir, a synthtic rathr than
an analytic proposition. ‘The concpt of th ral or th actual and that of th slfsam […] or slf-idntical
[…] ar […] not on and th sam, but instad two differnt concpts’ (1:164). Analogously, th principl
of non-contradiction is synthtic for Spir; it is somthing that rality could fail to satisfy ([1877]1:168-70)”
[Grn 2002, p.61]. In othr words, Spir argus that slf-idntity is ncssary for an objct to b a Bing,
yt it is not ncssary for it to xist. Hnc th xistnc of Bcoming, which cannot b a Bing bcaus
it is nvr slf-idntical. Not only dos it lack “diachronic slf-idntity” (or a slfhood which ndurs ovr
tim), it also lacks “synchronic slf-idntity” (maning it is not slf-idntical at any givn momnt) [ibid.,
p.60-63]. Bcoming is a world of “unnding fluux or chang” (Spir 1877, 1:164), and Bcoming is all that our
snss prciv [ibid., p.61]. For xampl, if w xprinc a pncil, our snss may tll us that th pncil
is hard, or that th pncil is cylindrical. Yt, nithr of ths xprincs ar a synthsis of idntical things
[P = P]. Rathr, thy ar a synthsis of differnt things [P = H, or P = C]. As a rsult, th xprinc is a
‘unity of differnc’ which is not slf-idntical at any momnt, and thrfor violats th principl of non-
contradiction at vry momnt. In brif, all xprinc is Bcoming [ibid., p.61-62, 64].
But why dos Spir bliv that Bcoming cannot b thought? The answr is Spir, lik Parmnids,
associats thought with Bing – and thrfor with slf-idntity (Spir 1877, 2:177). (In fact, Spir concivs
of Bing/knowldg as “an absolut unconditional Parmnidan On” [Grn 2002, p.60].) Theis is du to
Bcoming’s lack of slf-idntity. Indd, bcaus it is nvr slf-idntical, Bcoming violats th law of
noncontradiction – it is contradictory. Whil Spir admits that somthing which is contradictory – .g. a
squar not-squar – could xist, it could nvr b concivd or thought. Howvr, this raiss th qustion
of why w should bliv that Bcoming litrally xists. Whil it is tru that th mr inability to think
somthing is not proof that it cannot xist [ibid., p.66], that dos not man w hav any rason to bliv
that it xists. Grn xplains Spir’s position in this way: “Bcoming – th occurrnc of vnts in tim –
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is incompatibl with th truth or falsity of our judgmnts. Theis might lad on to dny that bcoming is
objctivly ral, but Spir insists that th rality of tim cannot b dnid. The finnal inscapabl argumnt
for th xistnc of tim is th succssion of our own thoughts and snsations – th fact that our mntal
lif itslf bcoms” [Grn 2002, p.50]. In othr words, th fact that Bcoming xists is provn by th fact
that our thoughts com to b. As such, Bcoming cannot b thought, yt its influunc on our thoughts is
undniabl du our dirct xprinc of it in th coming-to-b of our mntal livs.
But why should that prclud th possibility of mpirical knowldg? Why is th gap btwn Bing
and Bcoming ‘unbridgabl’? Spir himslf admits that “thr is no contradiction in th ida of a mrly
conditional unity of differnt qualitis (.g. 1:179-80)” [Grn 2002, p.64; cf. Spir 1877, 1:191]. Howvr, h
dos not bliv this to b a viabl solution; for Spir blivs that in ordr to b thought, mpirical objcts
hav to b Bings. As such, thy hav to b slf-idntical, “unconditional unitis.” (Theis fact is spcially
important for our purposs – for as Grn xplains, “Spir’s argumnt that objcts must b unconditional
unitis drivs in larg masur from argumnts in Kant’s antinomis of pur rason” [Grn 2002, p.64].)
Furthrmor, “Spir argus that mpirical objcts, by thir vry natur, rfr to unconditiond substancs
such as atoms or a Spinozistic God (1877, 1:281, 295). Without ths substancs thr would b no objct-
iv connctions btwn qualitis in th world” [ibid., p.65]. An mpirical objct dmands “a condition for
why its qualitis ar unitd (2:75). Theis tndncy of objcts to rfr to th unconditiond is th objctiv
corrlat of th fact that our thoughts about objcts must b unconditiond unitis” [ibid.]. Put brifluy, an
mpirical objct can only b thought if it is Bing, and Bing alon. If thr is any Bcoming in th objct,
it cannot b thought at all – for Bcoming is contradictory. Ther is no way to synthsiz Bcoming with
Bing in an objct, without rndring that objct an unthinkabl contradiction (.g., an “unconditional
conditional unity,” a “thing-idntical-with-differnc,” a “squar not-squar”). Howvr, th chang and
Bcoming prsnt in our mpirical xprincs cannot b dnid, which mans vry mpirical thought
must b contradictory – unlss w can xplain away ths changs by grounding thm in Bing, in th
unconditiond. Then w can say that chang and Bcoming ar not ‘chang’ or ‘Bcoming,’ pr s. Thy
ar mrly xprssions of Bing – causs and ffects – which form a chain of causation raching all th
way back to th unconditiond (.g., atoms, Spinoza’s God, tc.). Theus mpirical objcts and th changs
w xprinc in thm ar, in fact, Bing and Bing alon, and can b thought. The qustion is: Can w
rally rduc ‘chang’ and ‘Bcoming’ to xprssions of an unconditiond Bing? Spir’s answr: No.
Whil “Spir argus that mpirical objcts dmand to b conditiond by th unconditiond, h also
argus that this dmand can nvr b satisfind. Empirical objcts ar a multiplicity, and no unconditional
unifincation of multiplicity is possibl” [ibid., p.66]. Grn continus, xplaining that for Spir, “absolutly
simpl and unconditiond substancs cannot intrsct with th multiplicity of th world thy ar mant to
xplain. The unconditiond can nvr condition th conditiond” [ibid.]. To put this simply, Spir agrs
with Kant’s Antinomis that mpirical objcts must b xplaind in trms of Bing [A1, A2] – yt Bing
itslf [as pr th fourth Antinomy] collapss in th fac of nihilistic Bcoming. Spir’s rasoning for why
this is th cas is quit intrsting: Spir argus that Bing must b immannt to th sris that it grounds
in ordr to hav any xplanatory powr. (Not that this is th sam argumnt Kant mploys in th fourth
Antinomy’s Thesis whn h dnis th viability of a transcndnt unconditiond bing.) Yt Spir dnis
that ‘Bing’ is capabl of bing immannt in th finrst plac.
THE ANTINOMIES AND NIETZSCHE: II-A2     26
II-A2.  The Antinomial Spir: ‘Causality’ and The Impossibility of ‘Immannc’
SPIR’S concption of causality is quit similar to Spinoza’s,45 in that h thinks that in ordr for causality to
b concivd, it must b concivd as th xprssion of a singl, unconditional unity (Spir 1877, 1:256-57,
1:268-71; cf. Grn 2002, p.76-77]. For unlss th whol of rality is idntical to itslf – and th rlation-
ships btwn objcts ar govrnd by trnal, lawlik connctions [Spir 1877, 1:271] – thr can b no
guarant that any two cass ar th sam, or that idntical things cam to b as thy ar through idntical
procsss. Causal rasoning rquirs th xistnc of idntical cass [ibid., 1:102]; and if th fac of rality
itslf could chang, th xistnc of idntical cass could nvr b guarantd. “The validity of induction,”
Grn xplains, “rsts upon th blif in th ssntial idntity of th world with itslf (1:271). To s th
world as bcoming […] is to rjct inductiv rasoning and to s ach vnt as an uncausd arbitrary
happning (2:134)” [Grn 2002, p.77]. In othr words, th concpt of ‘causality’ dmands that th uni-
vrs b concivd as Bing – that w “s natur as a whol as on unchanging unit, as a slf-idntical
substanc” [ibid., p.76] – and ‘chang’ as a mr xprssion of th lawlik natur of Bing. Theis singular
and trnal unity may chang “in its particulars,” but nvr “in th aggrgat” (Spir 1877, 1:271). Theus, for
Spir, ‘causality’ itslf dmands a rality akin to Spinoza’s “fac of th whol univrs.”46
But if Spir’s concptions of Bing, causation, th univrs, and our knowldg of it ar so rmarkably
Spinozistic, thn why dos Spir mbrac th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ at all? It would not mak sns to
do so unlss Spir, lik Kant, did not bliv that such a concption could scap th Antinomis. In othr
words, Spir blivd that th concpt of ‘causation’ ncssarily dmandd a concption of rality similar
to Spinoza’s “fac of th whol univrs,” but that such a concption was ultimatly contradictory. Why
would Spir bliv this? Grn offers this answr: “The principl of causality’s attempt to forc th imag
of bing and slf-idntical unity onto bcoming and plurality fails. For th unconditiond can nvr intr-
sct with th changs or altrations in th world (1:327, 2:130-31). Any ‘finrst caus’ would hav to itslf
b causd. Any gnral law of natur will not b ncssary but will always rquir an xplanation of why
it is th way it is rathr than som way ls (1:329-30)” [Grn 2002, p.77]. Grn’s answr is rally two
answrs, for it dals with two sparat problms. (Whthr or not Spir connctd both of ths problms
in this way in his own writings is irrlvant.)
The finrst problm is ‘th problm of justifying finrst causs.’ If Aristotl tlls his class that thr is a
‘Prim Movr,’ any rasonably intllignt studnt might ask whr th ‘Prim Movr’ coms from. Theis
is not a particularly difficcult problm, howvr. In th fac of such qustions, all Aristotl would hav to do
is shrug his shouldrs and say that motion dmands a ‘Prim Movr,’ and that nothing byond it can b
concivd – which is sufficcint rason to postulat it as a ‘finrst caus.’ Bing unabl to xplain whr this
‘finrst caus’ cam from dos not, in any concivabl way, introduc contradictions into th cosmology that
it grounds. (No on thinks that th inability to prov an axiom introducs contradictions into th logical
systm which is built upon it.) Mor importantly, for our purposs, is just bcaus Aristotl cannot know
whr th ‘Prim Movr’ coms from dos not man h cannot xplain how it can intrsct with changs
and altrations in th world. In ordr to prov that a ‘finrst caus’ cannot intrsct with its ffects, on has
to prov that thr is a mystrious gap btwn ‘finrst caus’ and th world, not that th origin of th ‘finrst
caus’ itslf is unknown (or unknowabl). The latter is irrlvant to ‘causal rasoning,’ xcpt with rgard
to th origin of th univrs itslf. Spinoza also addrsss this xact problm with his doctrin of causa sui:
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th ida that God is th caus of Himslf. Bcaus H is infinnit and trnal, God must xist always and
vrywhr, for h simply is xistnc – thr is nothing which could b th caus of Him xcpt Him.
Nitzsch would vntually rbuk this concpt in th harshst trms, without argumnt.47 Spir may hav
don th sam, but vn if h did, it would not b a ral thrat to Spinoza’s position; and vn if it was, it
would do nothing to indicat that ‘causality’ itslf is a contradictory notion.
The scond problm is ‘th problm of th (im)possibility of immannc,’ or ‘th problm of locating a
connction btwn th unconditiond and th conditiond.’ Theis problm is far trickir, and it actually
poss a thrat to causal rasoning – bcaus it thratns to crat a gap btwn th unconditiond ‘finrst
caus’ and th conditiond ‘world’ that it grounds. If w rcall th fourth Thesis of th Antinomis, w
rcall Kant’s argumnt that an unconditiond must b ‘immannt’ to th sris that it grounds. Spinoza’s
God is immannt – or at last, H is on papr. Yt proving that Spinoza’s God is indd immannt is mor
complicatd than it may sm. For xampl, according to Spinoza, th xistnc of any finnit thing must
b xplaind by following th chain of causation all th way back to th infinnit Atteribut which grounds
it (which itslf must b groundd in God’s ssnc). All wll and good – but how do finnit things mrg
from an infinnit thing? How can infinnity bcom finnit? Spinoza attempts to addrss this by introducing
th concpt of ‘infinnit mods,’ which act as bridgs btwn Atteributs and ‘finnit mods.’ Howvr, this
solution lavs us with th sam prdicamnt – how can an infinnit thing bcom finnit? – only th words
hav changd. If ‘infinnit mods’ wr supposd to b th bridg btwn Atteributs and mods, now w
finnd ourslvs wanting a bridg to connct to th bridg – and it is ntirly possibl that no matter how
many bridgs btwn bridgs w introduc, th actual point of contact btwn infinnit and finnit may
nvr b found. If th point of contact btwn infinnit and finnit cannot b locatd, this would man that
Spinoza’s God is immannt on papr, and nothing mor. Goth, with his usual loqunc, sums up th
problm is this way: “Hr w mt th ral difficculty, on w do not always s clarly: btwn ida and
xprinc thr invitably yawns a chasm.”48 It is byond th scop of this papr to xplor whthr or
not Spinoza – or any othr thinkr – succds in bridging this chasm. What matters for our purposs hr
is that Spir blivd that such pursuits wr futil.
Som may b tmptd to think that this scond problm is rally only a problm for an infinnitistic
cosmology (.g. Spinoza’s God, Kant’s A1 concption, tc.), and that a finnitistic cosmology (.g. A2) and
its ‘finrst caus’ (.g. Aristotl’s ‘Prim Movr’) can avoid th issu altogthr. Aftr all, in a finnit univrs,
thr is no nd to finnd th bridg btwn th infinnit and th finnit – thus thr is no unbridgabl gap
btwn th unconditiond and th conditiond. Howvr, th rality is not so simpl – for vn without
th finnit/infinnit problm, it may still b impossibl to locat th point of contact btwn unconditiond
and conditiond. Grn xplains th issu in this way: according to Spir, “absolutly unconditiond sub-
stancs cannot intrsct with th multiplicity of th world thy ar mant to xplain. The unconditiond
can nvr condition th conditiond” [Grn 2002, p.66]. Grn asks us to considr th A2/Thesis position
of th finrst Antinomy (which h misidntifins as th “Nwtonian position” [ibid.]), and its ramifincations as
rgards absolut spac [s II-C2]: “Absolut spac was supposd to dtrmin how big and whr things
ar ovr and abov th siz and position of things in rlationships to othr things. It was supposd to b
th masurr of all things that dos not itslf gt masurd. But how dos absolut spac prform this act
of dtrmination? The totality of rlations ar compatibl with any rlationship in absolut spac. They
could b within a vast xpans or within th had of a pin. They could b slightly to th lft or slightly to
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th right. But that mans that thr is no contnt to th connction btwn absolut spac [i.. th uncon-
ditiond] and th totality of rlations [i.. th “sris”] that will dtrmin how big or whr th totality is.
The sam point can b mad concrning th simpl substancs, or atoms, out of which th thsis position
claims th world is constitutd” [ibid.; cf. Spir 1877, 1:285]. 
As such, whthr w look to atoms or th “fac of th whol univrs,” th point of contact with th
unconditiond ‘finrst caus’ is nvr locatd. An atom (th lowst concivabl lvl of th sris) can always
b brokn down into subatomic particls, thn into sub-subatomic particls, and so on, ad infinnitum. Each
lvl dmands an vn lowr lvl to condition it. The fac of th univrs (i.. th causal sris takn as a
whol) – vn whn it is concivd in “absolut” trms – can nvr ntr into any dfinnitiv rlationship
with th ‘highst [unconditiond] mmbr’ which is supposd to dtrmin it. It will always point to an
vn highr conditiond – on that may dtrmin its absolut siz, absolut location, and so on, tc. From
th point of viw of th sris, thr is always both anothr lvl up and anothr lvl down. The Prim
Movr nvr actually maks contact with th world that was supposd to rciv motion from it, no matter
how many bridgs w introduc. So vn in th finnitistic A2 concption, th unconditiond bing which
grounds th sris turns out to b immannt on papr alon; thus it cannot actually ground th sris. In
brif, th prsnc of Bing in th mpirical ralm is undrmind from both sids of th cosmology by a
‘pincr atteack of Bcoming’ – that is, by Bcoming assrting itslf and dstabilizing Bing at th highst
and lowst lvls of th cosmology. Theus, for Spir, no matter what cosmological concption on chooss,
‘immannc’ is impossibl; and th unconditiond (Bing) can hav no xplanatory powr in th mpirical
world of xprinc.
The ‘impossibility of immannc’ is profoundly important to Spir’s position rgarding ‘causality.’
For ‘causality’ dmands Bing, and thrfor (as pr th fourth Antinomy) dmands ‘immannc.’ As a
rsult, ‘causality’ is a contradictory concpt. Bcaus th dmand for ‘immannc’ can nvr b fulfinlld,
nithr can th dmand for ‘causality.’ Theus, “instad of bing, th [mpirical] world is an unnding chain
of contingncy. […] Undr this position, in th nd no altration or chang is vr xplaind (1:373-74). As
Spir puts it […]: ‘Theat somthing happns at all, that altrations occur at all, that chang xists, that can-
not hav a condition or caus’ (2:131). In th nd, chang simply happns without caus: ‘Theus w must
viw chang in gnral as a givn stat of rality, which is maintaind through its own impuls, and not
ask about its original sourc’ (2:132). Our fling that this is intolrabl is simply our dsir to apply th
concpt of bing [‘causation’/‘immannc’] to bcoming” [Grn 2002, p.77]. In othr words, just lik th
fourth Antinomy – in which th Thesis position (Bing) ultimatly collapss into th Antithsis position
(Bcoming) – th concpt of ‘causality’ must collaps into a sris of ‘uncausd, arbitrary happnings.’ Of
cours, th Antithsis position must also collaps – and our xprincs invitably call out for ‘causality’
again. Hnc, rathr than bing a simpl falshood, th concpt of ‘causality’ is a ncssary contradiction
govrnd by th ‘fundamntal antinomy.’
II-A3.  The Antinomial Spir: Kant’s Schmatism as Faild Antinomial Escap Hatch
ONE mystry still rmains rgarding Spir’s rading of th Antinomis, howvr. Why dos Spir, a No-
Kantian, bliv that th Antinomis must bar mpirical knowldg to vryon?  The Antinomis ar
traps dsignd to undrmin transcndntal ralists – such as Spinoza, Libniz, and Nwton. Kant’s own
position – transcndntal idalism – is posd as an altrnativ that avoids th Antinomis altogthr. As
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such, on would xpct Spir – a thinkr who mbracs much of Kant’s thory of judgmnt – to apply th
‘fundamntal antinomy’ to transcndntal ralists alon. And yt, Spir applis his ‘antinomy’ univrsally.
Why? It would mak no sns to do so unlss, contra Kant, Spir did not bliv that th Kantian idalist
position was capabl of ithr avoiding or scaping th Antinomis. Theis is indd th cas. In fact, Spir
blivd that rathr than sking an scap hatch to th Antinomis, th propr cours of action was to
bit th bullt and accpt that th Antinomis wr inscapabl. To brifluy summariz his position: Spir
blivs that th concpt of ‘mpirical judgmnt’ is contradictory for th sam rason that ‘causality’ is
contradictory. Goth’s chasm yawns btwn th timlss unity of th ‘I’ (Bing) and th plurality and
chang of snsibl xprinc (Bcoming). Spir is ld to this conclusion by th fluaws in Kant’s thory of
judgmnt – spcifincally, in his thory of apprcption.
As Grn xplains it: “Apprcption is […] a unity of th slf of which w ar not mpirically awar”
[Grn 2002, p.40]. “W hav indpndnt vidnc of th apprcptiv slf through th ‘I think’ that w
can rfluctivly atteach to any of our rprsntations. The slf indicatd by th ‘I think’ is th subjct of x-
princ that is nvr abl to b mad an objct of xprinc (B131-33). […] The fact that w ar so awar
[of our mntal rprsntations, associations, tc.] shows that w hav a unity of slf that cannot b rduc-
d to mpirical rgularitis” [ibid.]. Apprcption is vital to Kant’s account of judgmnt bcaus it prsrv-
s th objctiv validity of human, mpirical judgmnt in a way that is compatibl with th notion of th
non-mpirical, timlss and transcndntal ‘I’ [ibid., p.41]. Howvr, in stablishing th objctiv validity
of our judgmnts about rality, “Kant has xplaind only th formal charactr of thought” [ibid.]. H has
not xplaind “why w ngag in th particular concptualizations that w do. Why is it that on mpiri-
cal concpt is usd rathr than anothr? […] Why ar th striking of a match and its lighting ncssarily
connctd and not th striking of a match and th apparanc of a gni?” [ibid., p.41-42]. Theis problm
is what Baily rfrs to as th problm of how snsibl xprinc can b admitted into judgmnt [Baily
2013, p.146]. If Kant fails to xplain why and how th non-mpirical ‘I’ applis a spcifinc judgmnt to a
spcifinc mpirical xprinc, thn his thory of apprcption loss th ability to to justify th claim that
objctiv, mpirical judgmnt is possibl. In ordr for th objctiv validity of an mpirical judgmnt to
b prsrvd in a way which is compatibl with th transcndntal ‘I,’ Kant nds to b abl to account
for how th ‘I’ intrscts with mpirical data – to xplain how mpirical data can caus th ‘I’ to apply a
particular judgmnt. Othrwis, a mystrious gap rmains btwn th ‘I’ and snsibl xprinc, such
that w could nvr xplain why or how th mpirical xprinc of striking a match could caus th non-
mpirical ‘I’ to think anything at all, much lss to apply a spcifinc judgmnt to it [ibid., p.43-45].
Kant attempts to solv this problm by proving that th choics of mpirical concpts which th mind
applis to particular cass “follow from th ncssary charactr of apprcption” [Grn 2002, p.42]. To
that nd, Kant mploys what Grn calls “Kant’s unhappy solution,” namly: “th dus x machina of
th transcndntal synthsis of th imagination, which is supposd to function as a bridg btwn th
passiv and spontanous lmnts in cognition. It is th imagination that units thm togthr so that
thy can b takn up by th spontanity of th undrstanding (Kant 1965, A77-78/B102-3)” [ibid., p.44].
Theis occurs whn “th synthsis of th imagination maks th formal catgoris rlvant to th intuition
by crating snsory conditions or markrs for thir application” [ibid.]. Kant’s stratgy, which Grn rfrs
to as th schmatism, is “widly acknowldgd to b th wak link in Kant’s transcndntal dduction” (or,
as Baily puts it: Kant’s solution is “notoriously unsatisfactory” [Baily 2013, p.146]) [Grn 2002, p.44].
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W do not hav tim to adquatly discuss th difficcultis raisd by th schmatism; or how it crats, as
Grn argus, a “causal gap btwn snsory contnt and mpirical contnt” that “sparats our mpiri-
cal judgmnts from what thy ar about” [ibid., p.45]. The asist analogy is to th third Antinomy. Kant
concivs of th transcndntal ‘I’ as a Bing which is “spontanous” – maning that is has ‘fr will,’ or
an ability “to bgin to act of itslf, without rquiring to b dtrmind to action by an antcdnt caus in
accordanc with th law of causality” (B561/A533) [cf. Grn 2002, p.40]. In othr words, this ‘I’ ntails
what th third Antinomy’s Thesis calls th ‘causality of frdom’ – and with it, th thrat of violating th
“unity of xprinc,” which would rduc th ‘I’ to an “mpty thought ntity” [s I-B2.]. Introducing th
transcndntal schmatism was mant to supply th answr to this problm – th xplanation for how
th ‘I’ could b “spontanous” and connctd to th agnt’s antcdnt stats (.g., snsibl xprincs).
Howvr, this introducs a nw dilmma: dos th schmatism’s ‘synthsis of th imagination’ occur in
a causal fashion, or spontanously? If it is a causal procss, “it is impossibl to s how it can b linkd to
th spontanity of thought. If it is an act of spontanity, howvr, it is hard to s how it can connct with
th dtrminat charactr of intuition” [ibid., p.45]. In brif, th schmatism dos not allow us to scap
th Antinomis, sinc w ar forcd to choos btwn two differnt undrstandings of th ‘synthsis of
imagination’: th formr (i.., th ‘causal’ undrstanding) aligns with th Antithsis – th latter (i.., th
‘spontanous’ undrstanding) aligns with th Thesis. As both positions invitably collaps, thy tak th
schmatism with thm, no matter which option w choos.
Kant’s apprcptiv account of judgmnt is th cornrston of Spir’s account [Grn 2002, p.47].
“For Spir, th distinguishing charactristics of th Kantian transcndntal unity of apprcption, which
is rquird for thought, ar its timlssnss and unity” [ibid.]. Howvr, in taking up so much of Kant’s
thory of apprcption, Spir now facs th sam problm as Kant: that is, th problm of th causal gap
btwn snsibl xprinc and th transcndntal ‘I’ – btwn an mpirical judgmnt and how th ‘I’
applis it. If this causal gap – th sam gap that Kant trid to cross with th transcndntal schmatism –
cannot b bridgd, thn Spir cannot xplain how “this timlss unity of apprcption conncts with th
tmporal fluow of snsations” [ibid., p.47]. “Spir gnrally spaks of th problm as on of conncting th
tmporality and particularity of snsation [i.. snsibl xprinc] with th timlssnss and simplicity
of apprcption [i.. thought]. Spir taks this gap so sriously that h dnis that it can b bridgd at all”
[ibid.]. Accordingly, h dnis th validity of mpirical judgmnts. Onc again, rathr than bing simpl
falshoods, th concpts which w nd in ordr to think of rality (‘mpirical judgmnt,’ ‘causality,’ tc.),
prov to b contradictions.
Put simply, Kant’s transcndntal ‘I’ of apprcption is a timlss, unconditional unity. Hnc, th ‘I’
is Bing, vry bit as much as th unconditiond is Bing. As such, Kant’s transcndntal ralism dos
not avoid th Antinomis by Spir’s lights – sinc it still has to account for how th chasm btwn Bing
and Bcoming can b bridgd (or, in this spcifinc cas, th gap btwn thought and snsibl xprinc).
Kant’s schmatism is prcisly such an attempt to locat a bridg btwn thought (Bing) and snsibl
xprinc (Bcoming). Yt Kant’s schmatism fails, and thrby Kant’s thory of apprcption fails to
bridg thought and xprinc, Bing and Bcoming. Bing, whthr it is concivd as a transcndntal
‘I’ or th unconditiond ground of a cosmological sris, fails to b immannt to th world of Bcoming
(i.. th world of xprinc). Theus, Kant’s transcndntal idalism not only fails to avoid th Antinomis,
it fails to scap thm; and Spir concluds that thy simply cannot b scapd.
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For Kant, th lsson of th Antinomis is that transcndntal ralism lads to contradictions, and
philosophy rquirs a transcndntally idal altrnativ. Kant constructs th Antinomis thinking h has
an scap hatch, but Spir taks th failur of Kant’s schmatism as proof that his scap hatch fails with it.
Rathr than sking to finnd an altrnativ to th schmatism, Spir dnis that an antinomial scap hatch
xists. Hnc, h drivs a vry differnt lsson from th Antinomis: that contradiction is an inxtricabl
aspct of rality. Ther is no altrnativ to b sought. H boils th Antinomis down to a singl principl
– th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ – and compls us to bit th bullt.
II-A4.  The Antinomial Spir: His “Error Theory” and th Therat of Noncognitivism
FOR Spir, “[i]nsofar as w think, w must b thinking of a world without any tim or particularity – an a-
tmporal Parmnidan On” [Grn 2002, p.47]. But if that is th cas, thn what do w call our thoughts
about this world, and our mpirical xprincs within it? What do w call mpirical judgmnt, which, as
w hav sn abov, Spir taks to b a contradictory concpt? W cannot simply dny thir xistnc, for
vn if such thoughts ar contradictory, thr is no dnying that w xprinc thm. So what ar thy?
Spir’s answr: w call thm “rrors.”
Grn xplains Spir’s “rror thory” in this way. Th “natur of rprsntation is always th sam
– it is th ncssary unity standing outsid th tmporal fluow of consciousnss. It thrfor follows that
individual rprsntations [i.. thoughts] do not actually xist at all, rathr only individual contnt [i..,
sns xprincs],” and that “rprsntations differ from ach othr only in this contnt and rciv th
smblanc of individuality” (Spir 1877, 1:73) [Grn 2002, p.47-48]. Theought is indpndnt of individual-
ity and particularity [ibid.], and “if w dviat from bing [i.., Spir’s ‘Parmnidan On’], w fail to think”
(Spir 1877, 1:30-31). As such, “thought xists in inscapabl tnsion with th world of xprinc,” bcaus
w cannot think anything that w mt in xprinc [ibid.]. “[C]ognition of xprinc is contradictory
bcaus it is an attempt to forc th imag of ncssity onto th tmporal fluows of snsation. W ar think-
ing about th world only to th xtnt that w apply th imag of unity, and yt in doing so w conciv
a world that contradicts particularity and th fluow of tim. The ida of th mpirical world contains within
itslf this contradiction btwn particularity and unity, btwn tim and timlssnss” [ibid.]. Bcaus
concpts of Bing – unity, timlssnss, slf-idntity, causality, tc. – ar as ncssary for cognition as thy
ar incompatibl with th Bcoming that is vidnt through snsibl xprinc, all mpirical judgmnt
or knowldg is fals, a mr instanc of rronous thought [ibid., p.60]. Theis is Spir’s “rror thory,” and
it too is govrnd by th ‘fundamntal antinomy.’
Howvr, it must b notd that Spir’s “rror thory” is fundamntally unstabl. His argumnt for th
rronous natur of mpirical judgmnt – i.., that it is fals on account of th impossibility of taking up
snsibl xprinc into judgmnt – only justifins th claim that mpirical objcts cannot b thought. It
dos not provid us with rason to bliv that our thought about mpirical objcts rrs. Yt if Spir cannot
prov that falshood in cognition occurs [cf. Spir 1877, 1:107], thn his “rror thory” has no justifincation
[ibid., 1:81-89]. Instad of an “rror thory,” Grn xplains, th inability to think of objcts “would push
him toward a noncognitivist position” [Grn 2002, p.66]. Spir sms to sns this problm, so h argus
“that rror occurs bcaus thought about multiplicity” – which is ntaild by mpirical objcts – “rathr
than bing only mpirical association, ‘stands undr th influunc of two sorts of laws’” (Spir 1877, 1:107)
[Grn 2002, p.63]. The “two sorts of laws” Spir mntions ar a) mpirical laws of association, and b) logical
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laws [ibid.]. “Spir admits that ‘if th function of thought wr dtrmind only through logical laws, fals-
hood in cognition could not occur’ (1:107)” [Grn 2002, p.63]. Morovr, mpirical associations do not
qualify as thought (Spir 1877, 1:83). Howvr, Spir argus, bcaus mpirical judgmnts fall undr both
logical laws and mpirical laws of association, th tnsion btwn thm lads to an rror: a fals blif in
individual, particular thoughts. Thes cannot xist, for th only thought which is possibl is th univrsal,
non-particular thought of Bing – of th absolut Parmnidan On [cf. Grn 2002, p.47-48, 63]. Theus,
Spir claims, our mpirical judgmnts ar indd rrors, and not mrly non-thoughts.
Yt, Spir’s solution struggls with th sam sort of problms that bst Kant’s schmatism:  How do
ths contingnt laws of association connct  with th pur Bing of thought? It would b mor consist-
nt, Grn argus, to claim “w ar thinking only to th xtnt that our thoughts ar of an unconditiond
unity. If w dviat from this unconditiond unity and admit plurality, w do not rr – w simply fail to
think” [ibid., p.64]. Not this tnsion btwn “non-thought” [or noncognitivism] and “rror thory”; for
w shall s that Nitzsch’s thory of judgmnt falls into a vry similar pattern. 
And so concluds our discussion of Spir, th purpos of which was two-fold. First, w aimd to show
how Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy’ was a dirct rspons to Kant’s Antinomis; thus conncting Spir to
th antinomial through lin, which will, in turn, allow us to connct it to Nitzsch. Scond, by xamining
th ramifincations of th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ – particularly rgarding Spir’s thoris of causality and
judgmnt (his “rror thory”) – w st th stag for an xamination of th impact it would hav on Nit-
zsch’s thinking. Nitzsch’s rspons to th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ – which drov him to rjct a) th
possibility of objctiv mpirical judgmnt, and b) th vry xistnc of Bing – not only charactrizd a
signifincant portion of his philosophy for th majority (prhaps th ntirty) of his carr. It is what drov
him toward an “antithtic viw” of rality, and, by xtnsion, toward an antithtic alignmnt with Spinoza.
II-B1.  Nitzsch th No-Kantian?: Spir’s Rlation to Nitzsch’s Philosophical Contxt 49
IT was nar th nd of a priod of intns ngagmnt with No-Kantianism50 that Nitzsch discovrd
Spir. “Nitzsch borrowd th finrst dition of Afrikan Alxandrovich Spir’s (1837-90) Dnkn und Wirk-
lichkit […] in 1873,” Brobjr xplains, “and rrading it xtndd his knowldg of Kant and influuncd
his writing” [Brobjr 2008, p.59]. H borrowd th finrst dition of Spir’s book from th Basl Univrsity
Library finv tims btwn 1873 and 1874 – mor than any othr book during that priod [Grn 2002,
p.46; cf. Crscnzi 1994]. Then, in 1877, Nitzsch would buy and intnsivly rad th scond dition of
th work [Brobjr 2008, p.59]. H would continu rading, r-rading, annotating and xcrpting from it
for th rst of his activ lif [ibid., Tabl 3].51 In fact, “many of Nitzsch’s nots and commnts rgarding
pistmological qustions wr written in rspons to, and in opposition to, Dnkn und Wirklichkit”
[ibid., p.71]. On of th main idas from Spir that forcfully impactd Nitzsch was his “postulation of
a singl non-mpirical objct of judgmnt, on th grounds that th tmporal and manifold charactr of
snsibl xprinc contradicts th rquirmnts of concpt application” [Baily 2013, p.136]. Although
h rjctd th ida of a ‘non-mpirical objct of judgmnt,’ Nitzsch absorbd th rasoning bhind it –
that ‘th charactr of snsibl xprinc contradicts th rquirmnts of concpt application’ – and as a
rsult, bcam skptical about th possibility that any judgmnt could b succssfully applid to rality;
or, in othr words, that any judgmnt could b “tru.” “Indd,” Baily continus, “bfor Twilight of th
Idols Nitzsch found himslf in th pculiar position of rjcting th notion of an inaccssibl rality in
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th nam of th rality that is accssibl to us whilst also dnying that w can mak gnuin judgmnts
about that rality” [ibid., p.141]. Nitzsch’s arly unpublishd writings, as wll as his publishd works
from Human, All Too Human to Byond Good and Evil, “ndorsd Spir’s argumnt for th impossibility
of mpirical judgmnts, according to which a concpt can b applid only to a slf-idntical objct and
no such objct manifstd in snsibl xprinc” [ibid., p.142]. Theis is indd a strang position, as “it is
paradoxical to claim to know that w can hav no gnuin knowldg,” spcially whil at th sam tim
afficrming (as Nitzsch dos) “th importanc of mpirical knowldg and making numrous knowldg
claims” [ibid., p.138]. 
It is in momnts of this sort that th naturalistically-inclind Nitzsch radr fls th long, cold
shadow of th wastbaskt looming ovr thm, and out of charity thy attempt to rintrprt his thought
into a mor dfnsibl form. Theis tndncy has affectd not only how Nitzsch is rad, but also how his
intllctual dvlopmnt is chartd. Baily, for xampl, in his articl on Nitzsch’s rlationship to Kant
and th Kantians, d-mphasizs th priod in which Nitzsch was most undr th influunc of Spir by
lapfrogging ovr it. Theough Baily dos admit, as h must, that Nitzsch qustiond th accssibility of
knowldg to th human prspctiv for quit som tim, h sms to think this priod btter rprsnts
th Spiran influunc which Nitzsch vntually scapd rathr than th matur thought of Nitzsch’s
latr works [ibid. p,143-44; cf. fn.23].52 Baily argus that in Twilight [Ch.3, “‘Rason’ in Philosophy”],
“Nitzsch abandons Spir’s argumnt for th impossibility of mpirical judgmnts.” Morovr, Nitzsch
“not only rjcts th postulation of non-mpirical objcts, as h had don prviously, but also dnis that
rality can b dtrmind on logical grounds” – a ky componnt of Spir’s argumnt [ibid., p.142]. Theus,
“only in Twilight […] dos Nitzsch rjct th Spiran grounds on which h had prviously dnid that
w can mak mpirical judgmnts – that is, th ‘logical’ grounds that concpts can b applid only to a
slf-idntical objct. By rjcting ths grounds […] h coms to accpt that w can mak judgmnts of
this rality” [ibid., p.143]. Whil Baily’s argumnt is ntirly plausibl and worthy of srious attention,
it is incrdibly limitd in scop. By jumping to Nitzsch’s argumnts in Twilight of th Idols (written in
1888), Baily passs ovr quit narly Nitzsch’s ntir carr (which ndd in 1889 with his complt
mntal collaps). In what sms to b an attempt to sav at last som part of Nitzsch’s work – i.. th
parts which can b justifind from a naturalistic standpoint – Baily jtteisons most of Nitzsch’s carr as
an incomprhnsibl (and indfnsibl) Spiran paradox.
Yt, unfortunatly for Baily, right up until vry nd of Nitzsch’s carr – vn as h workd on
his intndd magnum opus, The Will to Powr, which h nvr compltd du to his mntal collaps –
thr continud to b rcurring chos of th Spiran thms from his pr-Twilight writings. H still
rturns, tim and tim again, to th notion that to th xtnt that w think at all, what w think must b
fals: “Parmnids said, ‘On cannot think of what is not’; – w ar at th othr nd of th xtrm, and
say, ‘What can b thought must crtainly b a finction’” (WP 539) [cf. Grn 2002, p.60]. Therfor, vn
if Nitzsch did brak with th No-Kantians in Twilight, it was not a clan brak. Baily might countr
that th book known as The Will to Powr is an amalgam of nots assmbld aftr his dath.53 Therfor,
th argumnts found in The Will may not b positions h was truly committed to – thy may simply b
mor of his famous philosophical “xprimnts.” According to Baily, Nitzsch’s dabbling with idalism
(particularly in his notbooks) ar usually mr xprimnts to which Nitzsch nvr truly committed
himslf [Baily 2013, p.137-138] – and this may b tru. Still, it must b notd that xtrm caution must
THE ANTINOMIES AND NIETZSCHE: II-B1     34
b usd in dclaring this or that statmnt by Nitzsch to b an “xprimnt.” For it is incrdibly asy for
a commntator to nip-tuck away any aspct of Nitzsch’s thinking which is offensiv to thir thory by
dclaring it a mr “xprimnt.” Morovr, vn if thy wr “xprimnts,” th fact that Nitzsch was
still “xprimnting” with Spiran concpts in his post-Twilight nots implis that h had not compltly
abandond Spir. In fact, sinc Baily’s main sourc of vidnc that Nitzsch had lft th Spiran viw
of judgmnt bhind is mrly on chaptr from on book in on priod of Nitzsch’s activ lif (that is,
TI: “‘Rason’ in Philosophy”), th onus falls on Baily to prov that th argumnt from Twilight was not,
itslf, an “xprimnt.” Eithr way, Nitzsch’s Twilight of th Idols likly rprsnts a far lss dramatic
dpartur from Spir than Baily suggsts. Whil it is plausibl that Nitzsch driftd from Spir and th
No-Kantians as h maturd, th vidnc sms to suggst that h nvr compltly scapd th grip of
th transcndntal tradition [Grn 2002, p.165]. Therfor, on cannot undrstand Nitzsch’s thought
and its dvlopmnt, not vn in his finnal works, by lapfrogging ovr his smingly paradoxical Spiran
priod. If sns can b mad of ithr, it must b mad in light of Spir’s influunc.
In ithr cas, w ar facd with a clar distinction. Whr th influunc of Spir and No-Kantian
philosophy on Nitzsch’s thought prior to 1888 is wll-stablishd and agrd upon [Baily and Grn
both attest to it (Baily 2013, p.141)], th rlationship btwn Nitzsch and Kantian philosophy aftr
Twilight is unclar. Therfor, w will b limiting our window of Spiran influunc to th yars btwn
1873 (th yar Nitzsch finrst discovrd Spir) and 1888 (th yar TI was written). Theis is anothr boon
to Grn’s thory: if tru, it canvass narly th whol of Nitzsch’s carr, and it rtains (som) valu
vn with rgard to th last yar of Nitzsch’s sanity – th yar in which h was furthst rmovd from
th No-Kantians who had influuncd his thinking for so long. For if Nitzsch was still in th middl of
a procss of sparating himslf from Spir whn h collapsd – if h had not yt “had don” with Spir by
th writing of Twilight, as Baily sms to bliv – thn no pictur of Nitzsch’s thought, at any stag
of his lif, can b complt without accounting for Spir’s plac in it.
II-B2.  Nitzsch th Contrarian?: Spir’s Rlation to Nitzsch’s Viw of Contradictions
“NIETZSCHE’S commnts concrning logic,” Grn argus, “provid furthr support for a No-Kantian
rading of his pistmologis” [Grn 2002, p.55]. Nitzsch famously (or infamously) qustions logic’s
utility – spcially latr in his carr as h driftd from Spir’s logic-orintd argumnts (as Baily has
pointd out [Baily 2013, p.142-43]). Howvr, this aspct of Nitzsch’s philosophy is xplord almost
xclusivly “by thos who argu that his philosophy itslf must b undrstood indpndntly of logic”
(Haar 1977, p.6-7); an approach which “ignors th fact that Nitzsch praiss logical form in rasoning
(HA 265) and that h provids, or at last attempts to provid, logically consistnt, if xtrmly comprs-
sd, argumnts for his conclusions” [Grn 2002, p.55]. Howvr, h nvrthlss maks radical claims
rgarding logical principls, such as his criticisms of th principl of noncontradiction. Nitzsch dos
not claim that th principl of noncontradiction is without valu. Howvr, h “dos […] argu that an
accptanc of th principl is not dmandd by th natur of th world. It is instad a consqunc of a
mrly psychological disinclination to contradict” (s KSA 7:7[110]; WP 515, 516, 535) [Grn 2002, p.
56]. Nitzsch’s viw maks sns if w accpt th Spiran influunc in his thought. “Bcaus Nitzsch
dnis th objctiv validity of all judgmnts,” on account of his accptanc of th Spiran argumnt for
th ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ “h dnis that anything but our subjctiv dispositions stand in th way of
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contradiction” (WP 516; KSA 9:6[124]) [ibid.]. The world can only dmand noncontradiction from us if
w can succssfully form and apply concpts to it – a possibility that Spir (and consquntly Nitzsch)
dnis [ibid.; cf. Baily 2013, p.136].
It is common for sympathtic commntators to attempt a d-radicalization of Nitzsch’s stanc
rgarding logic. “Considr,” Bohm suggsts, “Maudmari Clark, who taks Nitzsch to hold that our
judgmnts can b tru or fals not with rspct to things-in-thmslvs but according to our ‘bst stand-
ards of rational accptability’ (1990, 50),” which our currnt thoris can fail to mt [Grn 2002, p.56-
57]. Such an intrprtation dos not fint Nitzsch’s stanc, howvr. As Grn obsrvs, “if thr is any-
thing that violats our bst standards of rational accptability, it is contradictions” [ibid., p.57]. Litr is
anothr xampl. In his discussion of Nitzsch’s ‘prspctivism,’ h “accpts that Nitzsch abandons
mtaphysical ralism (1994, 343-51), but h rjcts what h calls th ‘Rcivd Viw’ of Nitzsch’s pis-
tmology, undr which ‘no prspctiv can njoy an pistmic privilg ovr any othr’ (334)” [ibid., p.
57]. Litr writs: “The pistmic mrits of a viw ar thos baring on its claim to count as knowldg;
at a bar minimum, thn, an pistmically privilgd viw must b capabl of bing tru or fals. Truth
carris an implicit rquirmnt of objctivity: what counts as bing th cas (as tru) must b indpnd-
nt of our prdilctions” [Litr 1994, p.336]. Howvr, if Nitzsch did bliv that our judgmnts wr
capabl of bing ‘tru or fals’ by ‘objctiv’ standards which ar ‘indpndnt of our prdilctions,’ thn
w would xpct Nitzsch to rjct contradictions as mr falshoods. As Grn succinctly puts it, “H
dosn’t” [Grn 2002, p.57]. Instad, Nitzsch claims that “[w] ar unabl to afficrm and dny on and
th sam thing,” but “this is a subjctiv mpirical law, not th xprssion of any ‘ncssity’ but only of
an ‘inability’” [WP 516; cf. Grn 2002, p.56].54 Therfor, vn if w accpt that Nitzsch driftd from
Spir and Spir’s notions rgarding logic in his post-Twilight yars, as Baily dos, th influunc of Spir in
Nitzsch’s thinking rmains. Accpting this allows us to btter mak sns of Nitzsch’s pistmology.
Thes atteitud ar ntirly consistnt if on allows that contradictions can actually xist, as pr th ‘fun-
damntal antinomy.’
Accpting Nitzsch’s Spiran atteitud toward contradictions also hlps us to mak sns of othr
aspcts of Nitzsch’s thought – for xampl, his viws of slf-idntity. Nitzsch rpatdly dnis th
xistnc of slf-idntical objcts, in his publishd works (HA 11, 18-19; BGE 4; TI 3:5) and his notbooks
(KSA 9:11[329-30]; WP 516, 521, 552, 574) – and yt, this fact of Nitzsch’s philosophy “has not bn
givn much attention by commntators. To th xtnt that th ida has bn addrssd, it has gnrally
bn assumd that Nitzsch rjcts diachronically slf-idntical objcts, […] as opposd to synchronic-
ally slf-idntical objcts, that is, objcts that ar slf-idntical at th vry sam momnt. An xampl is
Maudmari Clark, who rads Nitzsch as rjcting a mtaphysical world of trnal substancs only
(1990, 104-9). For Clark, Nitzsch’s dnial that rality is slf-idntical is compatibl with standard m-
pirical and scintifinc knowldg” [Grn 2002, p.60]. Grn provids us with two rason why it is mor
consistnt to rad Nitzsch as dnying that anything is slf-idntical at any momnt, not mrly that a
thing’s idntity dos not ndur ovr tim. The finrst is that Nitzsch “links his rjctions of slf-idntical
substancs with a rjction of th logical principl of slf-idntity (KSA 8:9[1, p.136], 12:7[4, p.266]; WP
520). To rad Nitzsch as rjcting mrly diachronic slf-idntity is to conclud that h is confusd about
on of th simplst and most rudimntary logical principls, for th logical principl of slf-idntity con-
crns synchronic slf-idntity only. It says nothing about whthr an objct is th sam thing ovr tim.
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Nor can on argu that Nitzsch mans somthing ls by ‘law of slf-idntity,’ for h maks it clar that
his targt is on of th ‘basic laws of logic’ (WP 530). The scond pic of vidnc is Nitzsch’s frqunt
claims that rality is contradictory (.g. PTG 15; KSA 7:19 [239], 9:21[3.53]). […] Onc again, th ida that
rality is contradictory must b a claim about a lack of synchronic slf-idntity. For nothing about an ob-
jct changing ovr tim is incompatibl with th law of noncontradiction” (cf. WP 517) [ibid., p.60-61].
Nitzsch’s rasoning can b btter trackd if w accpt that his viws rgarding logic, noncontradiction,
and slf-idntity hav thir sourc in Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy.’ In fact, “[w]hn Nitzsch splls out
th slf-idntical objcts whos xistnc h is rjcting (HA 18), h quots Spir (1877, 2:177),” driving
hom th lasting impact of Spir on Nitzsch’s thought [ibid., p.61].
In brif, through th majority of his carr, Nitzsch mbracs som radical conclusions in rgard to
th notion of judgmnt (on account of Spir’s influunc). And vn if h driftd away from Spir in th last
yar of his productiv lif, h still rtaind lmnts of Spiran thought in his own – as vidncd by his
nots rgarding logic and slf-idntity. As such, whthr w rad Nitzsch’s works for th nrichmnt of
naturalist projcts, post-modrnist projcts, or any othr projct whatsovr, w will b that much mor
succssful to th dgr that w can proprly account for th Spiran influunc on his thought at ach of
th various stags of his dvlopmnt – rathr than stratgically ignoring that influunc.
It is also worth noting that th stratgy of d-radicalization is oftn applid to Nitzsch’s thory of
judgmnt as wll. Baily, for xampl, attempts to d-radicaliz Nitzsch’s skpticism rgarding mpirical
judgmnts. H argus that Nitzsch’s critiqu of No-Kantian notions of an ‘inaccssibl rality’ “suggst
that h dos not hold [our] capacitis ‘simplify’ or ‘falsify’ rality or that th notion of rality is incohr-
nt, and instad indicat that, in rjcting […] inaccssibl rality, h also admits a rality which is, […]
in principl, accssibl to our prcptual and concptual capacitis, whil bing ontologically indpnd-
nt of thm” [Baily 2013., p.139]. Baily is claiming that Nitzsch’s rjction of an ‘inaccssibl rality’
is vidnc that Nitzsch supports mpirical judgmnt. Nitzsch mrly assrts that human knowldg
is prspctival; h dos not “prclud knowldg such that rality must b inaccssibl, or compltly in-
comprhnsibl, to prspctival knowrs lik ourslvs” [ibid., p.139-140]. Nitzsch is trying to protct
th accssibility of knowldg to partial, xprimntal, “frog’s” prspctivs [cf. BGE, ch.1, §2] from th
Kantians who would dny that rality is accssibl to our prcptual/concptual capacitis [ibid., p.138].
Howvr, ths attempts struggl for th sam rasons that Clark’s and Litr’s attempts to d-radicaliz
Nitzsch’s viws of logic struggl. Nitzsch mbracs contradictions (WP 515), dclars all knowldg
to b a finction (WP 539), and qustions our ability to form ‘concpts’ (WP 516; KSA 9:6[124]). Morovr,
vn Baily admits that Nitzsch ndorss Spir’s argumnt for th impossibility of mpirical judgmnts
prior to Twilight [ibid., p.142]. The finnal nail in th cofficn is that Nitzsch – following Spir – continually
idntifins ‘thought’ with ‘Bing’ (PTG 12-13;TI 3:2;WP 517-520); yt h insists that th fact that thought
“movs” and coms-to-b is proof that thr is no ‘Bing’ and only ‘Bcoming’ xists (HA 2, TI 3:2, KSA
7:23[12 & 19], WP 1062) [Grn 2002, p.51-52]. At tims h argus that to los th fals blif in ‘Bing’
would cost us th ability to think (WP 487). Evn if h softnd on this stanc in his post-Twilight works,
h nvr fully rlinquishd th notion that all thought falsifins. The qustion is: why? Onc again, Spir’s
‘fundamntal antinomy’ can provid us with an answr. The short vrsion is this: if h accpts objctiv
mpirical judgmnt as a possibility, Nitzsch loss his mtaphysics of ‘radical Bcoming.’
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II-B3.  Nitzsch and th Antinomial Therough Lin: The “Error Theory” and ‘Radical Bcoming’
GREEN xplains that “much of what Nitzsch says about th falsity of judgmnt – th incompatibility
with chang and bcoming – has strong parallls in Spir’s thought” [Grn 2002, p.48]. “In a rvaling
passag in his notbooks, Nitzsch paraphrass much of Spir’s discussion of th fundamntal antinomy
(Spir 1877, 1:379-80) and thn offers his own solution (s D’Iorio 1993, 277-83), undr which only rr-
or, and not tru knowldg of th slf-idntical, xits:
The antinomy: “th lmnts in givn rality that ar forign to th tru ssnc of th thing cannot 
b drivd from this tru ssnc, and thus must hav bn addd to it— but from whr? thr is no-
thing outsid th tru ssnc of things [that is, outsid of Bing]— thrfor an xplanation of th 
world is just as much ncssary as impossibl.” I unti th knot in this way: th tru ssnc of th 
world [that is, Bing] is a fabrication of th rprsnting bing [that is, th ‘go,’ th ‘I,’ th ‘dor’], 
without which it would b impossibl to rprsnt. Theos lmnts in th givn rality that ar forign
to this fabricatd “tru ssnc” […] ar not addd. But also th rprsnting bing, whos xistnc
is tid to th rronous blifs, must b itslf cratd […] rprsnting and th blif in th slf-idnt-
ical and nduring must b cratd at th sam tim.— My viw thn is that vrything organic pr- 
supposs rprsntation. (KSA 9:11[329]). 
“Theus, Nitzsch agrs with Spir that mpirical knowldg is contradictory and thrfor fals. But h dis-
agrs with Spir about th tru natur of rality. Instad of claiming that rality is in its ssnc simpl and
unitary, […] Nitzsch argus that rality is bcoming. Theis amounts to adopting th antithtic positions
in Kant’s antinomis as th corrct dscription of rality. But Nitzsch nvrthlss accpts that thinking
rquirs th application of th thtic [A1, A2] position to th world. Therfor th tru natur of rality
cannot b corrctly dscribd” [ibid., p.67-68]. Theis passag highlights a numbr of rcurring thms in
Nitzsch's writings: th rjction of th ‘I,’ th rjction of th xistnc of Bing, and (most importantly)
th notion that th ‘I’ and ‘Bing’ ar cratd by “rronous blifs” which ar ‘prsupposd’ by “vry-
thing organic.” In othr words, that all conscious, organic “bings” ncssarily falsify rality in ordr to
think of it. Theis is Nitzsch’s “rror thory,” and it is dirctly adaptd from Spir’s; altrd to accord with
his rjction of Bing – that is, his mtaphysics of ‘radical Bcoming.’
Lik Spir and Kant bfor him, Nitzsch found himslf facing what Baily calls th problm of how
snsibl xprinc can b admitted into judgmnt [Baily 2013, p.146] – and what w rfrrd to as th
gap btwn th transcndntal ‘I’ and th mpirical sris. Kant trid to bridg th gap with th “dus
x machina” of th transcndntal ‘synthsis of th imagination’ [ibid., p.44]. Howvr, to rpat Baily’s
obsrvation: “to claim that th imagination provids critria for th application of concpts to snsibl
xprinc, is notoriously unsatisfactory and it might b mor fruitful to rjct th notion of judgmnt on
which th problm rsts” [Baily 2013, p.146]. Theis is xactly what Nitzsch is doing whn h dnis th
xistnc of a transcndntal ‘I,’ or a ‘dor’ bhind ‘dds.’55 By dnying that th ‘I’ is anything mor than
a fabrication which facilitats rprsntation, h avoids th problm of taking up snsibl xprinc into
judgmnt altogthr – for without th non-mpirical, transcndntal ‘I,’ thr is no longr anything that
stands outsid of th mpirical sris. As a rsult, th mystrious gap btwn ‘I’ and mpirical sris is
collapsd in th dirction of th sris. Undr such a concption, knowldg can b accountd for as som
amalgamation of drivs and xprincs. Theis is th aspct of Nitzsch’s account of judgmnt which th
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naturalistically-inclind radr finnds amnabl. By liminating non-mpirical bings such as th Kantian
transcndntal ‘I,’ thr is no longr anything byond th mpirical world to account for.
Howvr, in clbrating Nitzsch’s rjction of non-mpirical bings, naturalistic commntators
hav ovrlookd (willfully, it sms) th othr half of Nitzsch’s motivation for doing so. Nitzsch dos
not stop at rjcting th ‘I’ (or th “rprsnting bing”), whos xistnc is tid to “rronous blifs”; h
also rjcts th xistnc of ‘Bing’ itslf (th “tru ssnc” of things) as a mr projction of th falsly
positd ‘I.’ In othr words, Nitzsch is arguing that ‘Bing’ is an rror built atop an rror. Whil it may b
tmpting to argu as Maudmari Clark dos that Nitzsch is mrly rjcting th xistnc of trnal
bings or substancs, as w saw abov, Nitzsch rjcts synchronic slf-idntity – maning h dnis that
a “thing” is slf-idntical at any givn momnt in tim (HA 11, 18-19; BGE 4; TI 3:5; KSA 9:11[329-30];
WP 516-521, 552, 574). As Nitzsch says in th passag just quotd, “th tru ssnc of th world is a
fabrication of th rprsnting bing”; both “rprsnting and th blif in th slf-idntical and nduring
[i.. synchronic and diachronic slf-idntity] must b cratd at th sam tim” (KSA 9:11[329]). H dos
this bcaus h accpts Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ which, as w saw abov [s II-A2], argus for th
impossibility of immannc – thus rmoving all xplanatory powr from ‘Bing.’ His solution, thrfor,
is to liminat ‘Bing’ altogthr. ‘Bing,’ thrfor, is mrly an illusion – an “rror” which is ncssary
for thought. ‘Bcoming’ cannot b thought, and yt ‘Bcoming’ is all thr is. As such, all thought falsifins
rality. Lik Spir, Nitzsch accpts that mpirical xprinc is a contradiction. Unlik Spir, h blivs
that th contradictory ralm of snsibl xprinc is th only on that xists. Not also Nitzsch’s claim
that th rronous blif in th ‘I’ and in ‘Bing’ ar cratd “at th sam tim.” Bcaus ‘Bing’ and th ‘I’
ar cratd at th sam tim, thy must b rjctd at th sam tim. The ‘I,’ as w argud abov (II-A3 ),
is a Bing. Nitzsch’s rjction of th ‘I’ is motivatd by a rjction of Bing; which, in turn, is motivatd
by accpting of Spir’s antinomial rasoning whil rjcting its ‘aftrworldly’ conclusions.
Grn nots a problm in Nitzsch’s thory of judgmnt, howvr – “a problm xplaining rror
that is curiously th complimnt of Spir’s” (cf. Spir 1877, 1:81) [Grn 2002, p.68]. Spir struggls bcaus
h cannot xplain how dviation from Bing rsult in rronous thought, rathr than a failur to think.56
Nitzsch, on th othr hand, struggls bcaus in giving up Bing, and th transcndntal ‘I’ along with
it, h loss a signifincant pic of Spir’s justifincation for th notion that mpirical judgmnt is contradictory.
Spir, lik Kant, blivs that judgmnt must b groundd in th ‘I’ (as ‘causality’ must b groundd in th
‘unconditiond’). Yt th ‘I’ fails to b immannt to th mpirical sris. It is this tnsion btwn th ‘I’
(which is Bing) and snsibl xprinc (which is Bcoming) that gnrats th ‘fundamntal antinomy.’
By collapsing th gap toward th sris – that is, by dnying th xistnc of Bing – Nitzsch rmovs
th sourc of tnsion (th unbridgabl gap btwn Bing and Bcoming) that Spir’s thory rlis upon.
Furthrmor, sinc Nitzsch follows Spir in associating thought with Bing, and yt rjcts th xistnc
of Bing, Nitzsch now has to xplain how thought is “possibl at all in th world of bcoming” [Grn
2002, p.69]; and h nds to do so in a way which is compatibl with his “rror thory.” How can notions
of Bing – both ‘slf-idntical objcts,’ and th ‘I’ which thinks and has knowldg of thm – aris out of
a world charactrizd by ‘radical Bcoming’ [ibid.]? How and why dos Bcoming crat th dcption of
Bing?57 Although Nitzsch dos at tims suggst that an xplanation is possibl (cf. KSA 9:11[268]; WP
517), it is unclar what that could b [ibid., p.69-70]. As a rsult, Nitzsch is complld to mak a choic:
accpt that Bcoming cannot b thought, and thus los thought altogthr; or accpt that Bcoming can b
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thought, thus accpting th possibility of ‘objctiv,’ mpirical judgmnt. Yt, if Nitzsch wr to tak up
ithr position, h would los his “rror thory” – and with it, a good dal of his justifincation for rjcting
both Bing and th transcndntal ‘I’ in th finrst plac.
To put th problm in anothr way: Nitzsch’s “rror thory” “appars to b prdicatd upon an
antinaturalist thory of cognition, which, givn Nitzsch’s rigorous naturalism, will not allow cognition
to xist at all – vn rronous cognition” [Grn 2002, p.70]. Grn argus thr ar two solutions that
Nitzsch could (and at tims dos) turn to: th “finrst is to bit th bullt and dny that cognition occurs
[i.. noncognitivism]. […] The scond is to allow that thought within bcoming is possibl [i.. mbrac
a naturalizd thory of cognition]” – both of which would forc Nitzsch to giv up his argumnt that
thought falsifins [ibid., p.70]. Theis xplains many of th apparnt contradictions in Nitzsch’s nots and
publishd works rgarding judgmnt. The truth is Nitzsch mployd, at differnt tims, thr differnt
positions rgarding judgmnt: (1) “rror thory,” (2) noncognitivism (a position which Grn blivs to
b gnrally ovrlookd by Nitzsch scholarship  [ibid.]), and (3) a naturalizd thory of cognition. It is
option (3) that writrs lik Baily, Litr, and Clark tnd to focus on (to th xclusion of th othrs) and
which Nitzsch bgan to favor in his post-Twilight writings. (Rcall, howvr, that h nvr compltly
abandond his Spiran influunc, and w will unfortunatly nvr know xactly what dirction h was
hading in whn h collapsd.) What Spir offers us hr is not a singl xplanation for all of Nitzsch’s
thought, but a simpl thory which unifins th apparnt dviations in Nitzsch’s thought: thy wr all
various xprssions of an instability at th hart of Nitzsch’s adaptation of Spir’s “rror thory.”
It should b notd, howvr, that Nitzsch’s dviations wr not random “xprimnts.” In ordr to
fully undrstand Nitzsch’s thory of judgmnt, w nd to undrstand why this apparnt vacillation
occurs. It is my blif that positions (1), (2), and (3) can b unifind by a singl thory of judgmnt, and that
a carful analysis of Nitzsch’s apparnt vacillation btwn thm points th way toward it; but ths ar
topics which w do not hav tim to addrss hr. For our purposs, it is nough to raliz that Nitzsch’s
various positions rgarding mpirical judgmnt – “rror thory,” noncognitivist, and naturalistic – ar bst
xplaind through thir rlationship to Spir’s “rror thory”; and that Spir’s “rror thory” is itslf a rsult
of th ‘fundamntal antinomy.’ Sinc th ‘fundamntal antinomy’ is a dirct rspons to th Antinomis,
and th Antinomis ar a dirct rspons to Spinozism, Nitzsch’s thoris of judgmnt connct him –
via Spir – to th antinomial through lin.
Bfor moving on, thr is on mor thing w should not: Nitzsch’s “rror thory” is on of th
ky componnts of his rjction of Bing. Indd, Nitzsch’s ‘radical Bcoming’ is difficcult to justify with-
out it. From th point of viw of option (3) – i.. naturalizd thoris of cognition – th notion of ‘radical
Bcoming’ would appar to b nothing othr than th “crackpot mtaphysics” Litr says it is. If mpirical
objcts and human judgmnt about thm ar no longr contradictory, thn how can Nitzsch justify his
stanc rgarding noncontradiction, or his claim that synchronic slf-idntity is impossibl? And if h can-
not claim that synchronic slf-idntity dos not xist, thn how can h dny that Bing xists? By option
(3)’s lights, a mtaphysics basd in Bing is far mor consistnt. Som might b tmptd to turn to option
(2) for a justifincation of ‘radical Bcoming’; but as Grn points out, noncognitivism is as unstabl as th
“rror thory” [Grn 2002, p.71]. “If on ntirly dnis th xistnc of truth and falsity but allows that
th sourcs of our judgmnts in bcoming givs us rasons to continu judging as w did bfor, th qus-
tion thn ariss why ths rasons ar not sufficcint to formulat a naturalizd thory of truthful cogni-
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tion” [ibid.]. Put anothr way, thr is nothing about a noncognitivist position which is incompatibl with
Bing. So what if non of our thoughts qualify as ‘thought’ by Kantian standards? How could that justify
th claim that nothing is vr slf-idntical? In brif, if Nitzsch cannot dfnd option (1) – i.. his “rror
thory” – his justifincation for ‘radical Bcoming’ is signifincantly waknd, and his mtaphysics is at risk
of collapsing back into Bing (just as th fourth Antithsis collapss back into th Thesis). 
In othr words, Nitzsch is not contnt to bit th bullt whr th Antinomis ar concrnd (as
Spir is). Nitzsch wants to finnd a solution to th problm. His “rror thory” and mtaphysics of ‘radical
Bcoming’ wr mant to b that solution. Yt th instability at th cor of his “rror thory” thratns to
collaps back into a naturalizd thory of cognition, thus collapsing back into th possibility Bing – back
into th Antinomis. Nitzsch facs a similar problm at th mtaphysical lvl.
II-B4.  Nitzsch and th Antinomial Therough Lin: ‘Causality’ and th ‘Pincr Atteack of Bing’
“NIETZSCHE’S viws about causality hav provn intractabl to commntators,” Grn xplains. “Givn
his naturalism, Nitzsch is obviously wll disposd toward causal xplanations. Indd, it is prcisly his
commitmnt to causal xplanations of human judgmnt that lads him to dny th xistnc of cognition
[and ‘Bing’]. Furthrmor, Nitzsch’s works oftn contain cautions concrning th corrct us of caus-
al rasoning – for xampl, that on should not confus ffect with caus (HA 608; TI 6:1). Thes pass-
ags appar to prsuppos th gnral rspctability of causal rasoning. Nvrthlss Nitzsch also n-
gags in on of th most radical critiqus of th concpt of causation in th history of philosophy. The
main thm in this critiqu is that caus and ffect ar somhow improprly sparatd from th fluow of
vnts (BGE 21; KSA 9:6[412 and 433]; WP 624, 633) [cf. GS 112; WP 624]. […] Thes finctitious isolat-
d causs, Nitzsch argus, ar modld aftr human agnts (.g. GS 127; GM 1:13; KSA 9:12[63]; WP
550, 552, 547). ‘The intrprtation of an vnt as ithr an act or th suffering of an act (—thus vry act a
bcoming othr, prsupposs an author and somon upon whom “chang” is ffectd)’ (WP 546). What
w nd is a rading that can mak sns of ths critiqus and Nitzsch’s philosophical sympathy to
causal xplanations. Onc again, Spir’s fundamntal antinomy can provid th answr.” [Grn 2002, p.
75]. To put it brifluy, Nitzsch accpts Spir’s argumnts for th impossibility of an immannt uncondi-
tiond,58 and th implications this has for th concpt of causality. Unlik Spir, Nitzsch is unwilling to
grant that ‘causality’ itslf is simply contradictory.
According to Brobjr, “Spir argud that it is th task of philosophy to sk absolutly tru know-
ldg (and thus assumd th dichotomy of a tru and apparnt rality, which Nitzsch cam to rjct)”
[Brobjr 2008, p.71]. Theis xplains why Spir hld onto th concpt of Bing, vn as h dnid that Bing
offerd any xplanatory powr rgarding th mpirical world: for him, th inxprincabl world of th
Parmnidan On (i.. Bing) was th last bastion of absolut truth. Nitzsch, howvr, whn offerd a
choic btwn xplanatorily uslss Bing and ‘causality,’ h divrgd from Spir. Rathr than abandon
‘causality’ as a contradiction, h chos to abandon Bing (and ‘absolut truths’) as non-xistnt. Instad,
h tris to ground th concpt of ‘causality’ in Bcoming. Howvr, this poss a fw difficcultis. Bcaus
thr is no Bing, thr is no such thing as slf-idntity (synchronic or othrwis). As such, not only ar
thr no slf-idntical ‘things,’ thr ar no slf-idntical ‘vnts.’ Clarly, undr such circumstancs, th
concpt of ‘causality’ cannot b concivd in th traditional sns: i.., as a procss of discrt ‘objcts’ or
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‘vnts’ making contact with and moving ach othr lik billiard balls or falling dominos. For Nitzsch,
‘causality’ itslf has to b r-concivd – not as an absolut truth, but as a “conditional unity.”
So now Nitzsch has a nw problm: How can causality b xplaind if thr is no ‘Bing’ to ground
it? Grn argus that Nitzsch’s attempts to solv this problm – from within his Spiran framwork –
lav him vacillating btwn two picturs of an antithtic rality of Bcoming [Grn 2002, p.85]. The
finrst pictur (what Grn calls “th chain vrsion” of th antithtic pictur), rlis upon xtrnal causation
to xplain chang – but this lads back to th problm of causal chains always dmanding to b groundd
in som kind of Bing, and thus back to th Antinomis. The scond pictur (which Grn calls “th tl-
scopd vrsion” of th antithtic pictur), dscribs chang as a “radically contingnt happning that can-
not b b xplaind in trms of an undrlying sourc” [ibid.]. The advantag of this position is that thr is
no intrinsic pull toward Bing. As discussd abov, such a position dstabilizs th xplanatory powr of
causation – for on could nvr b sur whthr a chang occurrd as a rsult of xtrnal causs, or if it
was mrly an “uncausd, arbitrary happning” (Spir 1877, 2:134). Grn calls this position “a rpudiation
of causality ntirly” [Grn 2002, p.85]. The problm with this viw – asid from th fact that it sms to
undrmin causality (th vry concpt Nitzsch was trying to sav) – is it undrmins th justifincation for
a mtaphysics of ‘radical Bcoming.’ For it was Bing’s inability to prsrv causality (its lack of xplana-
tory powr) that justifind Nitzsch’s rjction of Bing in th finrst plac.
Theos who would support th tlscopd vrsion of causality may attempt to addrss this problm by
articulating thir ontology of Bcoming in trms of Boscovichan or Hlmholtzan cntrs of forc – as
Nitzsch famously dos in BGE 12 [Grn 2002, p.83]. Bcaus ths ‘cntrs of forc’ ar not physical
objcts but ‘nrgy’ or ‘wills,’ on could argu that thy ar not bings, and thus do not rquir Bing to
ground thm. Morovr, it could b usd to xplain chang without a “causal chain” – which calls out for
Bing to ground it – whil maintaining som smblanc of th ‘causality’ that is ndd to justify th rj-
ction of Bing. Undr this viw, Nitzsch would say that ‘causality’ is concptually mistakn in bliv-
ing that thr ar discrt ‘vnts’ (‘caus,’ ‘ffect’), and instad argu that all of th “cntrs of forc” ar
in actuality atteracting and rplling ach othr constantly and simultanously. Theis approach also has an
advantag in that on can claim that it grounds ‘radical Bcoming’ in th mpirical scincs. Howvr, as
Grn points out, Spir had alrady forsn this possibility and argud ffectivly against it;59 xplaining
that “such a thory must, in th nd, collaps into on in which bcoming is sn from th prspctiv
of bing.” [Grn 2002, p.80]. Grn continus, arguing “it is impossibl to think of a forc as somthing
individual – whn on thinks of a forc, on is always thinking of a rlationship btwn changs accord-
ing to ncssary laws, that is, a causal rlationship (1:266-67)” [ibid.]. A Boscovichan may disagr, and
assrt that ‘cntrs of forc’ forc ar individuals with vrifinabl charactristics. For xampl, th ‘cntrs’
intract in pairs, “according to an oscillatory law which dtrmins thir rlativ acclration” [Whitlock
1996, p.215]. Howvr, if your concpt of forc has a crtain, dtrminat unifincation of qualitis which is
always th sam – such that a ‘cntr of forc’ is a ‘slf-idntical thing’ – thn your concpt of forc is not
an xprssion of Bcoming. Rathr, it is an altrnativ concption of Bing [Grn 2002, p.78-80] – on
which has mor in common with Kant’s A1 concption than Nitzsch’s ‘radical Bcoming.’
Therfor, whthr Nitzsch taks up th naturalistically rspctabl “chain vrsion” of causality or
th radical “tlscopd vrsion,” h still finnds himslf struggling to avoid bing suckd back into Bing. In
fact, Nitzsch finnds himslf in this struggl only at th vry top and th vry botteom of his mtaphysical
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pictur of th univrs: th top bing th intllctual world of concpts and judgmnt, th botteom bing
Nitzsch’s vrsion of th subatomic lvl of rality – th smallst, most fundamntal lvl of th mpir-
ical world. At th concptual lvl, Nitzsch’s “rror thory” struggls to justify why mpirical objcts
ar contradictory and cannot b thought. At th subatomic lvl of th “will,” his mtaphysics struggls
to conciv ‘causality’ without Bing. Theis ‘pincr atteack of Bing’ thratns his ‘radical Bcoming’ from
both sids – hnc th apparnt vacillations in Nitzsch’s position on ths topics. 
Mor importantly for our purposs, all of Nitzsch’s positions rgarding causality and judgmnt can
b tracd back to two things: a) his accptanc of th rasoning bhind th ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ and
b) his divrgnc from Spir’s conclusions. In othr words, Nitzsch’s philosophical dvlopmnt is part
of a continuous thrad, on which can b tracd back to th ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ which in turn can b
tracd back to Kant’s Antinomis, which in turn can b tracd back to Spinoza. In rspons to this thrad,
Nitzsch dvlopd in such a way that h and Spinoza shar a rmarkabl numbr of similaritis with
rgard to thir mtaphysical picturs of mpirical rality – similaritis which tnd to align with Kant’s
antinomial Antithsis positions.
II-C1.  The Antithtic Alignmnt: Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s ‘Broad Alignmnt’ with th Antithss
GREEN oftn rfrs to Nitzsch’s mtaphysical position as an “antithtic” viw of rality. What Grn
mans by this is that Nitzsch’s mtaphysics broadly aligns with th Antithsis argumnts from Kant’s
Antinomis – particularly th fourth Antithsis, which dnis th xistnc of an unconditiond bing.
Theis is intriguing, bcaus Bohm argus convincingly that Spinoza broadly aligns with th Antithss.
If both claims ar tru, thn w would xpct that Nitzsch’s mtaphysics and Spinoza’s would shar a
quit a fw similaritis – dspit th fact that Spinoza claims that th apparanc of Bcoming is only an
aspct of Bing, and Nitzsch argus th opposit is tru. W would also xpct that both Spinoza’s and
Nitzsch’s mtaphysical positions ar compatibl with most (if not all) of th Antithsis positions. As w
shall soon s, both Bohm’s and Grn’s claims – along with th xpctations which follow from thm –
ar indd th cas. W will bgin by comparing Spinoza’s Bing and Nitzsch’s Bcoming to th four
Antithsis positions thmslvs, to s if both thinkrs can b said to ‘broadly align’ with thm.
It must b notd – finrst of all – that although th finrst thr Antithss ar bst undrstood in trms of
th A1 concption (and thus as Bing), th fac valu of ach position can b construd as ithr Bing or
Bcoming. Only th fourth Antithsis is xplicitly anti-Bing – forcing Spinoza to sid with th Thesis
position in th fourth Antinomy (as w discussd in Sction I). The scond thing to not is, rgarding th
finrst Antimony, it is unclar whthr or not Nitzsch is capabl of fintteing with ithr position. Prima faci,
h should rjct th world’s cration – although Etrnal Rcurrnc could possibly afficrm th cration of
th world by simply arguing that th cration itslf rcurs. His stanc rgarding trnality is ambivalnt –
sinc h dnis th xistnc of any trnal Bings but afficrms that Rcurrnc and Bcoming itslf could
xist trnally. Howvr, h unquivocally dnis infinnity. “Nitzsch’s nw world concption,” Whitlock
convincingly argus, “is dfinnd by finnit forc. Theis compltly invrts th mtaphysics of Spinoza. In-
finnit forc, a ncssary postulat for Spinoza, ntails infinnit novlty […] infinnit xtnsion and othr rm-
nants of thology. Finit forc ntails finnit novlty, […] and finnit spac. Finit, but without th matrial
atoms, was th nw prspctiv Nitzsch sought and found in fragmntary form in Boscovich’s thory”
[Whitlock 1996, p.207].60 As such, Nitzsch could nvr align with th finrst Antinomy’s Antithsis viw.
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Lik Spinoza, Nitzsch’s viw aligns with thr of th four Antithsis positions. Theis is sufficcint to claim
that thy both broadly align with th Antithss.
Sinc Nitzsch’s position dos not fint with th finrst Antithsis and Spinoza’s position dos not fint
with th fourth, if thy can b said to shar an ‘antithtic alignmnt,’ it must b with rgard to th scond
and th third. The scond Antithsis can b broadly summarizd as a rjction of atomism, monadology, or
any cosmology in which vrything w xprinc is a composit-bing constructd out of fundamntal,
smallst-possibl, simpl bings which – whn aggrgatd or combind togthr – compos vry othr
thing in xistnc. Spinoza, as w hav statd numrous tims, rjcts th xistnc of “parts” – and thus
h maps onto th scond Antithsis’s cosmology. Nitzsch similarly maps onto th scond Antithsis du
to his numrous rjctions of th xistnc of atoms, things-in-thmslvs, and ‘dors’ bhind ‘dds’ (cf.
BGE, “Prjudics of Philosophrs,” 2, 17. Gnalogy, “First Essay,” 13. Twilight, “‘Rason’ in Philosophy,”
3, 5; “Four Grat Errors,” 3, 8). Du to his rjction of Bing (singular), Nitzsch rjcts bings (plural).
The third Antithsis, as w saw abov, rjcts th notion of fr will (or th ‘causality of frdom’) on th
grounds that thr is only on kind of causality – natural causality. As dmonstratd in Sction I, Spinoza
concivd of ‘natural causality’ as mchanistic causality, and h dnid th possibility of fr will via an
argumnt from th PSR. For Spinoza, ths argumnts ar clarly and consciously linkd. In Nitzsch’s
cas, th connction btwn causal rasoning and th dnial of ‘fr will’ is not so clar. Howvr, du
to Nitzsch’s commitmnt xplaining rality via “logical form in rasoning (HA 265) and […] logically
consistnt, if xtrmly comprssd, argumnts” [Grn 2002, p.55], w argu that Nitzsch is indd
ddicatd to th sam kind of mtaphysical/psychological continuity as Spinoza.
Nitzsch dos dny ‘fr will’ both rpatdly and mphatically in his publishd works (s BGE,
“Prjudics of Philosophrs,” 21. Gnalogy, “First Essay,” 13. Twilight, “Four Grat Errors,” 7, tc.) – but
th rasoning givn usually has nothing to do with causal rasoning. His usual approach is to argu that
mtaphysicians hav trid to injct ‘fr will’ into th world lik spidrs injcting vnom into a victim’s
blood; thir particular poison bing rssntimnt and th dsir to punish.61 Furthrmor, as statd abov,
Nitzsch’s pictur of causality is unclar, and h oftn vacillats btwn two picturs of how causality
oprats. Howvr, contrary to common blif that Nitzsch’s philosophy was strictly anti-mtaphysical,
Nitzsch maks a concrtd ffeort to nsur that his psychological studis do align with his mtaphysical
commitmnts. For xampl, in Twilight’s “Four Grat Errors” [§7], Nitzsch argus that “Bcoming has
bn dprivd of its innocnc whn any bing-such-and-such is tracd back to [fr] will, to purpos, to
acts of rsponsibility” [Kaufmann 1954, p.499]. The rason Bcoming is “innocnt” is bcaus it, lik th
humans agnts it govrns, was nvr ‘fr’ to “do othrwis,” and is thrfor blamlss. It is dtrmind
by innat drivs which apply as absolutly to th smallst quanta of forc as to human psychology. In this
sns, Nitzsch – lik Spinoza – fulfinlls all critria for what Kant calls “pur mpiricism”: th principl
“of granting only philosophical knowldg acquird by naturalistic principls; that is, by th standard of
‘possibl xprinc’ (A468/B496)” [Bohm 2014, p.86] – such that “w obsrv a prfct uniformity in
mannr of thinking, and complt unity of maxims, […] applid not only in xplanation of th apparan-
cs within th world, but also in th solution of th transcndntal idas of th world itslf, in its totali-
ty” (A465f./B493f.) [Bohm 2018, p.499]. In Spinoza’s cas, this ‘unity of maxims and mannr of thinking’
stms from his concption of substanc and th conatus doctrin; in Nitzsch’s, from ‘radical Bcoming’
th “will to powr.”
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Yovl maks th sam obsrvation in his articl, “Nitzsch and Spinoza: Enmy Brothrs.” Ther,
Yovl nots that on of th consquncs of Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s mutual ddication to th principl
of ‘immannc’ (givn his particular usag of that trm) is an “adhrnc, in thir thory of man, to a strict
naturalistic monism. For both philosophrs thr is a singl natural principl activ in man that constituts
his individual xistnc (as it dos vrything ls in natur). Theis principl is not a static bing but a dy-
namic thrust, striving, or dsir; as such, it is also th uniqu principl undrlying all th affects, drivs,
and divrs forms of human bhavior. Spinoza calls it conatus [i.., th striving for slf-prsrvation]; Ni-
tzsch, ‘will to powr’” [Yovl 2018, p.546]. Although thr ar a numbr of differncs btwn th two
concpts – for xampl th conatus doctrin’s mphasis on prmannc and slf-idntity, and th “will
to powr’s” mphasis on fluux and slf-ovrcoming [ibid., p.549] – thy ar much alik in that Nitzsch
and Spinoza applid thm qually to physical ntitis as to human psychology [ibid., p.546-48]. As Yovl puts
it, “Nitzsch […] sids with Spinoza’s anti-Hglian viw that humans hav nothing spcial that disting-
uishs thm ontologically from th rst of bing, to which thy ar assimilabl” [ibid., p.548]. Theis sort of
“uniformism,” as Yovl calls it [ibid.], is xactly what Kant mans by “pur mpiricism” [s I-A].
To put it brifluy, Nitzsch’s position fints with th third Antithsis bcaus his dnial of ‘fr will’ is
motivatd by “pur mpiricist” principls – i.., th rjction of any divisions btwn psychology and
natural causality. In addition, Nitzsch rjcts ‘fr will’ for th sam mtaphysical rasons that h rjcts
th atom, and Bing itslf. Theus, Nitzsch – lik Spinoza – oprats fully in th spirit of th Antithss
as Kant dscribs thm. A consistnt lin of rasoning can b tracd through Nitzsch’s positions, just
as th A1 concption can b tracd through th Antinomis. Although Nitzsch is not as nar-fluawlssly
consistnt as Spinoza (fw philosophrs ar), h still attempts to provid a logically and mtaphysically
cohsiv pictur of rality – such that th sam laws apply qually to th highst concpts of thought as
to th most fundamntal xplanations of causality. Indd, whnvr Nitzsch taks up th notion of th
‘will to powr,’ h assigns a kind of “primitiv psychology” to mtaphysical natur of th univrs itslf;
such that ‘causality’ and ‘psychology’ ar unitd by a singl thory [cf. Baily 2013, p.144-46]. (Spinoza
achivs a similar ffect with his conatus, and th compatibilism of Theought and Extnsion.) Therfor,
w hav a scur basis for th ‘antithtic alignmnt’ btwn Nitzsch and Spinoza. W hav not only
dmonstratd that thy both map onto th scond and third Antithss, but that thy also shar a commit-
mnt to Kant’s notion of “pur mpiricism,” which is th bating hart of th Antithss.
Bfor w continu on to our discussion of Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s compatibility with ach othr
(and, by xtnsion, th compatibility Grn’s thory with Bohm’s), it is worth noting that a truly robust
dmonstration of th notion that Nitzsch and Spinoza broadly align with th Antithss would b abl
to prov that Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s mtaphysical positions do mor than agr with th fac-valu of
an Antithsis position’s commitmnts. It should b abl to prov that both Spinoza and Nitzsch would
agr with th ntailmnts which go along accpting an Antithsis position as wll. Hr, w will prov
that our thory is abl to do just that – and w will bgin by rxamining th Antithss. 
II-C2.  The Antithtic Alignmnt: Antithsis Entailmnts and Grn’s Compatibility with Bohm
AS an xampl, lt us tak Kant’s finrst Antinomy, which argus for and against th cration-and-finnitud
of tim and spac (Thesis, or A2) and th trnality-and-infinnity of tim and spac (Antithsis, or A1). If
w tak up th Antithsis position, thn w accpt thr can b no absolut tim or spac. Theis is du to
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th fact that, according to A1 – upon which th Antithsis is basd – th unconditiond is concivd as th
ntir sris takn as a whol. As a rsult, th unconditiond has no absolut or finxd location within th
sris – for it simply is th sris. Morovr, bcaus A1’s concption of spac is infinnit, it is infinnitly
divisibl. Therfor, thr can b no absolut unit of masur, no absolut distanc btwn on mmbr of
th sris and any othr mmbr – or btwn conditiond bings and th unconditiond’s location. Only
in th A2 concption – upon which th Thesis is basd – dos th unconditiond hav an absolut, finxd
location within th sris as th highst mmbr of th sris; and bcaus its cosmology is finnit, it can
support a concption of rality which contains an absolutly dtrminat numbr of divisions in tim and
spac. Theus, only A2 can giv sns to qustions “of whr or whn th world – undrstood as th total-
ity of rlations btwn things – occurs” [Grn 2002, p.64]. A1, on th othr hand, must conciv spac
and tim in rlativistic trms.
Now lt us look at th sam problm again – this tim from th prspctiv of th fourth Antithsis.
Unlik th finrst thr Antithss – which Bohm convincingly argus ar bst undrstood as xprssions
of th A1 concption – th fourth Antithsis is nihilistic. It rjcts th xistnc of any unconditiond or
ncssary bings anywhr. It could b ithr finnit or infinnit – th fourth nvr spcifins. Yt, unlik th
Thesis positions, th fourth Antithsis must always b concivd as infinnitly divisibl – vn if it is finnit.
Sinc thr ar no absolut bings, thr can b no absolut rlationships – that includs spatial-tmporal
rlationships. As such, all distancs btwn objcts ar rlativ, and spac can b arbitrarily dividd in
an infinnit (or at last an indfinnit) numbr of ways – and ach of ths ways will b qually “tru.” Theus,
dspit thir dramatically differnt mtaphysical conclusions, th finrst thr (A1-basd) Antithss and th
nihilistic fourth Antithsis ar rmarkably similar in thir rlativistic viws mpirical rality [cf. Grn
2002, p.73]; and w ar still ntitld to spak of a gnralizd “antithtic viw.” It is in this sns that w
can claim that Spinoza and Nitzsch shar an antithtic viw of rality. Additionally, if w tak Grn’s
xplication of th ntailmnts which accompany an antithtic viw sriously, w s that Spinoza’s and
Nitzsch’s mtaphysical worldviws ar rmarkably similar – and absolutly what w would xpct of
philosophrs who spous an antithtic viw. 
First, philosophrs atteachd to th scond Antithsis (which dnis th xistnc of atoms – or any
othr kind of smallst-possibl ‘simpl’ bings) or to th fourth Antithsis (which dnis th xistnc of
ncssary, unconditiond, slf-idntical ‘bings’ of any sort) would both b inclind to argu that a finnit
‘thing’ is constitutd by its rlationships to othr ‘things.’ Nitzsch maks this xact claim svral tims in
his nots (KSA 9:11[36], 9:12[17]; WP 557-58, 560, 583). Whil Spinoza dos argu thr is a substanc
bnath ths rlations, h dnis th xistnc of ‘parts’ [E1p15n] – that is, slf-idntical finnit things. In
addition, Spinoza argus that a finnit thing is lss “prfct” (i.., lss ral) to th dgr that its xistnc
is not dfinnd solly by on of th fundamntal proprtis of substanc (i.. Atteributs) [E1p11, E2d6, E4-
prf., E5p40]. Unlik Libniz, for whom th fundamntal and finnit parts which compos all things in th
univrs (monads) ar absolutly ral and slf-idntical, Spinoza argus that – byond thir mutual partici-
pation in th Atteributs of substanc – finnit ‘things’ only xist du to th xtrnal intrfrnc of othr
‘things’ (i.. causs). Indd, as Spinoza puts it himslf in th Ethics: “whatvr prfction or rality thos
things may hav which ar producd by xtrnal causs [i.. finnit ‘things’], […] thy ow it all to th vir-
tu of an xtrnal caus, and thrfor thir xistnc springs from th prfction of an xtrnal caus a-
lon and not from thir own” [E1p11n; Gutman/Whit 1949, p.50]. As a rsult, finnit things ar dfinnd by
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xtrnal causs – that is to say, by thir rlationships to othr things. In fact, on could argu that “impr-
fction” is bst undrstood not as a “lack of rality” or “lack of xistnc,” but as “th dgr of xistnc
which is dfinnd solly by rlationships to othr ‘things.’” [Cf. Grn 2002, p.71-73].
Scond, givn th antithtic viw’s rlativistic concption of finnit ‘things,’ it follows that it should
hav a rlativistic viw of tim and spac. As discussd abov, both th A1 concption and th nihilistic
“third option” of th fourth Antithsis viw tim and spac in a rlativistic sns. Undr A2’s absolutist
concption of th unconditiond, spac is absolut, and is “usually undrstood as th viw that spac is a
singl unconditiond substanc, in rfrnc to which mpirical objcts ar of a dtrminat siz. But it is
qually possibl to argu that spac consists of numrous indivisibl spac-atoms. The siz of somthing
would b unconditionally dtrmind by rfrnc to th numbr of spac-atoms out of which th objct
is constitutd” [Grn 2002, p.73]. On th othr hand, th infinnitistic concption of A1’s unconditiond is
infinnitly divisibl – as is th purly ‘conditional unity’ th fourth Antithsis spouss. “If spac is infinn-
itly divisibl,” Grn argus, “thn thr cannot b a unit of spac in rfrnc to which things can hav
an unconditiond siz. To claim that spac-atoms can b infinnitly dividd is to claim that th totality of
spatial rlations could b infinnit in siz or xist on th had of a pin, onc again, to say that thr is no
unconditional answr to th qustion of what siz anything is” [ibid.]. Nitzsch, bcaus h rjcts Bing,
mbracs th fourth Antithsis’s concption of rality; i.., rality as an infinnitly divisibl and conditional
unity. Spinoza – bcaus h afficrms that rality is a singl, unconditiond substanc, and dnis th xist-
nc of ‘parts’ – rjcts th notion that rality can b dividd at all [E2p13]; at last, not insofar as it is
concivd adquatly [E2p11c, E2p32-35]. To conciv th infinnity of rality as dividd, fractionatd, or
finnit, is to conciv it in a “mutilatd and confusd” mannr – i.., inadquatly [E1p8n1, E2p35]. Theis
applis to both tim and spac. In fact, Spinoza xplicitly stats that all concptions of duration involv
‘inadquat knowldg’ [E2p30-31]. As such, thr can b no ntirly adquat or absolut concption of
finnit tim or spac. Both ncssarily contain som dgr of inadquacy, and thus contain som dgr of
rlativism. Onc again, dspit Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s many mtaphysical differncs, thir picturs of
mpirical rality ar striking similar.62
Theirdly – and finnally – sinc th antithtic viw abandons absolut tim and spac, it ncssarily
abandons absolut movmnt along with it. Without a masurmnt with rspct to absolut spac, “it is
not mrly impossibl to say what siz anything is but also whthr anything movs. W can know that A
movs in rlation to B, but if B itslf is moving, A may in fact b standing still” [Grn 2002, p.73]. Ther
cannot b any absolut motion. Rathr, thr is only “a gnralizd movmnt that cannot b atteributd to
anything. Sinc Nitzsch taks th antithtic position and dnis that absolut spac xists, w shouldn’t
b surprisd to discovr that h rjcts th ida of nonrlational movmnt (WP 562). Nvrthlss h
argus that to think of things as moving w must falsify this antithtic rality and assum th xistnc
of unconditional movmnt” – that is, in accordanc with A2 (cf. KSA 9:6[433]) [ibid., p.73-74]. Spinoza’s
mtaphysical rasoning is, as usual, quit differnt from Nitzsch’s; and yt th concption of mpirical
rality which rsults from his rasoning is much th sam. Whil h argus that th proportions of motion
and rst which constitut a ‘body’ ar “finxd proportions,” which will rmain “finxd” unlss thy ‘suffer’
from xtrnal intrfrnc [E4p39] – ths proportions, lik tim and spac, can b adquatly concivd
only as ‘part’ of th infinnit causal chain of an Atteribut [E2p13lm1-3]. To conciv motion as ‘finnit’ is
to conciv it inadquatly. As such, just as no unit of spac or tim can vr b absolut, nithr can any
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finnit motion through finnit spac. Finit tim and finnit motion ar “xhaustd by th procsss btwn
things” – procsss for which no absolut spd can b dtrmind [Grn 2002, p.74]. The sam is tru
for Nitzsch’s purly rlational motions (HA 19; D 117; KSA 7:19[140 & 153], 9:6[439], 9:11[281]; WP
487, 545, 563) [ibid.]. Therfor, for both thinkrs – insofar as thy ar considring th mpirical world, at
last –  motion, tim, spac, and vn objcts, ar concivd in a rlativistic, antithtic sns.
From ths xampls w can conclud that dspit thir fundamntally differnt ontologis, Nitzsch
and Spinoza draw rmarkably similar conclusions rgarding th natur of mpirical rality. Indd, this
compatibility btwn th Nitzschan and Spinozistic worlds of xprinc rinforcs our intrprtation
of Nitzsch’s philosophical linag, and th claim that Bohm and Grn wr – indpndntly of ach
othr – pointing to a Nitzsch-Spinoza connction through th Antinomis. Theis intrprtation is vn
furthr strngthnd if w not that Grn’s own xplication of what an antithtic viw ntails maks it
impossibl to mbrac th rcivd viw of th Antinomis – i.., that Libniz rprsnts th Antithsis
positions and Nwton th Thesis positions. Grn himslf accpts this viw, which is undrstandabl (it
is th “rcivd viw” aftr all) [Grn 2002, p.64, 66, 73, tc.]. Howvr, by his own lights, an antithtic
viw ntails th position that mpirical ‘things’ ar ntirly composd of thir rlations to othr ‘things’63
[ibid., p.72]. Libniz, howvr, not only mbracs th xistnc of atomistic ‘monads’ (th vry dfinnition
of a cosmology basd on simpl, smallst-possibl, slf-idntical bings), h also rjcts th notion that a
monad has any intraction whatsovr with othr monads. The only thing that a monad can intract to is
th divin plan or program dsignd and orchstratd by God. (In fact, it was this aspct of th Libnizian
monad which Goth rjctd in his own us of that trm.)64 Ths positions ar th opposit of Grn’s
xplication of th antithtic viw. Not that ths inconsistncis ar nowhr nar th hart of Grn’s
argumnt. Howvr, thy do imply that thos who accpt Grn’s thory hav twic as many rasons to
mbrac Bohm’s.
And so concluds our discussion of th ‘antithtic alignmnt,’ a dscriptiv account of th rmarkabl
similaritis btwn Nitzsch’s and Spinoza’s philosophis, which I bliv to b th most lgant of th
accounts so far dvisd. What’s mor, although this account is not ntirly immun to th charg that th
qualitis in Nitzsch’s thought which ar so similar to Spinoza’s dvlopd without Nitzsch bing dir-
ctly xposd to Spinoza’s works, and thus dvlopd somwhat coincidntally, it can at last mitigat th
impact such chargs by appaling to th ‘antinomial through lin.’ Although Spinoza had no dirct influu-
nc on Nitzsch’s dcision to spurn Bing – th dcision which brought Nitzsch into alignmnt with
th fourth Antithsis, and, by xtnsion, into alignmnt with Spinoza – th fact rmains that, without th
influunc of Spinoza’s philosophical lgacy, Nitzsch would hav likly nvr vn bn prsntd with
th choic. Without Spinoza, thr would b no Antinomis. Without th Antinomis, thr would b no
‘fundamntal antinomy’; and without that, Nitzsch would hav likly bcom a fundamntally differnt
thinkr from th man w know today. In brif, although th historical and dscriptiv lmnts of our ac-
count [i.. th ‘antinomial through lin’ and ‘antithtic alignmnt’] ar not dirctly connctd – as far as
w know – thy do shar th sam touchston [Kant’s Antinomis], th root of which is Spinoza. Again,
w ar not claiming that ithr Spinoza or th ‘antinomial through lin’ wr th sol historical sourcs of
Nitzsch’s philosophical dvlopmnt. W ar mrly claiming that thy wr signifincant influuncs; and
th similaritis which rsultd from thm ar too rmarkabl to ignor. They dmand to b accountd for.
I sincrly bliv this to b th bst nxt stp in that dirction.
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II-D.  Conclusion: The ‘Kantian Bridg’ and Nitzsch Studis
IN SUMMATION, Nitzsch’s philosophy is – to a signifincant xtnt – th rsult of Spinoza’s philosophical
lgacy. The aspct of this lgacy w hav focusd on in this ssay is th ‘antinomial through lin’ (though
thr may wll b othr aspcts which ar rlvant to Nitzsch’s dvlopmnt).65 W tracd this lgacy
from Kant’s Antinomis, through Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ to Nitzsch’s viws of ‘causality’ and
cognition [“rror thory”], of Bing and Bcoming, of ‘dor’ and ‘dd.’ Theough th rlationship btwn
Nitzsch and Spinoza bing xplord hr is lss lik th rlation btwn bloom and root and mor lik
th rlation btwn tsunami and butterfluy wings – th numbr of causal stps btwn th on and th
othr is small nough that prhaps w should b lss surprisd whn (by chanc) Nitzsch rsponds to
this influunc by bcoming rmarkably similar to th through lin’s ‘finrst caus.’ Indd, prhaps it should
not surpris anyon at all that th Antinomis – th philosophical artifact which Spinoza did so much to
shap, and which did so much to shap Nitzsch [albit through th lns of Spir] – should srv us so wll
as th masuring-rod by which thir many striking similaritis and irrconcilabl differncs ar brought
so sharply into focus. Theis masuring-rod-lik quality of th Antinomis with rgard to Nitzsch’s and
Spinoza’s rspctiv philosophis is th cor of th ‘antithtic alignmnt’; and th complx intrplay of
‘through lin’ and ‘alignmnt,’ of gnalogy and comparison, of ncssity and coincidnc, is what w
hav bn rfrring to as th ‘Kantian bridg.’ The grat strngth of this bridg is its lganc – which it
drivs from its dscriptiv and historical lmnts all sharing th sam touchston.
Ther ar svral ways in which th Kantian bridg can contribut to th discussion surrounding th
Nitzsch-Spinoza connction, but th primary way is that it allows us to dpn, clarify and unify th
bst accounts of this connction in th litratur. For xampl, Yovl’s account in “Enmy Brothrs” maks
th sam obsrvation ours dos rgarding a shard ddication to “pur mpiricism.” (H rfrs to it as an
adhrnc to “a strict naturalistic monism” [Yovl 2018, p.546] and physical/psychological “uniformism”
[ibid., p548].) W dpn this concpt by conncting it with Grn’s obsrvations on what such a world-
viw ntails [s II-C2], and by locating a historical xplanation for how this similarity cam to b [s
II-C1]. Indd, Yovl obsrvs quit a fw of th sam charactristics in Nitzsch’s thought that w hav
notd – .g. Nitzsch’s rjction of slf-idntity [ibid., p.549], his rjction of objctiv truths [ibid., p.550-
552, 556-559], his qustioning of logic [ibid., p.554-556] – charactristics which h claims (corrctly) dis-
tinguish Nitzsch’s thought from Spinoza’s. Asid from xpanding upon and historically locating ths
obsrvations, w clarify Yovl’s account by mor prcisly catgorizing what maks thm distinct. Yovl
accounts for th differncs in thir positions as two differnt approachs to immannc [ibid., p.540-544].
Our account mor prcisly catgorizs ths approachs to immannc as an ‘A1-antithtic viw’ and a
‘nihilistic-antithtic viw.’66 Finally, our account’s historical lmnts (i.., th ‘antinomial through lin’)
allows us to unify ths insights with th insights of thos who argu that Spinoza had a mor dirct im-
pact on Nitzsch’s philosophical dvlopmnt. 
Many scholars hav notd that Nitzsch ‘discovrd’ Spinoza nar th nd of his middl priod,
immdiatly prior to th invntion of his most notworthy coinags (amor fati, Etrnal Rcurrnc, th
‘will to powr’) [cf. Brobjr 2002, p.77-78, 83, 87; Whitlock 1996, p.201-03]. Whitlock, spcially, argus
convincingly that a carful rading of Nitzsch’s nots indicats that h was attempting to invrt Spin-
oza’s mtaphysics [ibid., p.201, 207, 211]. The ‘antithtic alignmnt’ provids som support to this thory,
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givn that Spinoza’s position aligns with th finrst thr antinomis, and Nitzsch’s with th last thr.
(Theis would b doubly convincing if it could b shown that Nitzsch aligns with th finrst Thesis, givn
that Spinoza aligns with th fourth Thesis). Also, Whitlock nots that Nitzsch was r-rading Spir around
th tim of his most intns ngagmnt with both Boscovich and Fischr’s volum on Spinoza, and that
at tims h rfrs to thm in th sam nots – nots in which h was bginning to dvlop his doctrins of
Etrnal Rcurrnc and th ‘will to powr’ [Whitlock 1996, p.208]. Theis implis that Spir (and, by xtn-
sion, th ‘antinomial through lin’) may hav playd a rol in th birth of Nitzsch’s matur philosophy,
and could hlp us to btter undrstand what xactly his matur philosophy is and how it cam to b. Theis
mans that th ‘Kantian bridg’ may nabl us to collct all aspcts of th Nitzsch-Spinoza connction
(dscriptiv and historical) undr th roof of a singl thory.
If this lad (and othrs lik it) prov to b fruitful, thn what w hav bn rfrring to hr as th
‘Kantian bridg’ may b but a smallr pic of a largr pictur. On which could provid a unifind thory
of Nitzsch’s philosophical gnalogy in rlation to Spinoza. On which could track Nitzsch’s prsonal
dvlopmnt from his youth [Goth, Höldrlin, and Emrson], through his arly priods [Spir, Ré, and
Hin], to th mtamorphosis nar th nd of his middl priod [Fischr’s Spinoza, Spir, and Boscovich],
and byond. On which could mak sns of his smingly contradictory (and oftn undsrvdly harsh)
statmnts about th philosophy and prsonal charactr of his “prcursor.” And vn should all of ths
projcts yild no fruit, thy will still b fruitful in that thy will contribut to an oftn undrapprciatd
aspct of th Nitzsch-Spinoza problm: mthodology.
It has bn claimd by som that “Spinoza was th most important and influuntial modrn philo-
sophr for Nitzsch, xcpting only Schopnhaur” [Brobjr 2008, p.77]. Howvr, whil this claim may
b asy to say (and convincing to har), it is difficcult to prov – and thr sms to b no consnsus on
how w should go about proving it. Many (most famously Yovl) hav gon th rout of dirct philosoph-
ical comparisons btwn Nitzsch and Spinoza. Whil I do bliv this approach can b fruitful, thr
is som truth in Brobjr’s charg that – bcaus Nitzsch nvr actually rad any of Spinoza’s works –
such comparison’s ar “simply irrlvant” [ibid.]. In his own book, Brobjr [2008] analyzs th potntial
influunc of th books w know for a fact Nitzsch did rad. Whil trmndously hlpful, it is lik most
rfrnc books in that it provids a plthora of lads and no clar narrativ of Nitzsch’s dvlopmnt.
The influunc of Brobjr’s work has cratd intrst in finnding just such a narrativ whil at th sam tim
grounding it in books w know Nitzsch was rading. On th whol this is a good thing, yt it may b
too rstrictiv. For th approach sms to assum that th bst (or only) way to influunc a philosophr
is to writ or b citd in a book thy hav rad.
In this ssay w hav attemptd an ntirly differnt approach – a gnalogical approach – which, to
my admittedly incomplt knowldg, has nvr bn rigorously applid to th Nitzsch-Spinoza problm.
W hav groundd, as Brobjr dmands, ach of our historical cas studis in matrials that wr rad (or
at last highly likly to hav bn rad) by th particular individual bing discussd – thus scuring th
mpirical vracity and vrifinability of our claims – whil at th sam tim sarching for a common link
or thrad which can b tracd through all of th individual cass. In this particular instanc, it was th
‘antinomial through lin.’ Hr, Spinoza influuncd Nitzsch not by bing th author of a book h had
rad (or bing citd or discussd or analyzd or critiqud in a book h had rad), but by bing th finrst of
th falling dominos in a chain raction of philosophical inspiration. Spinoza inspird Kant’s Antinomis,
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which inspird Spir’s ‘fundamntal antinomy,’ which inspird Nitzsch’s ‘radical Bcoming.’ In addition
to this gnalogical analysis w applid a comparativ analysis (th ‘antithtic alignmnt’) which, far from
bing “irrlvant” in my viw, dpns and clarifins our undrstanding of both th philosophical ancstor
th dscndants. The comparativ lmnt, although it is not dirctly linkd to any matrials which th
individuals w ar studying hav rad, is still rlvant bcaus thy ar tid to th historical through lin.
W ar using th cntral concpt of our historical though lin (in this cas, th rlation to th Antinomis)
as a lns through which w can intrprt th “ral-world” valu or rlvanc of th historical connction.
Again, to my (admittedly incomplt) knowldg, this kind of two-prong approach has not bn applid
to th Nitzsch-Spinoza problm bfor now. It is my hop that our approach, mor than our answrs,
will b adoptd and dvlopd to crat philosophical gnalogis and comparisons which ar accurat
and illuminating.
NOTES
1) An xcption to this rul is Jonathan Isral, who obsrvd that throughout his pr-critical priod
and th Critiqu of Pur Rason, Kant had bn conducting a “silnt war against Spinoza (somthing mo-
drn Kant spcialists ar oftn curiously blind to)” [Isral 2011, p.707]. Howvr, vn thos who would
agr with Isral hav notd that h dos not sufficcintly substantiat his claim [Bohm 2014, Prfac §7,
p. xxiii]. Anothr, mor substantiv xcption (for our purposs at last), is Omri Bohm – whos work
dals spcifincally with intrprting and dfnding Kant’s critical projct in th light of Spinozism.
2) Nitzsch’s intractions with Kant, in his notbooks as wll as his written works, ar as xtnsiv as
thy ar intricat [Brobjr 2008, p.3, 36-38; cf. Baily 2013, p.134-135]. Brobjr placs Kant on a list of
six thinkrs who wr th most important philosophical influuncs on Nitzsch’s dvlopmnt [Brobjr
2008, p.3]. H xplains that “with th xcption of Schopnhaur and Plato, Kant was th philosophr to
whom Nitzsch rfrrd to most oftn by far” [ibid., p.36]. In his young and arly priods [1844-69 and
1869-75 rspctivly] Nitzsch hld Kant in trmndously high stm; but “aftr that priod h bcam
Nitzsch’s main philosophical nmy” [ibid.]. Equally worth noting ar his commnts on Kant himslf.
In his arly priod, whn h hld Kant in high stm, Nitzsch wrot in a ltter to H. Mushack [Nov.
1866], “Kant, Schopnhaur, and this book by Lang – I do not nd anything ls.” Whras in his lat
priod, his opinion of Kant was th prfct opposit of his arlir stm, and h rfrrd to Kant as “th
worst concpt-crippl thr has vr bn” [Twilight of th Idols, “What th Grmans Lack,” §7]. The lvl
of passion in both sntimnts maks it clar that Kant was vry important to Nitzsch, whthr h was
thinking of him as a frind or as an nmy. (It is also worth noting that Nitzsch’s brak with Kant mor
or lss coincids with th tim of his intllctual crisis and traumatic brak from Wagnr and Schopn-
haur in 1876.)
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3) Nitzsch’s finrst-hand knowldg of Kant appars to hav bn vry slight (prhaps vn narly
nonxistnt). The only original work by Kant that scholars ar confindnt Nitzsch rad is th Kritik dr
Urtilskraft (Critiqu of Judgmnt) – many dny that h rad any of Kant’s works bsids this on. Janz,
howvr, has argud that Nitzsch’s “dialogu with Kant is so strong and so dtaild” that scholars should
b far mor cautious in ruling out th possibility that h rad Kant dirctly. Brobjr provids som vi-
dnc to support Janz’s position – but, h is carful to indicat that this vidnc is gnrally suggstiv,
and that most (if not all) of Nitzsch’s knowldg and quotations of Kant can b potntially xplaind
through his xtnsiv radings of th scondary sourcs alon. [S Brobjr 2008, p.36-39. S also Janz
1993, Part 1, p. 199, 504.]
4) Nitzsch was particularly wll vrsd in No-Kantian philosophy – an intrst, finrst kindld by his
ngagmnt with Schopnhaur, which ignitd a vry passionat priod of rsarch and struggl lasting
about a dcad [Baily 2013, p.135]. (Brobjr obsrvs that “much of Nitzsch’s undrstanding and dis-
cussion of Kant wr don from a Schopnhaurian prspctiv” [Brobjr 2008, p.32], and Nitzsch
“hardly vr vn mntiond Kant without mntioning Schopnhaur” [ibid., p.58].) Ths radings not
only would hav mad Nitzsch fluunt in th undrstanding of Kantian philosophy currnt in his day (if
not a gnuin xprt in th subjct), thy would also hav mad him snsitiv to th challngs of adapt-
ing this undrstanding to th modrn world, spcially th rapid progrss and ascnding status of th
physical scincs [Baily 2013, p.135-136].
5) As Brobjr puts it, “in th scondary litratur, it has bn claimd that Spinoza was th most im-
portant and influuntial modrn philosophr for Nitzsch, xcpting only Schopnhaur. […] Ther is
probably no othr philosophr for whom Nitzsch so xplicitly considrd his prdcssor. Spinoza is also
frquntly mntiond and discussd in Nitzsch’s writings – approximatly on hundrd tims – both
with high prais, such as, for xampl, of him as a ‘gnius of knowldg,’ ‘th purst sag,’ and, with sv-
r criticism, calling his philosophy ‘this masqurad of a sick rclus,’ and labling him as inconsistnt
and naiv. […] And yt […] Nitzsch nvr rad Spinoza!” [Brobjr 2008, p.77]. H thn argus that,
whil it is “almost impossibl to prov or to b crtain that somon has not rad a crtain book or author,”
thr simply is no proof that h vr rad or ownd ownd any of Spinoza’s works [ibid., ch.5, n.82]. (H
was snt a copy of th Ethics in 1785 by on of his favorit book vndors, but h rturnd it [ibid., p.79; cf.
ch.5, n.92].) Most of Nitzsch’s rfrncs to Spinoza’s thought can b tracd back to th scond volum
of Kuno Fischr’s Gschicht dr nurn Philosophi (which was ntirly about Spinoza) [ibid., p.77], thus
w can b confindnt that most of his knowldg cam th svral tims h rad this volum (although h
also ncountrd discussions of Spinoza and Spinozism from numrous othr sourcs throughout his lif-
tim [ibid. 72-82]).
6) S Brobjr 2008, p.58-59. S also Baily 2013, p.136, 141-142; and Grn 2002.
7) Yirmiyahu Yovl is, to my knowldg, th finrst to addrss Nitzsch’s prcption of himslf in rla-
tion to Spinoza [s Yovl 1989/2018]. Howvr, his work is mor of a comparativ analysis of th major
thms in thir rspctiv philosophis than an attempt to analyz Nitzsch’s viw of Spinoza; and sinc
Nitzsch nvr rad Spinoza, th valu of such comparisons is somwhat diminishd, for thy can nvr
scap th charg that thy ar mrly dscribing coincidntal similaritis. (Still, I would not go as far as
Brobjr and say that such comparisons ar “simply irrlvant” [Brobjr 2008, p.77].) A mor dirct ngag-
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mnt with Nitzsch’s vacillating opinion of and frqunt attempts to distanc himslf from Spinoza can
b found in Andras Urs Sommr [s Sommr 2012]; but though his work is oftn vry insightful, on th
whol I fl that h ovr-mphasizs th unfairnss in Nitzsch’s tratmnt of Spinoza, and h is oftn
too quick to claim that Nitzsch is mrly afraid of bing mistakn for or ovrtakn by his famous “pr-
cursor” – tru as that may b to an xtnt – at th xpns of a mor prcptiv rading of Nitzsch’s
motivations. Whil thr ar svral othr intrsting radings which attempt to finnd that mor nuancd
undrstanding [s Wismann 2013], I bliv thr ar crtain ky insights that thir intrprtations ar
missing. First is th on this ssay is built upon: namly, th antinomial through lin. Whn combind
with th obsrvations of thos who hav carfully studid th philosophical and scintifinc matrials Nit-
zsch was rading at th tim of his ngagmnt with Kuno Fischr’s volum on Spinoza [s Whitlock
1996], it producs a broadr pictur – on that hlps to track th dvlopmnt of Nitzsch’s philosophy
as a rvolution with and raction against Spinozism, an attempt to rach gratr hights than vn his
famous prcursor. Scond, th hostility and contrarinss of Nitzsch’s statmnts about Spinoza can in-
dd sm baffeling and undsrvd, and it is crtain that his critiqus of Spinoza oftn miss thir mark –
but, intrprtrs cannot b too quick to assum that h simply misundrstood Spinoza’s position. On th
contrary, I bliv h undrstood th mtaphysical implications of Spinozism only too wll – particularly
rgarding th concpt of “slf-prsrvation,” which inhrntly implis that th ultimat xprssion of
‘powr’ (i.. Spinoza’s God) is to b infinnitly crativ and yt ssntially changlss. (Theis is not to say
that Spinoza is incapabl of xplaining chang in th natural world; I am only arguing that th ssnc
God, th ultimat xprssion of powr, is by Spinoza’s lights infinnitly and trnally th sam.) Nitzsch,
for whom th tru xprssion of ‘powr’ is chang, would hav found Spinoza’s concpt to b mtaphy-
sically intolrabl – an nmy to b dfatd by any mans ncssary.
8) S Not 1.
9) Kant: “To this [transcndntal] idalism is opposd transcndntal ralism, which rgards spac and
tim as somthing givn in thmslvs (indpndnt of our snsibility). The transcndntal ralist
thrfor rprsnts outr apparancs (if thir rality is concdd) as things in thmslvs [Ding an sich
slbst], which would xist indpndntly of us and our snsibility and thus would also b outsid us ac-
cording to pur concpts of th undrstanding” [“Fourth Paralogism,” A369]. (Queotd from Stanford En-
cyclopdia of Philosophy, “Kant’s Transcndntal Idalism,” §1.1)  Bohm summarizs th purpos of th
Antinomis in this way: “The Antinomis ar supposd to show that transcndntal ralism rfuts itslf,
that it gts tangld in contradictions. For that purpos, Kant constructs what h taks to b […] th most
consistnt vrsions of transcndntal ralism, hoping to show that thy confluict with on anothr” [Bohm
2012, p.30].
10) Exampls: “If w tak spac as ral, w accpt Spinoza’s systm” [cf. V-MP/Dohna (AA 28:103)].
“[Spinozism is th] tru conclusion of dogmatic mtaphysics” [Rflu. AA 18:436]. “[I]f spac is takn to b
a thing in itslf, Spinozism is irrfutabl – that is, th parts of th world ar parts of th Dity, spac is
God” [ML2 AA 28:567]. “Theos who tak spac as a thing in itslf or as a proprty of things ar forcd
to b Spinozists, i.., thy tak th world as th mbodimnt of dtrminations from on ncssary sub-
stanc” [V-MP-K3E/Arnoldt AA 29:132]. Cf. KpV AA 5:102.
11) S Not 11.
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12) Kant: “In th assrtions of th antithsis w obsrv a prfct uniformity in mannr of thinking, and
complt unity of maxims, namly a principl of pur mpiricism, applid not only in xplanation of th
apparancs within th world, but also in th solution of th transcndntal idas of th world itslf, in
its totality.” (A465f./B493f.) [Queotd from Bohm 2018, p.499.]
13) Ther ar many rasons why Libniz dos not fint with Kant’s notion of “pur mpiricism,” but for
now w will focus on on (which will discuss mor fully latr). According to Libniz, God and th world
ar sparat and differnt in natur. (Compar to Spinoza, for whom th univrs and God ar On.) By
his lights, only God is truly prfct, and thus only God is truly infinnit. Therfor th univrs cannot b
infinnit, but is mrly indfinnit – maning its bordrs may not b known or knowabl, but thy do not
xtnd infinnitly [Bohm 2018, p.487-488 & fn.28]. (Again compar to Spinoza, for whom God is infinnit,
and thus th Univrs – which is th sam thing as God – is also infinnit.) Theis mans that God and th
Univrs ar, for Libniz, govrnd by differnt principls – and thrfor, Libnizian mtaphysics dos
not mt th stipulation that th ‘uniformity of thinking’ and ‘unity of maxims’ must b applid “not only
in xplanation of th apparancs within th world, but also in th solution of th transcndntal idas
of th world itslf, in its totality” [s Not 12 (my italics)].
14) Bohm is particularly fond of a quot from Brtrand Russll – that  Libniz “fll into Spinozism
whnvr h allowd himslf to b logical,” hnc “in his publishd works […] [h] took car to b illogic-
al” [Bohm 2014, p.71]. It is also worth noting that thr is a history in Grman philosophy of associating
th Libnizians with Spinozism. For xampl, Christian Wolffe was drivn out of his univrsity position
bcaus his nmis accusd his philosophy of bing a backdoor to Spinozism (Wolffe bing a grat cham-
pion of Libnizian philosophy) [Isral 2001, p. 544-52].  Jacobi’s slogan that all philosophy must nd in
Spinozism and fatalism – adoptd from Lssing’s rportd rmark that “thr is no philosophy othr
than Spinoza’s” [cf. Lord 2011, p.21] – sms to tak a mor xtrm vrsion of this position: that vry
rationalist projct invitably succumbs to Spinozism. Kant, as w will show latr, sms to hav agrd
with Jacobi’s mor xtrm viw to a crtain xtnt.
15) Kant: “I do not s how thos who insist on rgarding tim and spac as dtrminations blonging
to th xistnc of things in thmslvs [.g., Libniz, Wolffe, Mndlssohn – O. B] would avoid fatalism
of actions; or if (lik th othrwis acut Mndlssohn) thy fluatly allow both of thm [tim and spac] to
b conditions ncssarily blonging only to th xistnc of finnit and drivd bings but not that of th
infinnit and original bing – I do not s how thy would justify thmslvs in making such a distinction,
whnc thy gt a warrant to do so, or vn how thy would avoid th contradiction thy ncountr whn
thy rgard xistnc in tim as a dtrmination atteaching ncssarily to finnit things thmslvs, whil
God is said to b th caus of this xistnc but cannot b th caus of tim (or spac) itslf.” (KpV AA
5:102) [Queotd from Bohm 2014, p.82-83; Kant’s Critiqu of Spinoza.] According to Bohm, “Kant’s point
is that if on is committed to viwing spac and tim as divin atteributs, on is committed to viwing
thm as infinnit and trnal. Hnc Libniz’s dnial of Spinozism, rlying on th indfinnit altrnativ [of
th infinnit/indfinnit distinction (Not 25)], holds only by dnying th claim that spac and tim, which
ar proprtis of things, ar also atteributs of God. Kant dismisss this dnial as arbitrary and inconsistnt”
[ibid., p.83].
16) The “infinnity” and “trnity” of th world ar crucial lmnts of Spinoza’s mtaphysics.
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17) “Not also th trm Schöpfungsthori (‘cration thory’),” Bohm says. Both Libniz and Wolffe,
bing Christian thinkrs, ndorsd cratio x nihilo – that God cratd th univrs out of nothing. Theus,
by using th trm ‘cration thory,’ Kant is also rfrring to th Libnizian-Wolffican thoris. By claiming
that Spinozism is mor consistnt than cration thoris – so long as thy adopt th Libnizian viw that
“outr apparancs […] xist indpndntly of us and our snsibility” [Not 9], as th “ffects of a suprm
caus” but nvr as a ‘part’ of it (KpV AA 5:102) – it rinforcs Bohm’s argumnt that Kant was of th
mind that Libnizian thinkrs wr aping agrmnt with Christian doctrin out of “shrwdnss” rathr
than “sincrity” – that an honst unpacking of thir position commits thm to som form of Spinozism
[Bohm 2014, p.84-85]. 
18) Queotd from Bohm 2014, p.76-77, Kant’s Critiqu of Spinoza.
19) S Himsoth, “Zitlich Wltunndlichkit und das Problm ds Anfangs,” p.286.
20) It should b notd that this is th sam argumnt that was usd by Wolffe and Mndlssohn to rfut
Spinozism, not ralizing that Spinoza dos not admit th xistnc of “parts” in his mtaphysics.
21) Kant argus lswhr that thr ar som argumnts that mak sns in mathmatics but not in
mtaphysics and vic vrsa. For xampl, Kant argus in th finrst Antinomy that whil th whol-part ax-
iom is an mpty ‘Subtilität’ whr mathmatics is concrnd, it is vitally important to mtaphysics (A511-
5/B369-43). On th othr hand, Kant argus whr mtaphysics is concrnd, “th mathmatician can by
his mthod build only so many houss of cards” (A727-38/B755-66). (Theis is most likly a vild swip at
Spinoza’s Ethics [Bohm 2018, p.484-85].) So for anyon who has vr hard of Hilbrt’s Hotl and bris-
tld, muttering that an “infinnit hotl” could nvr b “full,” know that Kant agrs with you; at last whr
mtaphysics is concrnd.
22) PSR (Principl of Sufficcint Rason): th blif that absolutly vrything that is or occurs must hav
a rason, caus, or ground for its xistnc (i.. a ‘sufficcint rason’ for bing). A cntral fatur of trans-
cndntal ralism.
23) Nwton’s concption of ‘mpty containrs’ is th ida that tim xistd prior to th cration of th
world, and that spac xists byond it [Bohm 2014, p.73; cf. Kant A430/B458-63].
24) I.., Al Azm’s The Origins of Kant’s Argumnts in th Antinomis.
25) Bohm: “The indfinnit: concivd as th ngation of th finnit. Theis concption consists in th
uncasing potntial to add, for any givn magnitud, an additional unit. Theis concption thrfor has
no actual siz and is not a concption of an actual infinnit masur. The infinnit: concivd as an actual
infinnity, th absolut, or th biggst possibl actual masur” [Bohm 2014, p.75 (my italics)].
26) Bohm 2014, p.74; ch.2, n.15. Cf. Libniz, Nw Essays, p.151.
27) Libniz: “It would b a mistak to try to suppos an absolut spac which is an infinnit whol mad up
of parts. Ther is no such thing: it is a notion which implis a contradiction. […] [T]h tru infinnit,
strictly spaking, is only in th absolut [God], which prcds all composition” (Nw Essays, p.157f.).
[Queotd from Bohm 2014, p.74].
28) As an xampl, Bohm cits W. Walsh’s Kant’s Criticism of Mtaphysics, also M. Grir’s Kant’s
Doctrin of Transcndntal Illusion [Bohm 2014, ch.2, n.8].
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29) W will b skipping ovr th scond Antinomy bcaus (as far as I know) Bohm has not yt covrd
it. Howvr, it is asy to s how Spinozism could fint as natly into th scond’s Antithsis as it dos into
th finrst and third. The scond’s Antithsis position argus, against th atomistic Thesis, thr ar no
composit bings composd out simpl parts bcaus thr ar no ‘simpl’ bings anywhr. Theis can as-
ily b construd as a Spinozist position. Spinoza himslf dnis th xistnc of “parts” – thr is only th
On (i.. God, or substanc), and vry “individual bing,” or “part” of this substanc is mrly a modif-
ication of th On. In a sns, all of rality is ‘simpl’ by his lights. Howvr, this cannot b th way that
Kant concivd of th scond’s Antithsis, bcaus – as w hav alrady notd – Kant did not considr th
possibility that Spinozism may b concivd as bing dvoid of “parts.” Theis is th rason th Antinomis
fail to undrmin Spinoza’s position whn proprly construd. 
30) Bohm obsrvs that Kant’s argumnt rgarding tim can b applid “almost intrchangably” to
spac [Bohm 2014, ch.2, n.11].
31) Anothr factor to bar in mind, which w do not hav spac to addrss, is th insidious influunc of
antismitism in th raction against Spinozism. In his articl on th rlationship btwn Spinoza and
Hgl, Paul Franks dmonstrat that th confluunc of antismitic historians (who had bn attempting to
prov that Jws wr actually Orintals and not tru Europans) and th ‘discovry’ of Kabbalah by th
Latin spaking world ld to a pculiar strain of Spinoza-criticism. In it, an attempt was mad to xplain
Spinoza’s philosophy and “solv th conundrum of Spinoza’s Jwishnss” (for it was assumd that th two
must b linkd) by intrprting him as a sort of Kabbalist [Franks 2018, p.513.]. “It was argud in partic-
ular,” Franks continus, “that both Spinoza and th Kabbalah wr committed to th principl that ‘nothing
coms from nothing,’ rjcting th orthodox Judo-Christian viw of cratio x nihilo” [ibid., p.514]. Out
of this rading grw an intrprtiv tradition which continud to b dvlopd and drawn from wll into
Kant’s tim [ibid.] – most notably by Jacobi, for whom th linchpin of his undrstanding of Spinoza was
th “nothing coms from nothing” principl. Many yars latr, Jacobi’s xplication of this undrstanding,
and particularly th attention h drw to th formula “dtrmination is ngation,” would bcom cntral
to Hgl’s critiqu of Spinoza as wll [ibid., p.521-522]. In kping with this antismitic, Orintal-Jwish
connction, it should b notd th vnt which triggrd th Spinoza-cntrd campaign against Wolffe
was a lctur h gav in 1721 on th ‘Practical Philosophy of th Chins’ [Isral 2001, p.544]. As h ul-
ogizd ancint Chins philosophy, Wolffe mad th mistak of comparing som aspcts of Confucian
philosophy to his own tachings, “whil simultanously admitteing th athistic tndncis in Chins
thought” [ibid.]. Bfor th 1721 lctur, Wolffe’s nmis had alrady dcidd for thmslvs that Wolffe’s
doctrin was committed to th “absolut ncssity of things” and “apt to fomnt athism” – both of which
wr frquntly associatd with Spinozism. Aftr th lctur, thy dcidd it was tim to mak thir mov
against Wolffe; and whn thy did, thy drw upon th commonly prcivd similaritis btwn Spino-
zism and classical Chins thought (a connction finrst notd in Bayl’s Dictionnair) in ordr to dnigrat
Wolffe as a crypto-Spinozist [ibid., 544-545].
32) According to Bohm, Jacobi snt Hamann a copy of his book, Übr di Lhr ds Spinoza (th vry
book that ignitd th Strit), and thn askd him to dlivr it to Kant. “In th book, Jacobi accuss not only
Lssing but also Kant of Spinozism, writing, for xampl, that Kant’s discussion of spac in th Critiqu of
Pur Rason was written ‘ganz im Gist ds Spinoza’ – fully in Spinoza’s spirit.” [Bohm 2018, p.484].
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Jacobi would walk back ths commnts in th scond dition of his book, saying “that th Kantian philo-
sophy is not accusd of Spinozism, on nd not say to any snsibl prson” [quotd from Franks, All or
Nothing, p.91; cf. Lord 2011, p.62], but not bfor Kant was forcd to rspond to th thrat of bing impli-
catd in Spinozism finrst.
33) In a ltter to Jacobi, Kant wrot that “contrary to [his] inclination,” h “was rqustd by various
popl to clans [himslf] of th suspicion of Spinozism” [Kant to Jacobi, 30 August 1789, C 11:76–7].
Theough it possibl that Kant’s prais of Jacobi’s critiqu of Spinozism was sincr (to an xtnt) [ibid.,
11:75-6; cf. Lord 2011, p.61-64] – and it is crtain that Kant blivd Spinozism to b dply mistakn [cf.
Bohm 2018, p.501] – his dsir to “clans” himslf of Spinozism rflucts his warinss of th potntially
damning political implications of proximity to Spinoza. 
34) Dspit his own Christian faith, Goth – a dyd-in-th-wool Spinozist – would affectionatly rfr to
Spinoza as “th athist.” For xampl, in a ltter to Jacobi (May 5th, 1786), Goth writs, “I hold mor and
mor finrmly to th athist’s [i.. Spinoza’s] rvrnc for God.” [WA, iv, VII, 214] 
35) According to Richard Popkin, Bayl was “an xprt at dscribing and criticizing philosophical and
thological thoris,” and that his Dictionnair Historiqu t Critiqu (a widly rnownd biographical
dictionary which also critiqud rligious and philosophical positions) was “a monumnt to th dialctical
skills of Bayl. The on articl in which this sms to fall apart is that of Spinoza. Each tim, in this long
articl in which Bayl attempts to dscrib Spinoza’s viw, h quickly bcoms incohrnt. Theis happnd
so much that popl told Bayl that h did not undrstand Spinoza's thory and that h should gt som-
body to xplain it to him. In th scond dition of th Dictionnair in 1702, Bayl dscribs sitteing down
with a discipl of Spinoza and going ovr th txt of th Ethics lin by lin. Then, whn Bayl cam to
xplicat it, th sam thing happnd – Spinoza’s thory bcam incohrnt. Theis is, in fact, Bayl’s criti-
cism, that thr is no way of stating athism cohrntly. H uss his dialctical skill to dmonstrat this
ovr and ovr again.” [Popkin 2004, p.117]
36)  S A727-38/B755-66 [cf. Bohm 2018, p.484].
37) According to Aaron Garrtte, Spinoza wrot thr gomtrical works [Garrtte 2018, p.18]. Ethics,
Spinoza’s magnum opus, is famous for its us of th gomtrical mthod. It was written in gomtrical
form from start to finnish – as was his arlir work, Dscarts’ Principls of Philosophy. Spinoza’s Political
Tratis was not; howvr, Garrtte taks it as a “broadly gomtrical” work on account of TP 1.4, “whr
Spinoza assrts that h will dduc from human natur in ‘th sam unftterd spirit as is habitually shown
in mathmatical studis’” [ibid., p.18, fn.1].
38) Hinrich Hin was on of th grat ulogizrs of Spinoza and Spinoza’s influunc in Grmany. H
said of Spinoza, “Ther is a pculiar, indscribabl fragranc about th writings of Spinoza. W sm to
brak in thm th air of th futur” [Rligion and Philosophy, p.68]. H crdits Spinoza’s works with th
transformation of Grmany into “th frtil soil of panthism,” which had bcom “th rligion of our
gratst thinkrs, of our bst artists” [ibid., p.79]. Howvr, lik Kant h did not think highly of Spinoza’s
mathmatical bnt: “W also finnd in Spinoza, as in Dscarts, a mod of dmonstration borrowd from
mathmatics: this is a grivous fault” [ibid., p.68]. It was on account of this “grivous fault” that Hin
praisd Goth as “th Spinoza of potry,” proclaiming that “The doctrin of Spinoza has scapd from its
NOTES: [39-44]     57
chrysalid mathmatical form, and fluutters about us as a lyric of Goth” [ibid., p.137]. (Goldstin 2018, p.
638-639.)
39) For rfrnc: Kant was born in 1724; th Critiqu of Pur Rason was originally publishd in 1781;
th Strit lastd btwn 1785 and 1789.
40) Bohm: “Hnry Allison writs, ‘[Kant’s] prim concrn was to avoid th Spinozistic implications of
th idntifincation of God with th sum total of rality’ […]. Paul Franks similarly writs, ‘it is tru that
Kant talks at finrst of th omnitudo ralitatis as if it wr idntical with th ns ralissimum, which might
suggst a Spinozist construal. But Kant xplicitly rviss his formulation, indicating that th omnitudo
ralitatis is groundd in God, so that God is not to b idntifind with th sum-total of all rality’” [Bohm
2012, p.42; cf. A578f./B606f.].
41) Bohm gos on to point out that “this is somthing that Kant himslf ss and insists upon whn
writing about Spinoza” [Bohm 2012, p.42]. In on passag, Kant compars and contrasts Spinozism with
Panthism in this way: “Panthism still has Spinozism as a spcial kind […] [For] Panthism is ithr on
of inhrnc, and this is Spinozism, or on of th aggrgats […] Spinoza says: th world is inhring in
God as accidnts, and so worldly substancs ar his consquncs, and in itslf xists only on substanc
[…] In Spinozism God is th ground of vrything that is in th world. In Panthism h is an aggrgat of
vrything that is in th world”  (AA 28:794–795) [Bohm’s translation and mphasis; 2012, p.43]. 
42) Ther ar two ways to A1’s unconditiond: ithr in a) th Panthistic way (i.. as th aggrgat of all
things), or b) th Spinozistic way (i.. as th ground within which all things inhr) [s Not 40]. Both, by
dfinnition, must contain th ntir cosmological sris as a whol. Howvr, as Kant says himslf, “th
suprm rality must condition th possibility of all things as thir ground, not as thir sum” (A578f./B606f.).
Therfor, th Panthistic way is concptually insufficcint to truly conciv of A1’s unconditiond, which
must srv as th ground of all possibility for its cosmological sris – it is not nough to mrly contain
it. Theus th only option lft is th Spinozistic way – that is, conciving A1’s unconditiond as a bing that
is both immannt in and ontologically prior to th cosmological sris which it grounds.
43) Kant: “The concptus originarius of Bing in gnral, which is supposd to b th ground of all con-
cpts of things, is a concpt of th ns ralissimum. All concpts of ngations ar drivativ, and so w
must finrst hav ral concpts if w want to hav ngativ ons. The mbodimnt [Inbgriffe ] of all ralitis
is considrd also as th stock [Magazin] from which w tak all th matter for th concpts of all bings.
Philosophrs nam “vil” th formal, and “good” th matrial. Theis formal can man only th limitation
[Einschrankung] of all rality, through which things [Ding] with ralitis and ngations, i.. finnit things
ar producd. All differnc btwn things is thus a differnc of form … All concptus of ntia limitata
ar concptus drivativi and th concptus originarius for our rason is that of an ns ralissimum. If I
dduc th xistnc of an ns ralissimum from its concpt, this is th way to Spinozism” (AA 28:785-
786) [Bohm’s translation and mphasis; Bohm 2012, p.43]. As for th rason why Spinoza would dduc
th xistnc of th ralissimum from its concpt, Spinoza was influuncd by th ontological argumnt for
th xistnc of God, from which his own philosophy follows as an spcially laborat xampl [Scruton
1986/2002, p.38-39, 45-48].
44) Of cours th trm nihilism had not yt bn coind by th tim th finrst Critiqu was publishd.
Theat would not b until th Strit, whn Jacobi raisd th alarm about Spinozism bing th ultimat nd
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of all philosophy, and nihilism bing th ultimat nd of Spinozism [Bohm 2014, Prf. §1; cf. Lord 2011,
p.21]. “His critiqu of Spinoza,” B. Lord writs, “rprsnts a critiqu of philosophy as such. […] Jacobi’s
purpos in writing th dialogu is not to atteack Spinozism, which h taks to b th paragon of philoso-
phical consistncy. Rathr, it is to criticiz all philosophy groundd on rason on th basis that it, lik
Spinozism as its most consistnt xampl, falls invitably into athism and fatalism” [ibid.]. Basd on what
w hav said so far, it sms clar that thr is a fair amount of agrmnt btwn Jacobi’s stanc and
Kant’s. Kant agrs with Jacobi not only with rgard to Spinoza’s suprior consistncy (and that all trans-
cndntal ralists invitably collaps into it), but also (to som dgr) with Jacobi’s prmonition of nihil-
ism as a rsult of transcndntal ralism. The concit bhind Kant’s Antinomis is that ach of th anti-
nomial positions (Thesis and Antithsis) rprsnts an actual transcndntal ralist position; and as such,
th fourth Antithsis – which rjcts th xistnc of any ultimat rason, caus, or ground (an absolutly
nihilistic position) – must b thought of as a lgitimat transcndntal ralist position. Rcall now that
both A1 and A2, th gnrators of th finrst thr Antinomis, ar housd undr th fourth’s Antinomis
Thesis, which collapss in th fac of th nihilistic Antithsis – implying that nithr has th powr to
rsist nihilism without collapsing in Kant’s opinion. Although th similarity btwn Kant and Jacobi’s
positions should not b ovrstatd, it sms saf to say that by th finrst Critiqu, Kant was alrady onto
Jacobi’s lin of argumnt rgarding nihilism – h simply faild to nam it.
45) Theis is not trribly surprising, if on rcalls th numrous tims that Kant – th singl gratst in-
fluunc on Spir’s thinking – associatd Spinozism with th Idal of Pur Rason, th ns ralissimum, and
with any thinkr who took tim/spac to b a thing-in-itslf. If Spir had rad Kant’s works byond th finrst
Critiqu, h would hav bn xposd to an incrasing numbr of argumnts that transcndntal ralists
ar forcd b conciv of Bing along th lins of Spinozistic substanc. Furthrmor, Spinoza was a dirct
influunc on Spir’s thinking as wll [Brobjr 2008, p.71].
46) It is, in fact, a matter of contntion as to whthr or not Spinoza’s mtaphysics can b couchd in
trms of “laws,” scintifinc or othrwis [s Schlissr 2018].
47) BGE, “On th Prjudics of Philosophrs,” 15, 21. Cf. TI, “‘Rason’ in Philosophy,” §4.
48) Goth. “Doubt and Rsignation” (“Bdnkn und Ergbung”). Morphologisch Hft, 2nd volum.
(Queotd from Eckart Förstr’s “Goth’s Spinozism,” in Spinoza and Grman Idalism.) Goth was also
concrnd with th mtaphysical natur of causality, and how his mpirical, scintifinc studis wr to b
undrstood in rlation to his Spinozistic convictions. H laborats th problm in a fascinating passag:
“Theis difficculty of uniting ida and xprinc prsnts obstacls in all scintifinc rsarch: th ida is ind-
pndnt of spac and tim whil scintifinc rsarch is bound by spac and tim. In th ida, thn, simul-
tanous lmnts ar closly bound up with squntial ons, but our xprinc always shows thm to b
sparat; w ar smingly plungd into madnss by a natural procss which must b concivd of in [th]
ida as both simultanous and squntial” (Goth, Scintifinc Studis, p.33) [ibid.].
49) The titl for this subsction is takn from th titls of its two primary sourcs: Tom Baily’s articl
“Nitzsch th Kantian?” [Baily 2013], and Theomas Brobjr’s book Nitzsch’s Philosophical Contxt
[Brobjr 2008].
50) Nitzsch’s discovry of Schopnhaur at twnty-on “was followd by a priod of xtnsiv rad-
ings in No-Kantianism, lasting som tn yars or so” [Baily 2013, p.135]. (S Nots 2, 4 & 5.) It was
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from authors such as Spir, Lang, Zöllnr, Übrwg, Otteo Libmann, Hinrich Romundt, Kuno Fischr, and
Eduard von Hartmann that Nitzsch formd his imag of Kant [Brobjr 2008, p.36, 58; cf. Baily 2013,
p.136]. Morovr, ths No-Kantians wr “among thos whos writings taught him about philosophy
and how to philosophiz (and how not to do it)” [Brobjr 2008, p.3]. 
51) Tabl 3: Alphabtical Listing of Nitzsch’s Philosophical Rading [Brobjr 2008, p.243-258]. S
also Grn 2002, p.46; and Schlchta/Andrs 1962, p.122.
52) Brobjr: “Nitzsch’s ovrall intllctual dvlopmnt is dividd into four priods: [1] young (1844-
69), [2] arly (1869-75), [3] middl (1875-82), and [4] lat (1883-88). Theis is th convntional division that
Nitzsch himslf usd and for which thr ar many good rasons […]. Howvr, […] othr divisions ar
possibl. The argumnt could b mad, with som justifincation, that in almost all ssntials, Nitzsch’s
thinking was consistnt throughout his dvlopmnt, with no major changs. Anothr mor rasonabl
viw is th claim that Nitzsch, du primarily to th influunc of Schopnhaur and Wagnr, had a mark-
d promtaphysical priod during 1869-75 [2], which h brok with fairly radically during 1875-76 [3a];
that Human, All Too Human, 3 vols. (1878-80) [3b] constitutd a raction and ovrraction to his finrst
position; and that it is with Dawn (1881) [3c] that w can s th mrgnc of his own distinct philoso-
phical positions, which h thn furthr dvlopd [in Gay Scinc (1882) {3d}, and finnally in Zarathustra
(1883-85) onward {4}].” [Brobjr 2008, p.5].
53) For rfrnc: “[…]
 1900:  Nitzsch dis in Wimar on August 25. […]
 1901: [Nitzsch’s] sistr publishs som 400 of his nots, many alrady fully utilizd by him, in Volum
XV of th collctd works undr th titl Dr Will zur Macht. […]
 1904: [Nitzsch’s] sistr intgrats 200 pags of furthr matrial ‘from The Will to Powr ’ in th last
volum of hr biography, Das Lbn Fridrich Nitzschs. A compltly rmodld vrsion of The 
Will to Powr, consisting of 1067 nots, appars in a subsqunt dition of th works in Volums 
XV (1910) and XVI (1911).” [Kaufmann 1954, Chronology, p.23].
54) Grn xplains this by asking us to think of a maninglss word lik “frob,” around which “on has
dvlopd crtain associativ tndncis” [Grn 2002, pg.56]. Bcaus thr is no such thing as a “frob,”
thr is nothing wrong with afficrming th xistnc of “frobs” and dnying thir xistnc at th sam
tim [ibid.]. If on dnis th xistnc of absolutly ral or discrt “things,” as Nitzsch dos (and, to som
dgr, Spinoza dos as wll), thn in a sns all “objcts” of mpirical judgmnt ar som sort of “frob.”
55) It is worth noting that Nitzsch frquntly maks a point of rjcting th ‘I,’ ‘dors,’ atoms, Bing,
substanc, and ‘fr will,’ all at th sam tim [GM, “First Essay,” §13]. H likns th dsir to locat an
‘I’ bhind a ‘thought,’ a ‘dor’ bhind a ‘dd,’ a ‘substanc’ bnath phnomna, or a Bing bnath B-
coming, to a misguidd attempt to sparat “th lightning from its fluash.” For “thr is no ‘bing’ bhind
doing, ffecting, bcoming; ‘th dor’ is mrly a finction addd to th dd” [ibid.].
56) Grn likns this problm to th problm Kant has in xplaining vil – “that is, th problm of why
rsponsibl action is not always moral action” [Grn 2002, p.69]. H furthr nots, “in a suggstiv pas-
sag, Nitzsch links th two problms […] (WP 579). Error and guilt ar dviations from bing. The qus-
tion for blivrs in bing, such and Kant and Spir is: How is it that somthing is in its ssnc bing wills
its own dviation from bing? How it is possibl?” [ibid.]
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57) William Ramsy wrot a vry intrsting articl on this topic in rspons to Plantinga’s critiqus of
philosophical naturalism [“Naturalism Dfndd,” Ramsy 2002]. The main thrust of th articl is that it is
vry difficcult to convincingly argu that “rror” could prov to b consistntly mor advantagous than
prcptual/concptual accuracy, from an volutionary prspctiv. Theis is th kind of argumnt Nitzsch
must b abl to rspond to, if h wants to claim that th univrs must produc minds that falsify rality.
In fact, Nitzsch oftn dscribs our spcis’ volution as a compounding sris of advantagous rrors
(GS 110).
58) S HA 16; KSA 9:6[441]; WP 555. [Cf. Grn 2002, p.72].
59) Cf. Spir 1877, 1:266-67, 2:92-94, 2:112-13; 1873, 2:81-82, 2:97-98, 2:111-12; 1869, 165-67.
60) Cf. KSA 9, 11[213 & 269 & 305]; 10, 24[18]; 11, 36[15]. Cf. FW 109.
61) It should also b notd that Nitzsch’s rjction of th atom is usually givn for psychological
rasons – dspit th fact that h has a working mtaphysical rason to rjct it as wll [BGE, “On The
Prjudics of Philosophrs,” §2, 12, 17].
62) In fact, thy sm to agr on anothr intriguing point: to th xtnt that w conciv of finnit ob-
jcts, dtrminat points in spac, or mpirical objcts in gnral – w falsify rality.
63) “…in favor of thir bing xhaustd by th rlations btwn objcts (th Libnizian or antithsis
position…” [Grn 2002, p.64]
64) As David Bll puts it, “Goth’s us of monadistic trminology in such contxts dos not prmit us
to conclud that h shars th mtaphysical implications of th monadistic thory, any mor than his us
of th trm ‘ntlchy’ allows us to call him Aristotlian. Indd, othr utterancs about th monad
rval a concption vry differnt from th hrmtic ntity postulatd by Libniz; lik Hrdr, h could
not accpt that such monads could not intract with thir nvironmnt (s Maximn und Rfluxionn,
Nos. 391, 392, p. 76). Evn in ‘Vrmächtniß’ th third lin, njoining adhrnc to ‘Bing,’ sms out of
plac among th othr wis Libnizian idas, and rcalls instad th monism of Spinoza” [Bll 1984, p.
160].
65) Theis work is on part of a gratr projct: to trac th various subtrranan paths of Spinoza’s
lgacis and how thy hav manifstd thmslvs in Nitzsch’s dvlopmnt. In an upcoming work, an
attempt will b mad to dmonstrat that Kant’s concption of th Intuition was rintrprtd by th Ro-
mantics in light of Spinoza’s 3rd Kind of Knowldg. Theis cam to b b vry influuntial not only for th
Europan Romantics but also for Amrican philosophrs, particularly Ralph Waldo Emrson, who thn
had a trmndous impact on Nitzsch – particularly his prfrnc for intuition abov logic, as xprssd
by his hroic, intuitiv ‘fr spirits’ who hat to dduc whr thy can guss [Ecc Homo, “Why I Writ
Such Good Books,” §3].
66) My main point of differnc with Yovl is his us of th word ‘immannc.’ By his usag, that trm
rfrs to “th ngation of all transcndnc” by a dsir to mbrac this world, th “immannt world” – a
world which “constituts th ovrall horizon of bing and th sol possibl sourc of valu,” and yt is “d-
void of an innr or outr purpos” [Yovl 2018, p.540]. Whil I agr that both Nitzsch and Spinoza ar
committed to such a principl, I disagr that this is an ntirly sufficcint dfinnition of ‘immannc.’ In my
viw, ‘immannc’ also rfrs to th concpt of ‘Bing’ – .g. th unconditiond which must b ‘immannt’
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to th sris which it grounds. Whn w us th trm ‘immannc’ in this sns, as I do, Nitzsch must
rjct it. Theis is part of th rason I think it mor usful to catgoriz th differncs btwn Nitzsch
and Spinoza as on of th two typs of ‘antithtic viws,’ rathr than (as Yovl dos) differnt approachs
to ‘immannc.’ (Not: both typs of th ‘antithtic viw’ – A1 and nihilistic – fint with Yovl’s us of th
trm ‘immannc.’) For an intrsting xploration of th trm ‘immannc’ as it rlats to both Nitzsch
and Spinoza (which xamins and in som ways challngs Yovl’s usag of th trm), s Andras Urs
Sommr’s 2017 papr, “Nitzsch: An Immanntist?”
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TP           Political Tratis (Tractatus Politicus)
TTP        Theological Political Tratis (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus)
       E             Ethics
       ^ Naming Convntion: [Ethics][book#][Elmnt][lmnt#][Sub-Elmnt][sub-lmnt#]. 
 Exampl: E1p8n1 = [Ethics][Book 1][proposition][8][not][1]
 Othr Abbrv.: app = “appndix”; c = “corollary”; a = “axiom”; d = “dfinnition”; prf = “prfac”; lm = “lmma”
Kant:
All quotations from Kant’s works ar from th Akadmi Ausgab. The finrst Critiqu is citd by th 
standard A/B dition pagination, and othr works by standard siglum AA vol:pag. Gsammlt 
Schriftn Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Prussich Akadmia dr Wissnschaftn, Bd. Dutsch Akadmi dr 
Wissnschaftn zu Brlin, ab Bd. 24 Akadmi dr Wissnschaftn zu Götteingn. Brlin 1900ffe.
Unlss othrwis notd, English translations from th Critiqu ar takn from N. Kmp-Smith’s trans-
lation, Critiqu of Pur Rason (Nw York: Palgrav Macmillan, 2003).
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